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CHAPTER 1 7 
VOTING TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE QUEST FOR TRUSTWORTHY 
ELECTIONS 
CANDICE HOKE 
Over three decades after voting systems first incorporated software and computer 
chips,1 and almost a decade after federal legislation impelled nationwide adoption 
of electronic computer-based voting equipment,2 significant performance deficien-
cies undermine voters' and electoral officials' confidence in the reliability and accu-
racy of voting equipment. This conclusion may seem inexplicable given some notable 
achievements in the voting systems regulatory system. A relatively robust federal 
testing and certification apparatus has been created to subject voting systems to pre-
market technical evaluation; 3 heightened standards and rigorous testing procedures 
for reliability, accuracy, and other essential attributes of the voting systems have 
been implemented.4 Further, rates of voter error as measured against established 
metrics have sharply diminished, presumptively attributable to the federally required 
notice to the voter and an opportunity to correct the ballot before casting it. 5 
Nevertheless, more than 98 percent of Americans voting on 2012 election days 
will cast ballots on precinct e-voting machinery that has not been federally tested 
and certified in compliance with the 2005 standards.6 Additionally, 2012 absentee 
ballots will similarly be tabulated on equipment that pre-dates the federal certifi-
cation standards and testing system, although most absentee ballots will at least 
produce a voter created record that can be recounted or audited.7 While federally 
certified voting systems have been marketed since 2009, 8 state governments lack the 
funding to upgrade their voting systems. 
If the federal certification of these aging voting systems were merely perfunc-
tory, providing a gloss but little more, the certification omission would arguably 
be acceptable. Unfortunately, nationally prominent independent computer experts 
have repeatedly documented that all but a tiny fraction of the equipment currently 
deployed manifests grave design, performance, and security issues that can produce 
inaccurate vote totals.9 They have cautioned that the software's design and coding 
deficiencies combined with vendors' noncompliance with good industrial prac-
tices mean that no scientific basis exists for trusting the election results the equip-
ment produces.10 Additional quality assurances techniques are needed to verify the 
machine results, but few jurisdictions have mandated these steps . 
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Problems surfacing in actual elections tend to prove that the scientists' assess-
ments are not merely theoretical projections.11 Yet the vast number of ballots in 
2012 and into the foreseeable future will be cast and tabulated on this gravely 
flawed voting equipment.12 
When Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA),13 creating 
the bipartisan U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) charged with improving 
election administration and enunciating minimum standards for voting systems 
used in federal elections,14 undoubtedly legislators expected substantial improve-
ments over the punch card technologies that had caused the Bush v. Gore debacle. 
But the EAC faltered repeatedly during its first decade, from both misjudgments and 
calculated attacks.15 As this chapter goes to press, the EAC's existence remains in 
question despite its assigned statutory role in voting technology regulation.16 With 
the EAC's future and the federal role in regulating election technologies threatened,17 
this chapter seeks to provide an impartial examination of the legal, scientific, and 
regulatory structural issues embedded in the widespread use of problematic voting 
technologies. 
This chapter reviews four dimensions of the still-unresolved voting technology 
quandary. It begins by briefly reviewing the Florida Bush v. Gore background that, 
combined with the tradition of state governmental control over election adminis-
tration, spawned the contours and limitations of new federal regulatory apparatus. 
It also surveys some illustrative voting system malfunctions and their consequences 
surfacing predominantly from 2009-12. Thus, the first part of this chapter, Back-
ground: Performance Records of Deployed E-Voting Systems, commences where the 
2009 edition of America Votes! chapter on voting technology ended.18 
The second part of this chapter, Federal Compulsion to Adopt Software-Based Vot-
ing Technologies, explains the misconceptions about software and digital equipment 
that led to both the flawed federal mandates and the ineffectual regulatory struc-
ture.19 These misconceptions continue to inhibit creation of a regulatory structure 
and substantive requirements that function effectively to protect the voting tech-
nology component of the fundamental right to vote. This part argues for a more 
robust and technically well-informed federal-state partnership in regulating voting 
technologies and their use. 
The third part of this chapter, Litigation and Enforcement Strategies , focuses pri-
marily on the curious omission of Federal enforcement of HAVA's voting technology 
standards. HAVA expressly vests enforcement powers in the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice. 20 This part also considers private party litigation that has sought to invalidate 
the use of allegedly defective voting machines. 
The final part of this chapter examines Federal Promotion of Problematic Inter-
net Voting. Despite the essentially unanimous warnings of the computer security 
community in the United States that Internet voting cannot achieve accurate vote 
counts or permit a trustworthy recount, some federal policy makers have pursued 
online voting. Because these systems cannot be secured by any known or foreseeable 
technology, they present the grave danger that remote cyber attackers could silently 
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change the outcomes of Internet elections without officials able to detect any prob-
lem. While some state and local governments appear to have learned that a skepti-
cal approach to vendors' overwrought marketing literature and field performance 
may be warranted, an obscure federal agency has been falsely contending that the 
U.S. Department of Defense has backed Internet voting. The Federal Voting Assis-
tance Program (FVAP) has developed both carrot and stick approaches to urge states 
to modify their election laws to permit online return of voted ballots for overseas 
military and civilian voters. This section also examines the agency's claims that its 
actions fulfill rather than violate federal law. 
The chapter concludes by advancing recommendations for preparing the legal 
system to realize voting rights despite the wide deployment of problematic voting 
technologies. Once we accept that the existing equipment is finicky rather than 
reliable, and that it is subject to tampering and tabulation disruption that may be 
undetectable without special skills and procedures, what should follow for the legal 
system? The legal presumptions thus far tend to assume accuracy of election totals 
and place the onus of proving a technical problem or tampering on a candidate. 
Requiring election equipment to provide extrinsic corroboration of electronically 
produced election results, or "evidence-based elections,"21 better accords with the 
courts' role in assuring fundamental rights to vote. 
Background: Performance Records of £-Voting Systems 
SOUTH CAROLINA 2010 
South Carolina's experience in 2010 serves as one recent exemplar. Reviews of the 
state's vote records generated in the Democratic Party statewide primary and the 
November general election documented legitimate bases for questioning the accu-
racy of the automated vote totals reported by the direct recording electronic (DRE) 
touchscreen22 voting devices and tabulation software. 23 A virtual unknown cata-
pulted to apparent victory in the Democratic U.S. Senate primary over a widely 
supported and well-known candidate, perplexing many seasoned consultants and 
political insiders. Oddly, the vote margins differed dramatically depending on how 
the votes were cast. The paper absentee ballot vote margins differed substantially 
from the reported Election Day e-voting machine totals, in a manner sharply diver-
gent from other statewide Democratic primary races. 24 Election experts then docu-
mented a range of other anomalies that some, but certainly not all, commentators 
considered possible evidence of malfeasance or software bugs. 25 
The November 2010 general election added to South Carolina's concerns over 
electronic vote tally accuracy. Computer scientists working with the state's League of 
Women Voters gathered county ballot records to show that the legally certified elec-
tion totals were erroneous. They demonstrated that county tabulation processes had 
somehow bypassed numerous voting machines' vote totals, effectively disenfran-
chising hundreds if not thousands of voters. 26 Their independent audit of county 
election tallies showed that the announced election results had excluded more than 
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300 votes from some candidates' totals. 27 But in addition to not tallying some of 
the electronic DRE touchscreen machines, one county's records reflected a count of 
1,400 more ballots than actual voters. 28 
How could these tabulation errors remain invisible to conscientious election 
officials? The manufacturers often suggest "human error" rather than any fault in 
their voting system products. 29 But a closer evaluation shows the manufacturer had 
not designed the tabulation software to alert officials when some voting machines' 
vote tallies had been skipped and remained omitted from the overall election tabula-
tion. Equally bizarre, the manufacturer did not design the voting system to report 
when one machine's tallies had been uploaded and added into the final tabulation 
more than once, thus according some voters more than the promise of one person, 
one vote. The software could easily have included the fail-safes of blocking the ability 
to close the election and report final vote totals if the tallies of any voting machines 
activated for the election had not been included in the final tally, or if any had been 
included multiple times. But the software designers did not include these mission-
critical features-and no regulation or voluntary standards mandated them. 
To complete the serious design omissions, manufacturer ES&S-the largest and 
one of the oldest election equipment vendors nationally3°-did not recommend post-
election auditing methods for verifying that every valid ballot cast had been reflected 
in the tabulation and that none were counted multiple times. 31 Not surprisingly, with 
no indicators otherwise, the local election officials reasonably believed all votes had 
been tallied, and the State Election Commission certified the vote totals as accurate. 32 
Unfortunately, South Carolina's experience with problematic electronic vot-
ing equipment is not aberrational. The ES&S "iVotronic" DRE touchscreen equip-
ment33 used pervasively in South Carolina lacks a paper record of the vote choices 
yet is deployed nationwide. The performance of the iVotronic machine and its cen-
tral software have generated many electoral controversies, including some high pro-
file litigation. 34 Whether using vendor ES&S's voting equipment or others', election 
offices have experienced a broad range of serious issues with e-voting systems. All-
electronic DRE touchscreen units that produce no contemporaneous voter-verified 
paper record have received the most pointed criticism. The most widely endorsed 
e-voting systems require voters to mark a paper ballot that is then read by an optical 
scanner with vote tallies produced by potentially flawed software. 35 But these sys-
tems permit the extrinsic paper record to be used to verify or correct the software-
produced vote tallies in post-election audits or recounts. 
Elections conducted on e-voting equipment that HAVA financed have contin-
ued to experience inaccurate counts, unreliable performance, and other deficiencies 
from 2005 through 2011 regardless of the vendor, the type of equipment, the size of 
jurisdictions, and other factors. 36 
ILLUSTRATIVE E-VOTING EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES 
While South Carolina's 2010 voters endured particularly searing experiences with 
their voting technology in both the federal primary and the general election, 37 South 
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Carolina is by no means unique. A national survey of irregularities demonstrates 
that no one equipment type or currently marketed brand or vendor can be singled 
out as either above the norm or well below the norm for serious technical prob-
lems. This section reviews a wide assortment of these serious issues arising in actual 
elections . 
Turning first to a 2011 local election race in New Jersey, a supposedly losing but 
highly favored candidate suspected that the candidates' names were not correctly 
associated with the on-screen "buttons" a voter used to select candidates, causing 
swapping of vote totals. 38 In a lawsuit to investigate, the Fairfield County official 
acknowledged her programming "error" of mis-mapping buttons to the Zirkle and 
Henry candidates, leading to the official announcement of the wrong candidates 
as winners. The state judge ordered the computers that configured the election 
impounded for reviews by Princeton University computer and voting system expert 
Professor Andrew Appel, to confirm or clarify whether this explanation sufficed. 
But Appel's scheduled arrival to assess the relevant log files somehow proved to 
be too late. Appel discovered that despite the court order to preserve the evidence, 
the logs and a vast amount of other system information had been erased the day 
prior to his evaluation, essentially tampering with evidence that might have revealed 
tampering with the election.39 He had previously testified and written reports docu-
menting the ease of tampering with voting systems' vote totals,40 but other wit-
nesses had ridiculed the likelihood that this could or would occur.41 Nonetheless, 
within a matter of months, Appel's warnings arguably had been validated.42 
In the 2010 general election in Saguache County, Colorado, several types of 
malfunctions undermined the trustworthiness of the reported results generated by 
the central office's scanner-tabulator system. "Every time we ran the ballots through 
the machine, it resulted in different numbers."43 Additional machine malfunctions 
prevented the officials from complying with legal requirements to protect the elec-
tion's integrity and assure its accuracy. The Canvass Board ultimately concluded 
that it could "not attest to the accuracy or inaccuracy of the returns."44 Thus, the 
core election mission-producing accurate vote totals-could not be fulfilled , largely 
because of a range of voting equipment failures at mission-critical junctures. Nota-
bly, the same model of central count, high-speed optical scanner is one of the most 
broadly deployed central-count scanners nationwide.45 
Cuyahoga County, within which Cleveland is located, is Ohio's most populous 
county. It postponed its transition to HAYA-approved e-voting until May 2006, but 
still found the demands of the primary too great. The absentee ballot system tabula-
tion system failed, requiring a 24-hour hand count for almost a week. Every mana-
gerial system also failed, producing a notorious debacle.46 Over the next three years, 
the county used three different e-voting systems and two different vendors, and it 
experienced major problems with each. But the election officials learned to distrust 
marketing claims and to check closely for performance quality.47 When the county 
finally received one of the first EAC-certified precinct-based scanning systems, it 
proceeded critically. Cuyahoga County officials then discovered a range of issues, 
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including that the equipment could not accurately count ballot choices in one col-
umn on extra-long ballots, although it had been marketed and certified for using 
extra-large paper. The county officials discovered a total of three additional serious 
failure modes that affected vote total accuracy or security and reported them to 
the EAC.48 The EAC investigated and "substantiated" the three defects, promising to 
continue its work.49 
In the 2008 primaries, a wide range of system irregularities and unexpected 
tabulation events occurred. For instance, on Super Tuesday, Senator John McCain's 
campaign had predicted an easy victory in the candidate's home state of Arizona. 
But Cochise County's initial tallies reported that challenger Mitt Romney had won. 
Local election officials examining the county tallies noticed a strange outcome: the 
tabulation software reported total votes that exceeded the total number of registered 
voters in the county. The officials then discovered that the software had counted the 
ballots of five large precincts not once each, but five separate times, thus generating 
an outcome of "one person, five votes" for those digital enhanced voters. "It was a 
cumulative (computer) error that just kept adding the results for five polling places 
every time new figures were added,'' explained the county official. 50 
One month later, Ohio held its 2008 presidential primary on March 4. The 
statewide weather of unseasonable freezing rain and snow proved the smaller of the 
major headaches facing suburban Butler County, near Cincinnati. While the tabula-
tion software reported all precincts and memory cards had been tallied as part of 
the vote totals, election officials discovered that two memory cards and 105 ballots 
had somehow not been tallied. Curiously, the election software did not report the 
error, however, but instead had noted all votes were tallied. More troubling, county 
election officials discovered the memory card omissions only adventitiously, while 
examining the system's tabulation database for a completely unrelated reason. In 
their subsequent complaint letter to the vendor, Diebold, the local officials stressed 
their dismay that the software was capable of false representations that all votes 
were recorded and reported accurately. 51 Eventually, the vendor issued a "Product 
Advisory Notice" that acknowledged a software flaw that could lead to unreported 
failures in recording and tabulating votes, a flaw that affected all versions of the 
GEMS tabulation software stretching back a decade. 
These vignettes relate only a small fraction of the errors occurring nationally 
in real elections with the current e-voting equipment. 52 No comprehensive inven-
tory collects all irregularities and serves as a library for election officials and public 
consultation. 53 
Legal explanation of the status quo ineluctably requires a return to the pivotal 
Florida 2000 presidential election and its aftermath. The congressionally perceived 
urgency behind forcing nationwide adoption of these relatively untested e-voting 
systems requires returning briefly to Bush v. Gore54 and its aftermath. In the deci-
sion's wake, the nation demanded improvements that would obviate any repeats of 
the underlying punch card calamity. Congress translated these goals into a wide 
range of explicit requirements for federally financed voting systems deployed in all 
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federal elections no later than 2006. HAVA required all voting systems to attain an 
exceptionally high accuracy rate55 and permit manual audits.56 While HAVA did not 
specifically mandate electronic voting systems, virtually the only equipment deemed 
able to satisfy the new functional mandates entailed software and computer chips. 
FLORIDA 2000 
As the November and December 2000 days wore on post-election, the nation and 
its judiciary learned that the aging equipment used for recording and counting votes 
erred at the average rate of two percent of all ballots cast.57 While narrow elec-
tion margins in Florida and elsewhere were not unusual, it was unprecedented that 
the Electoral College's national determination of the presidency would depend on 
whether some counties would be permitted to conduct a manual recount of bal-
lots. On December 12, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to halt the recount 
ordered by the Florida Supreme Court, ruling that the state court had authorized a 
recount that could not achieve the protections against arbitrary and disparate treat-
ment afforded by the Equal Protection Clause.58 The Court's ruling ended the Flor-
ida recount and in effect determined the race between George W. Bush and Al Gore 
for the presidency. 59 
While the legal questions vexed the public and the courts,60 the voting tech-
nology itself assumed major role in the overall drama. During the legal and politi-
cal controversy and during the congressional inquiries thereafter, the punch card 
equipment came to be viewed as one of the chief villains of the 2000 election. The 
persisting controversy ushered in the contemporary era of distrust of voting tech-
nologies' accuracy. Not unsurprisingly, after the U.S. Supreme Court had effectively 
become the presidential race tie-breaker because of voting equipment issues,61 Con-
gress initiated rapid replacement of punch card, lever, and other existing voting sys-
tems. The federal legislation required the voting system to be able to alert voters 
when either of two voting "errors" occurred: the voter's failure to record any vote 
in a race (undervote) or the voter's selection of too many votes in a race (overvote). 
These "second chance" voting systems accord the voter timely notice of errors and 
an opportunity to fix the problem before the ballot is irretrievably cast. 62 
By 2006, the federal statutory and funding initiatives resulted in the vast major-
ity of American voters casting ballots on computer-based equipment. 63 After over-
coming the transition difficulties from the old voting systems, in the 2008 and 
2010 election cycles jurisdictions achieved certain measurable improvements, espe-
cially in reducing "overvoting" and other voter errors. 64 
But the nation has thus far not broadly benefited from the substantially 
improved standards and certification process. By early 2012, over nine years after 
statutory enactment and four years after the first federal technical standards had 
been generated by the new federal EAC, no more than 12 of the over 7,000 elec-
tion administrative jurisdictions are conducting elections using EAC-certified 
voting equipment. 65 Most U.S. election jurisdictions continue to use voting equip-
ment that lacks federal certification by federally certified independent labs that use 
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approved testing methods. Instead, the equipment was "qualified" under weak test-
ing procedures supposedly complying with the earlier minimal standards issued by 
the Federal Election Commission prior to the creation of the EAC. 66 The scientific 
evidence demonstrates that this equipment is far easier to rig for widespread and 
largely undetectable cheating than the punch card and lever equipment it replaced. 
This profoundly insecure voting equipment continues to be deployed in 2012,67 how-
ever, partly from lack of funding to replace it and partly from lack of significantly 
improved options. Thus, the federal quest to eliminate fallible voting technologies,68 
born in the aftermath of the Florida 2000 presidential election, remains unachieved 
in the midst of the 2012 election cycle. 69 
Even though voting technology legal and regulatory issues garner less media 
attention than voter fraud ,7° voter identification, and vote suppression issues ,71 
these matters are central to voting rights protection and popular sovereignty. 72 
Federal Compulsion to Adopt Software-Based Voting Technologies 
Is it possible to develop a voting technology that records and tabulates votes in an 
accurate, completely impartial manner regardless of inadvertent human error (by 
voters and officials) and deliberate tampering? Can the system also be designed to 
be responsive to all voters despite their presenting a diversity of languages, levels of 
literacy, and life situations, while also providing sufficient ballot secrecy to exclude 
possibilities for vote buying and coercion? After the controversies generated by the 
2000 presidential election, political scientists, government officials, and election 
advocates converged on a more or less common vision of an impartial, provably 
accurate, tamperproof, and consistently available election machinery for record-
ing and tabulating votes-a technological "Archimedean point." 73 HAVA became 
the vehicle for realizing this technological vision. 74 HAVA's proponents expected the 
market to respond to over $3 billion in federal funding by producing computer-
based, automated equipment that attained their idealistic objectives. 
HAYA 
Encouraged by vendors' representations, Congress envisioned an election adminis-
tration regime where the newer electronic voting equipment would expunge inad-
vertent human error and deliberate mischief from the voting process, regardless 
whether committed by voters or election staff. Vendors assured the representatives 
that new digital voting systems could attain previously unachievable accuracy and 
speed in both vote recording and election results tabulation, reducing the error rate 
to a level substantially below then-current punch card voting technologies discred-
ited in the Florida 2000 election.75 Because the information technology industry had 
automated seemingly similar tasks, the goal of automating elections on an expe-
dited timetable appeared straightforward. Little attention was accorded to whether 
and in what ways elections differed from prior contexts. 76 
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But congressional antipathy for creating another federal agency was intense, 
especially within a historic bastion of state power. Combined with the then-prevailing 
faith in the market, the compromise version of HAVA provided for an unusually weak 
Election Assistance Commission. Congress granted the EAC the power to disburse 
funds and to implement other HAVA sections that mandated research and clearing-
house functions, but did not vest the EAC with any regulatory power.77 Instead, Con-
gress charged the EAC predominantly with the role of providing "guidance" via "best 
practices" and "voluntary" standards for state election systems. 78 
Although the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to "make or alter" the 
states' rules concerning the "Times, Places, and Manner" of holding federal elec-
tions,79 states have zealously sought to protect their control over election admin-
istrative processes. In the development of HAVA and the EAC, state governments 
stressed the federalism dimensions of elections and argued for no new federal pow-
ers to be conferred on a federal agency. 80 To date, Congress has not delegated to a 
federal agency regulatory power to mandate state compliance with a set of federal 
minimum standards for voting equipment. 81 Congress had arguably vested in the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) some advisory responsibility over technologies 
used in elections, but only to generate guidance, not to impose mandatory perfor-
mance standards.82 HAVA transferred FEC's limited authority to the new Election 
Assistance Commission, and directed development of new voting systems standards 
with the participation of independent technical experts, National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) experts, some election officials, disability accessibil-
ity experts, and others. 83 But these standards were again voluntary, not mandatory, 
even for voting systems used in federal elections. 
Importantly, however, Congress did not defer all voting technology standards to 
the voluntary "consensus" approach. The 2000 election convinced lawmakers that 
voting systems must attain a much higher degree of accuracy and reliability than 
the antiquated, predominantly mechanical technologies. HAVA described func-
tional features the new technologies should incorporate but refrained from requir-
ing that all voting systems meet minimum federal technical standards other than 
those specified directly in HAVA. Thus, the Act expressly requires all voting systems 
used in federal elections to include a manual audit capability, and it proscribes rates 
of error in counting votes above a specified minimum. 84 
But HAVA was not the source for the regulatory and certification testing appara-
tus for the vast number of voting systems in use from 2004 through 2012.85 Because 
the HAVA-mandated voluntary voting system guidelines and certified testing labo-
ratory system could not be achieved quickly but HAVA mandated deployment of the 
federally funded voting systems no later than 2006, virtually all HAVA-funded vot-
ing systems have not been certified under the EAC's 2005 standards. HAVA's rapid 
deployment requirement effectively left in place the weak standards and lax cer-
tification process of the "qualification" testing system established by FEC and the 
National Association of State Election Directors (NASED).86 
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The weakness of FEC's efforts to develop publicly protective voting systems 
standards for computer-based voting equipment may be partly attributable to Con-
gress's omission of express delegation of regulatory authority. The FEC's original 
standards development began in 1984, with issuance in 1990.87 Although the FEC 
began updating in 199788 and issued a revised set of standards in 2002,89 they were 
known from the outset to contain weaknesses in security, auditability, usability, and 
system reliability.90 This NASED-FEC testing regime's structure did not lead to con-
sistent compliance testing, as the vendors directly contracted with the labs they pre-
ferred and thus were the paying customers of the labs. The labs did not maintain an 
appropriate arm's-length distance from the vendors. Several studies suggest that the 
labs performed substantially less than the minimal testing required even under the 
FEC's weak 2002 standards.91 
HAVA also did not specify a compliance system for ensuring that voting equip-
ment and voter registration systems would satisfy the mandatory statutory stan-
dards when fielded in real elections . This omission and its consequence-of no 
data to demonstrate the equipment's malfunction and miscount rates-may be 
one reason that neither the U.S . Department of Justice nor private citizens92 have 
sought to enforce HAVA's auditability and accuracy standards.93 Unlike data col-
lection under the National Voter Registration Act, HAVA did not require indepen-
dent verification of compliance with the statutory standards. Congress appeared 
to be persuaded that computer-based voting machines would resemble slightly 
re-configured banking technologies (such as ATMs) and thus presumably highly 
accurate and secure. Unquestionably, HAVA's reliance on the market reflected the 
then-prevailing congressional faith in the capacity of private companies to pro-
duce high-quality products at lower prices than a scheme of mandatory federal 
regulation. 
The market, however, did not produce equipment fully compliant with HAVA's 
specified requirements, or with the ideal of nearly perfect election equipment. Inde-
pendent scientific assessments of voting systems have identified numerous, gravely 
problematic design, implementation, and procedural flaws and outright defects 
in current voting equipment.94 Field performance records in actual elections have 
confirmed these flaws and their implications for voting.95 These include defects in 
both software and hardware that can be deliberately exploited to manipulate results , 
often in undetectable ways.96 Inadvertent software design defects generated from 
coding errors or "bugs" can also vitiate system security and data integrity.97 Yet 
the flawed systems continue to be widely deployed throughout the United States,98 
largely owing to state fiscal conditions and lack of better alternatives.99 Despite the 
independent documentation of serious deficiencies, with a few exceptions, the same 
flawed voting technologies from 2006 and 2008 will be utilized in the 2012 presi-
dential cycle.100 Thus, in the 2012 presidential election virtually all Americans who 
cast ballots will have them tabulated on unreliable computerized equipment con.,. 
trolled by problematic software. 
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ELIMINATING THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN VOTE TABULATION 
A largely tacit and highly contestable assumption has motivated the shift to software-
based technologies for voting: whenever humans are involved in determining what 
marks constitute a valid vote, or what is the correct electoral count, concerns arise 
regarding possibilities of political bias and conflicts of interest that might result in 
a less-than-honest count. The quest for unequivocal and irrefutable election tal-
lies has resulted in an effort to remove human judgments from the election system 
to the maximum degree possible. This conception seeks to substitute in place of 
humans a presumed impartial technological system for recording, tabulating, and 
reporting votes. With this system in place, supposedly the ultimate electoral objec-
tive can then be achieved: high public and candidate confidence in the results with 
virtually no need to question the actions of election officials. 
Voting technology and computer security expert Professor Doug Jones has 
traced the reasoning: "The problem of interpreting voter intent when hand count-
ing paper ballots has led many people, over the past century, to press for the use of 
impartial machinery in all ballot counting." Jones points to election recount dis-
putes in the 2000 election cycle as evidence. The attorney for presidential candidate 
George Bush, James Baker, suggested, "Voting machines are not Republican and are 
not Democratic, and are not subject to conscious or unconscious bias."101 Some of 
the proponents of this idealized view of an infallible technology include courts. The 
Eleventh Circuit observed, 
this vote counting model [is] the "machine model," because it counts as valid only 
those votes that the vote tabulating machine can read and record. The machine 
model thus relies on an objective tabulating machine that admits of no discretion to 
count votes-if a vote is properly cast according to the instructions given to the voter, the 
machine will count it.102 
Cumulatively, these approaches contemplate a supremely objective electoral Archi-
medean point, an election technology that functions accurately and reliably to 
record and tabulate votes in a completely neutral and impartial manner, impervi-
ous to all manipulations. When measured against this benchmark, current election 
technologies unquestionably present grave flaws. 
Professor Jones suggests that rather than the impartial neutral tabulator model 
of "vote counting systems," gambling machines provide the better analogy: 
Gambling machines, even such trivial machines as dice, can certainly be biased. 
Such biases can be accidental, the result of imperfect construction, or, as in the case 
of loaded dice, they may be deliberate. A voting machine may be biased in exactly 
the same ways! 103 
Notably, with both tampering targets to the untrained eye, the tampering may be com-
pletely undetectable, leaving observers and participants believing that the machines-
the dice and the software-based voting machine-are functioning accurately and 
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neutrally. Unfortunately, dashing the dreams of HAYA's core sponsors and arguably 
some prominent jurists,104 computer-based voting systems cannot attain the role of 
a neutral tabulator; numerous human tasks are required for it to function correctly, 
tasks that are susceptible to "(accidentally on purpose) mistakes." 
Misconceptions of the capacity to exclude human judgment and roles from 
electronic election machinery supply a major reason for the continuing congressio-
nal failure to construct an adequate regulatory regime for assuring that voting rights 
are realized. This fifth point joins the four other reasons identified in the chapter of 
the previous edition of America Votes! that discussed national deployment of voting 
and database technologies whose reliability, security, and other technical properties 
were profoundly deficient.105 First, the HAYA-mandated regulatory activities were 
not sequenced properly for the best use of the federal monies, as the funding man-
dated procurement and deployment before the standards and testing regime had 
been launched. Second, the timetable for purchase and initial launch of the tech-
nologies was far too ambitious for developing voting equipment that would function 
at high standards of accuracy, security, and reliability. The voting system vendors 
engineered only minor adjustments to their existing product line, and then rushed 
their products to market on the compressed HAYA-specified timetables. Third, 
HAYA dedicated far too little attention to the regulatory, managerial, and techno-
logical infrastructure at both the federal and state levels that was needed to support 
the dramatic systems shift into software-based voting systems, instead apparently 
assuming the market would satisfy all needs. Finally, Congress's prevailing faith in 
the market to produce outstanding election equipment constituted the fourth major 
regulatory mistake. The voting equipment market's defects include substantial mar-
ket concentration and few market players. Significant barriers to market entry and 
an artificial "market" comprised exclusively of state and local governmental pur-
chasers mean that it is not possible for a "free market" to exist; it does not partake 
of any of the essential features of a free market. Where governmental entities are 
the sole buyers, normal market dynamics cannot operate. The nation and the voting 
system vendors might be better served by considering a public utility model. 
THE EAC'S FUTURE 
Over 2011, the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) resumed work on 
its goal of terminating the EAC.106 As stated by the Senate bill's sponsor, the asserted 
justifications include contentions that no set of election problems persists on which 
its work is needed; voting system certification is unworkable because of costliness 
and delays in approving new systems and software patches; and the EAC's spending 
objectives are unimportant.107 Early in 2012, NASS surprisingly urged resumption of 
the EAC Boards' activities, suggesting that perhaps the organizations' members have 
recognized some significant losses would occur if the EAC were abolished.108 
Over two-thirds of the states by law depend in some manner on the EAC-voting 
system and testing lab certification system.109 Zeroing out the funding would imme-
diately leave the states and the voters without the testing lab supervision, ongoing 
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work updating voting system standards, and maintenance of the "clearinghouse" 
library of research and best practices relating to election administration. While the 
public record is thin, one explanation for the vendors' antipathy for the EAC lab 
testing system lies in its greater rigor in identifying serious flaws in the software 
and hardware that could undermine the systems' accuracy, security, auditability, or 
reliability.11° Because the vendors have tended to use the certification labs as their 
beta testing units rather than engaging in proper design and pre-certification test-
ing,111 the testing labs have faced a much more arduous and time-consuming set of 
tasks than expected. But vendors have not publicly revealed their system failures 
caught by the certification labs, and need not since the labs do not generally report 
the range of flaws found over the entire testing process if the vendor fixes the prob-
lems to the lab's satisfaction. Instead of upgrading voting system quality, the indus-
try has sought to weaken the testing apparatus and the standards-setting bodies, 
and recommends against imposing design standards, despite the most significant 
deficiencies occurring at the design level.112 
Given the constitutional importance of elections and voting rights, and the 
inability to design and manufacture voting systems that do not depend on insider 
humans-who may be biased or incompetent-having special access, the EAC's work 
in the voting systems arena and in data collection is too publicly valuable to be for-
saken in a cost-cutting effort. Unquestionably, the agency needs substantial struc-
tural and operational reform, and expert computer security staffing, to meet the 
current challenges election administration faces. 
Litigation and Enforcement Strategies 
Structural litigation challenging the adequacy of voting technologies for assuring 
franchise rights largely began with the 2000 Florida presidential race. While Bush 
v. Gore arose in the context of a disputed election, subsequent litigation has overtly 
sought structural reform.113 In the watershed case, the Supreme Court critically 
examined whether the state government had discharged its duty to realize franchise 
rights, which in turn spurred HAVA's enactment and state legislative reforms.114 This 
section provides a relatively brief, high-level overview of litigation and enforcement 
opportunities by providing a typology that covers much of the litigation to date. It 
concludes by reviewing major powers and duties legislatively vested the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ or Department) to ensure that deployed voting technologies 
do not impair voting rights and structural electoral legitimacy. 
LITIGATING VOTING TECHNOLOGY DEFICIENCIES 
Voting machines, whether electronic or mechanical, are merely tools to facilitate 
casting ballots and counting votes, a means for achieving the popular sovereignty 
guarantees of the Constitution.115 At bottom, litigation against certain electronic 
voting systems-paperless DREs in particular-claims that the tool generates suffi-
cient risks and potential deprivations of rights that the equipment should be legally 
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invalidated. Notably, the litigation need not (and should not) request a judicial order 
of specified preferred technology as that question lies beyond judicial competence. 
Specification of legally compelled minimum requirements to be met-for instance, 
a software-independent record of each cast ballot-is sufficient to permit the state's 
administrators to proceed.116 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not maintained consistency in whether an 
individual rights paradigm or a structural interests paradigm (focused on systemi-
cally fair elections) should ground election litigation, when facing a constitutional 
challenge courts tend to use the individual rights lens.117 The Supreme Court leans 
toward the individual rights approach, but the structural approach probably best fits 
the nature of the wrong and the rights in jeopardy.118 In virtually all electoral contests, 
an individual's votes and the votes of other eligible voters need to be recorded accu-
rately and then accumulated, tabulated, and reported as one tally reflecting all cast 
ballots. If the voting machinery is seriously flawed in ways that render some votes not 
safeguarded in all requisite steps, the accumulated totals may be affected in ways that 
legally amount to systemic deprivation of rights to political self-determination via 
elections for representatives. Voters thus inherently have an interest in the systemic 
attributes of the election, as their votes are meaningful only when accumulated. 
Although voting system litigations often arise in the context of a disappointed 
electoral result, this review sidesteps election contests in favor of systemic, struc-
tural litigation. 
Breach of Contract, Product Liability, and Warranty Claims. In a breach of con-
tract or warranty action, normally the government entity that purchased the equip-
ment files suit against the vendor. But the norm is breached often. For instance, an 
acrimonious Ohio action began when Premier Election (the former Diebold Cor-
poration election division) brought suit against the state of Ohio and several Ohio 
counties for a declaratory judgment that the company had met all of its legal obli-
gations.119 The Secretary of State counterclaimed for breach of warranty, breach of 
contract, and fraud in the inducement.12° In advance of the filing, the parties had 
exchanged written claims and had been conducting settlement negotiations that the 
Secretary expected to continue. But the vendor rushed to file first in its preferred 
venue. The Secretary of State returned the favor by issuing a press release announcing 
the state's counterclaim for "voting system malfunctions" in 11 of the 44 counties 
using the company's voting system. The statement explained that the malfunctions 
resulted in dropped votes when memory cards were uploaded to the server, without 
effective notice to the election officials.121 
Other election jurisdictions that have maintained successful breach of contract and 
warranty lawsuits include San Francisco122 and Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.123 
Voting Rights Act. Challenges to the adequacy of voting systems have been main-
tained under Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).124 Courts have recog-
nized two separate analytic categories under Section 2, specifically "vote denial" and 
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"vote dilution."125 As Professor Dan Tokaji succinctly explains, vote denial embraces 
practices that prevent individuals from voting, such as poll taxes and literacy tests. 
Vote dilution under the VRA identifies unlawful restriction of the political influence 
of minority groups.126 Section 5 requires preclearance of proposed modifications of 
voting systems for "covered" jurisdictions.127 Both courts and scholars have honed 
these claims during the nearly five decades since the Act's passage. 
Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection Clause and Substantive Due Process. 
Following Bush v. Gore, numerous cases have challenged aspects of voting technolo-
gies on equal protection and substantive due process grounds. In Ohio, the Sixth 
Circuit determined that the structural claims of Stewart v. Blackwell128 and League 
of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner129 (Ohio League) were properly embraced within 
the Fourteenth Amendment.13° Ohio League ultimately resulted in a substantial 
multi-year structural settlement with particularized relief for the voting technology 
flaws.131 Similar to Ohio's Stewart litigation, Illinois faced a combined equal protec-
tion and Voting Rights Act challenge to the use of punch card technology, primarily 
for differential error rates and disenfranchisement in the minority communities as 
compared with Caucasian voters. The district court ruled that no justiciability barri-
ers obstructed the case from moving forward.132 
The structural aspects of the Ohio League challenge to voting system adequacy 
are manifest in the Sixth Circuit's discussion: 
Jeanne White alleges that touchscreen voting machines utilized in Ohio violate her 
constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process .... White 
alleges that on November 2, 2004, she attempted to vote for president at her poll-
ing place in Mahoning County. That polling place utilized direct-recording elec-
tronic voting machines, more commonly known as touchscreen voting machines. 
White attempted to select the candidate she preferred, but the machine "jumped" 
from her candidate to another candidate. The machine "jumped" several times 
when White attempted to correct this problem. White believes that her vote may 
have been counted for the wrong candidate. She also alleges that "jumping" occurred 
on other machines in Mahoning and other counties, causing votes to be counted for the 
wrong candidate. White seeks injunctive relief, in the words of the district court, "to 
ensure Ohio voting machines function properly in the future and can be audited for 
accuracy. "133 
Winning a reliably accurate voting technology for herself or her precinct would do 
little to correct the harm to aggregative voting rights, for which all voters must have 
equal rights to cast ballots that can be counted accurately.134 Solving voting technol-
ogy issues at an individual level does not redress the structural problems generated 
by the voting system defects.135 
State Constitutional Claims. During 2011, three states that use paperless DRE "all-
electronic" touchscreen units for precinct voting faced major challenges based on 
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state constitutional law. At this writing in March 2012, two cases are pending in 
state appellate courts and one decision was issued in 2011. In the Texas litigation, 
the state supreme court unanimously ruled that the state law had delegated to the 
Secretary of State the choice of whether some counties could use DREs that lacked a 
paper record.136 The court did not discuss the possibility that under such a deferential 
standard of review, a political leader would be enabled to select voting machines that 
permit covert suppression or tampering with the votes of her party's opponents, thus 
assisting incumbents' maintenance of power. Nor did the court openly consider that 
political power over election operations could be used to create administrative rules 
that left vulnerable voting systems open to insider or remote programming for vote 
swapping.137 The Texas court also seemed not to recognize the need for software-
independent checks of the vote tallies to ascertain their accuracy. The court's selec-
tion of a highly deferential standard of review is inappropriate for the fundamental 
structural rights at stake and the ease of covertly abusing administrative power over 
voting systems in largely undetectable and untraceable ways. This judicial stance 
fails to protect Texas citizens' structural rights to elections with ballots counted as 
cast and fails to accord the citizens proof that their election tabulations are correct. 
Litigation filed in 2004 challenged New Jersey's compliance with the state con-
stitution's protection of voting rights. The case has contributed to multiple changes 
in state executive personnel and offices responsible for election technologies, but the 
state continues to defend its paperless DRE voting systems. After a long trial and a 
lengthy compromised decision on the merits, the court ordered the state to upgrade 
its physical security practices substantially.138 When the state did not comply with 
the judicial orders despite numerous extensions and yet no sanctions issued, plain-
tiffs filed an appeal requesting that the decision be overturned. Plaintiffs have pro-
duced proof of the mis-mapping of candidate "buttons" to the database vote tables 
in a manner that covertly flipped the losers and winners in a real election, and 
have also documented unlawful deletion of election electronic records that were the 
subject of a court order.139 This proof tends to confirm the plaintiffs' independent 
experts' assessments of real election consequences resulting from the equipment's 
deficiencies. Defendants had claimed the problems were "theoretical" rather than 
meaningful in real elections. The appeal is pending at the time of this writing. 
In Banfield v. Cortes,140 the plaintiffs' claim that the paperless DRE voting units 
used in much of Pennsylvania violate the Commonwealth's constitutional assur-
ance of elections that will occur on equipment with "perfect" accuracy. The case has 
been appealed on the basis of cross motions for partial summary judgment. Because 
the independent experts' empirical assessments of this voting equipment demon-
strate beyond cavil that the deployed equipment cannot produce accurate vote totals 
consistently, the court should validate the plaintiffs' claims. 
ENFORCEMENT BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
The U.S. Department of Justice allocates civil enforcement of federal election law to 
its Civil Rights Division (Division). A subdivision, the Voting Section, maintains the 
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primary election law expertise. The Division has posted on the Department's web-
pages a narrative of its pending cases and immediate past enforcement actions.141 
A close reading of this presentation, combined with a key word search of the DOJ 
webpages and a Westlaw electronic search of reported cases for the past decade, 
reveals that the Voting Section has generally avoided enforcement of HAVA's voting 
technology standards other than for assistive technologies for non-English language 
and physical accommodation.142 Additionally, despite HAVA's compulsion of shifts to 
e-voting virtually nationwide between 2003 and 2006, and the resulting change in 
the types of records that would need to be maintained as evidentiary proof of elec-
tion activities, DOJ has not undertaken the effort to reassess what electronic and 
related e-voting records need to be maintained to fulfill the purpose and letter of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1960 and other federal statutes.143 
The Division's narrative overview of its HAVA enforcement activity includes 
attention to bilingual ballots, protection of the Puerto Rican voter, and accessibility 
for disabled voters-all of which are vitally important, legally compelled objectives 
that can be characterized as classic civil rights enforcement of underserved minori-
ties. But the question is why DOJ has selected some parts of HAVA for enforcement 
and yet has systematically neglected the voting technology minimum standards 
articulated in HAVA's Title III. These include accuracy standards in vote recording 
and tabulations,144 an auditable manual ballot, privacy, and other foundational pro-
tections of systemically fair elections. 
Thus far, through both presidential administrations since HAVA's enactment, 
DO] has proceeded timorously rather than assure realization of the basic prerequi-
sites for computer voting systems that Congress specified in HAVA. The extant pub-
lic record suggests DOJ has largely sidestepped enforcing HAVA Section 301's more 
technical but mandatory145 voting systems standards. This neglect arguably sends 
an implicit message to states, voting system vendors, and the public that DOJ views 
compliance with these standards as not worth the Department's efforts, perhaps to 
the point of mere hortatory verbiage.146 Such a stance augurs poorly for realization of 
fundamental voting rights and warrants DOJ's rapid reconsideration. 
Despite the dramatic transformation of election technology over the past two 
decades, the need for verifying vote tabulation accuracy and verification-that the 
announced totals actually reflect the voters' choices-has become more critical 
rather than less. Auditability, or extrinsic proof of the count, is a required compo-
nent of HAVA.147 Especially with software-based systems, manual auditability of a 
contemporaneously generated paper record constitutes the only effective check on 
the largely invisible, buggy software, and is thus critically important to the struc-
tural dimensions of voting rights. The Supreme Court has historically viewed the 
verification that voters' ballots have been correctly counted and reported as integral 
components of the fundamental right to vote.148 Thus, marking vote choices on a 
ballot (whether electronic or paper) and successfully depositing it into a ballot box 
do not complete the scope of constitutionally protected voting rights. Instead, the 
Court requires that the subsidiary steps that ensure the right to vote is meaningful 
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rather than illusory are legally protected. Thus, the constitutionally protected right 
to vote does not stop at the ballot box but encompasses the activities of accumulat-
ing, counting, and reporting the vote tallies. 
The clearest delineation of these principles can be found in the numerous bal-
lot box-stuffing cases. In Gray v. Sanders, the Court stressed that the right to vote 
encompasses the right to have the vote correctly counted as cast: 
Every voter's vote is entitled to be counted once. It must be correctly counted and 
reported. As stated in United States v. Mosley, "the right to have one's vote counted" 
has the same dignity as "the right to put a ballot in a box." It can be protected from 
the diluting effect of illegal ballots.149 
Reynolds v. Sims150 further elaborates these constituent principles embedded within 
the constitutionally protected right to vote: 
A consistent line of decisions by this Court in cases involving attempts to deny or 
restrict the right of suffrage has ... repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters 
have a constitutionally protected right to vote, and to have their votes counted. In 
Mosley the Court stated that it is "as equally unquestionable that the right to have 
one's vote counted is as open to protection ... as the right to put a ballot in a box." 
Note that the Court explicitly separates voting participation-which impliedly 
encompasses the citizen's right to receive a blank ballot and to mark and deposit it into 
a ballot box-from the right to have the vote counted. The Court does not create a con-
stitutional hierarchy of the constitutive steps embedded in voting, and does not favor 
for particular protection front-end participation over the right to a correct count.151 
Given the Court's delineation of integral activities encompassed within the 
fundamental right to vote, which are cumulatively designed to assure that all valid 
voters can vote and that their votes are counted correctly as cast, DOJ's narrow 
approach to enforcing the right to vote as ending with the depositing or casting of 
the ballot cannot be validated. The Court's precedents stressing the critical impor-
tance of votes being counted as cast and assuring that vote totals reflect the undi-
luted strength of each voter's choices means the DO] must police the virtually 
invisible opportunities by which software-controlled voting systems can be exploited 
for denying voting rights. Fortunately, HAVA and other federal laws have already 
conferred the tools by which DO] can fully protect voting rights on computer-based 
voting equipment. DO], however, needs to acquire technical knowledge and a coura-
geous vision grounded in technical and computer security competence in order to 
assure the voting rights of all citizens. 
The need for DO] to reassess its enforcement tasks pertaining to voting technol-
ogy has recently become more critical. In a summary proceeding, the Supreme Court 
expressed doubt that HAVA implies a private right of action to enforce a state's man-
agement duties concerning the HAYA-required statewide voter registration data-
base.152 Whether private citizens can enforce this or other parts of HAVA, including 
Title Ill's voting system standards, remains unresolved. HAVA explicitly authorizes 
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DO] enforcement, however, of these "uniform and nondiscriminatory election tech-
nology and administration requirements."153 Arguably, Congress delegated to DO] 
not only the power but also the duty to enforce HAVA, especially where it implicates 
fundamental rights. 
At least three reasons militate in favor of DOJ's acquiring the requisite techni-
cal capacity for interpreting and enforcing federal law relating to the performance 
of voting systems. First, the legal monitoring and enforcement of voting systems 
in some respects relate to the civil rights of all Americans, and thus function more 
analogously to the seminal redistricting cases that established the principles of vot-
ing strength equality. This historic line of cases, summed popularly as "one per-
son, one vote," includes Baker v. Carr154 and Reynolds v. Sims.155 Voting technology 
enforcement relates both to the rights and interests of all citizens as well as to con-
stituting a special interest for protecting communities historically suffering abridge-
ment of their voting participation.156 
As part of its civil rights enforcement for all Americans, DOJ must recognize 
the unpleasant potentiality that nullification of franchise rights, and consequently 
of democracy and popular sovereignty, can be caused by software bugs or deliberate 
covert tampering. The Department's recent record, however, suggests it has allowed 
itself to remain ignorant of the new cyber threats to voting and the covert tools 
that can be used to defeat electoral democratic self-determination and voting rights. 
Although voting rights can be secretly nullified, with technical tricks or bugs, only 
those with the correct skill set and understandings can uncover the exploits and 
protect voting rights. The election officials managing the election operations also 
are predominantly without cyber security training sufficient to allow them to pro-
tect against the obscure but effective vectors-both deliberate and inadvertent-by 
which electoral results can be modified and voting rights nullified. The nation can 
no longer afford its chief vindicator of voting rights to remain an ignorant and pas-
sive bystander. Strategies are available for DO] to equip itself for protecting voting 
rights despite the use of software and complex technical systems, and for assur-
ing that elections produce competent evidence of recording and counting votes 
accurately.157 
The second reason for the Department to acquire voting systems with technical 
competence relates to DO] as a party plaintiff where lawsuits or other legal activities 
are necessitated to protect voting rights. DOJ is unquestionably a proper plaintiff 
statutorily empowered to vindicate citizens' structural rights to fair elections as well 
as their rights to vote on devices that meet HAVA's minimum standards.158 Technical 
competence is needed, however, to understand why many of the currently deployed 
voting systems arguably fail to satisfy HAVA and Fourteenth Amendment substan-
tive due process protections,159 and to exercise judgment in developing enforcement 
priorities. DOJ competence is even more critical given that the Court might hold the 
Department constitutes the only party plaintiff HAVA authorizes.160 Its support of 
other litigation via amicus briefs and other activities could dramatically improve the 
protection of voting rights from technical deficiencies in voting systems. 
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Third, DOJ has not delineated guidelines for what types of electronic records of 
federal elections must be maintained pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1960.161 The 
originating purpose of Section 1974 was to ensure that essential evidence is gath-
ered and protected for DOJ to evaluate the lawfulness of an election process and the 
fulfillment of voting rights. This purpose, however, cannot be fulfilled unless DOJ 
lawyers learn of the types of records that e-voting systems can keep and how these 
records can be covertly destroyed or not gathered owing to operators (or vendors) 
disabling the record-keeping functions. DOJ needs to redress this decade-old omis-
sion with vigorous record-keeping standards that it also subjects to its monitoring 
powers.162 
When one understands software and the multitude of opportunities it offers for 
mischief and malfeasance, avoidance of voting systems legal-technical issues cannot 
be viewed as a benign oversight. Because of the specialized expertise that is needed 
in an ongoing manner, a special DOJ legal team charged with full realization of the 
technical aspects of HAVA, the Voting Rights Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment 
protections of voting may be warranted. Fortunately, some preeminent computer 
scientists have developed expertise in voting systems and a facility in teaching the 
basics to those who lack the scientific background, and could be tapped to assist 
DOJ in fulfilling its critical civil rights role in the age of digital voting.163 
Federal Promotion of Pr,oblematic Internet Voting 
In the late 1990s when precinct-based electronic voting systems were gaining a foot-
hold in urban locations, a small unit within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
became convinced that military and overseas civilian voters would be best served by 
moving their election activities to the Internet. Unlike the e-voting systems HAVA 
funding spread throughout the nation that had been designed and deployed with 
little advance review from computer security experts, the Federal Voting Assistance 
Program's (FVAP) fanciful plans have received sustained critical attention. But 
despite emphatic and nearly unanimous refutation of the claims FVAP advances, 
FVAP marches to its own drummer, refusing to heed the consensus of independent 
computer security experts that it should drop or dramatically scale back its planned 
Internet voting initiatives given expanding and unpreventable serious cyber security 
threats to United States interests. FVAP has also offered millions in grant monies 
for states to experiment with proto-Internet voting technologies, despite the lack of 
any independent testing and validation of such systems before funding their pro-
curement. A considerable scientific literature concludes that Internet voting systems 
present enormous, technically unmanageable threats to the integrity of elections 
and to the legitimacy of the results. At least in the federal election context, the dan-
ger rises to the level of a threat to U.S. national security. FVAP's activities also argu-
ably violate governing election law, yet persist because of the agency's decade-long 
embrace of this vision of all-electronic, paperless elections and agency leadership 
issues. 
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Unquestionably, American military and overseas civilians have faced significant 
obstacles to casting valid absentee ballots in U.S. elections. State governments have 
historically designed their absentee rules for domestic voters temporarily absent 
from their homes on Election Day. The voting needs of those either in combat zones 
or living as long-term residents of foreign nations have until recently largely escaped 
state attention. Military personnel who change their residence frequently have his-
torically found the absentee balloting processes complex and confusing, imposing 
barriers to casting valid ballots. In some cases, the state rules had erected almost 
insuperable barriers to overseas voters, such as requirements for notarized ballots.164 
The federal government has been particularly concerned with redressing the 
procedural impediments to voting that uniformed service members face.165 While 
recognizing our electoral system's federalism tradition, Congress has attempted in 
several enactments to eliminate state hurdles and thereby facilitate military and 
overseas voting.166 By enacting the original Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absen-
tee Voting Act (UOCAVA) in 1986 and then amending it in 2009's Military and 
Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE Act),167 federal law no longer simply 
encourages states to reconsider absentee voting obstacles but now also bars certain 
practices. The MOVE Act seeks to ensure that UOCAVA voters will have sufficient 
time to complete all tasks requisite to voting, including voter registration, receipt of 
blank ballots, and return of voted ballots in a timely manner. By statute and Execu-
tive Order,168 the DoD, and in turn, the DoD's FVAP, have been delegated the federal 
duties for facilitating UOCAVA voting. 
This section reviews the federal legislation and FVAP's activities that relate to 
voting technology. Unfortunately, FVAP has arguably not executed its duties con-
sistent with governing law and in some respects has significantly undermined state 
and local capacity for conducting elections that are secure against remote hacking. 
Although federal statutes specify a series of affirmative steps to remedy UOCAVA 
voters' low voting participation rates, for at least a decade FVAP has not focused 
on its assigned duties but has set its priorities based on a nai:Ve and technically 
unsophisticated view that software and Internet-based technologies can "solve" the 
problems faced by UOCAVA voters. Since the late 1990s, FVAP has advocated Inter-
net voting as the tool by which the UOCAVA voting problems can be transcended. 
More recently, its director has espoused FVAP's role as the incubator of Internet 
voting technology for the nation.169 Despite the extraordinary growth in the scope 
and severity of cyber threats to government and private information systems alike 
during the last decade and the MOVE Act's technical research provisions, FVAP has 
continued to prioritize development and deployment of Internet voting. 
Neither UOCAVA nor MOVE endorsed or required the return of voted ballots in 
live elections over the public Internet.170 Nor did these statutes authorize the FVAP 
to lobby state governments in DoD's name to adopt all-electronic Internet voting 
technologies. At no point did the agency or DoD publish a legal analysis that assessed 
whether the voting technology FVAP was funding could satisfy the constitutional 
requirements for ballots that would be recorded and counted as the voter cast or 
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HAVA requirements of auditable and accurate voting systems. Nor did the FVAP 
require the technologies to be tested and certified by the EAC as a prerequisite to 
receiving funding. The FVAP charted an end run around the entirety of the federal 
testing and certification apparatus that been developed to assure that votes would be 
recorded and counted as cast, luring states with financial incentives totaling over $20 
million during 2011-12 if they adopted uncertified proto-Internet voting technolo-
gies.1 71 Given the ease, frequency, and impact of Internet-based fraud and the inabil-
ity to protect Internet communications from determined remote attackers, FVAP's 
actions raise considerable legal and pragmatic issues. Arguably, the agency has been 
engaged in promotion of unlawful voting technologies from at least 2007 forward. 
This review of the FVAP's pursuit of Internet voting first provides a high level 
overview of the complexity of laws and issues thus implicated. It then focuses on 
FVAP's programmatic plan to achieve Internet voting, followed by a review of Inter-
net voting facts versus the fantasies that have motivated FVAP's director to ridi-
cule the best computer security minds nationally to support his attempt to realize 
an antiscientific "vision" of internet voting. The final discussion reviews the legal 
framework for FVAP's power, finding that it has failed to adhere to the congres-
sional revision of FVAP's duties in its pursuit and justification for Internet voting 
development. 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION: UOCAVA, MOVE, AND DEFENSE 
AUTHORIZATION ACTS 
Broad-based federal legislative efforts to assist voting by military and overseas 
civilian Americans began in 1986 with passage of UOCAVA.172 In 2002, Congress 
supplemented UOCAVA's more modest approaches with new provisions in the 
Help America Vote Act.173 HAVA authorized the DoD to advise states on legislative 
changes to their election laws that would enhance UOCAVA voting. The section 
also mandated periodic state governors' reports to DoD on their states' responses 
to DoD's recommendations.174 HAVA also re-codified some provisions from the 
2002 National Defense Authorization Act (NOAA), including the directive for the 
Department to conduct an Internet voting demonstration "pilot" in the 2004 gen-
eral federal election.175 
With overseas voting rates considerably lower than domestic voting rates, two 
nonprofit think tanks and the EAC conducted studies to identify the most signif-
icant impediments UOCAVA voters have faced in casting ballots.176 They learned 
that the transmission time through the domestic, foreign, and military mail sys-
tems needed for each required sequential step in the voting process posed the most 
significant hurdle. Most states had required the absentee voter to register to vote (if 
not already registered) , then request and receive a blank absentee ballot, and finally 
return the marked ballot all within a narrow specified period before the hard dead-
line of Election Day. Passage of the MOVE Act177 in 2009 sought to eliminate this 
transmission delay by requiring states to offer electronic (over the Internet) options 
for voter registration, application for absentee ballots, and blank ballot delivery. The 
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Act also modified time limits for some tasks and mandated a minimum of 45 days of 
absentee ballot availability prior to Election Day, as the nonprofits recommended.178 
It is important to note that the MOVE Act did not require states to substitute 
electronic transmissions for more secure but slower traditional postal mail when 
performing election tasks. Instead, MOVE directed states to supplement their tradi-
tional processes by offering UOCAVA voters a choice of using the electronic, Inter-
net-based method for the steps leading up to but not including the marking and 
return of a voted ballot.179 Thus, the MOVE Act pointedly drew a line between pre-
liminaries to voting and the act of marking a ballot and returning it for the count. 
MOVE did not require or encourage states to approve the electronic transmission of 
voted or marked ballots, reflecting the vulnerability of the election system and the 
individual voter's marked ballot to automated cyber fraud.180 
From the mid-2000s through part of 2012, FVAP was lobbying states for "all-
electronic elections" without distinguishing the security vulnerabilities associated 
with the transmission of voted or marked ballots from those of blank ballots. Dur-
ing this period, 33 states modified their laws to permit UOCAVA voters to transmit 
voted ballots over the Internet in some circumstances, with the majority permitting 
e-mail of voted ballots.181 The appendix inventories the state law modification of 
ballot secrecy laws. While all 50 states assure ballot secrecy to their domestic voters, 
at the FVAP's request, more than half the states now reduce these protections for 
UOCAVA voters. MOVE is silent on whether local election agencies (or FVAP) must 
inform overseas voters of the different levels of voting success depending on the 
type of balloting method. But no legal impediment bars states from providing cyber 
security disclosures to voters so they can select the method best able to protect their 
votes from hacking or other covert modifications. 
Although the MOVE Act 's mandates improved UOCAVA voters' ability to cast 
timely ballots, the new requirements dramatically increased the technological and 
security demands on states and localities.182 The Act's passage in late December 
2009 required states to provide substantial new services during the 2010 federal 
election cycle that had already commenced.183 Many states had less than six months 
to study technical options; obtain budget approval; and procure, test, and deploy 
the newly required capacity for specified Internet-facing voting services even though 
they excluded voted ballot transfer. Moreover the jurisdictions needed to acquire 
sufficient staff or capability to assure their secure and reliable operation.184 With 
enactment occurring in the midst of a major election cycle, election officials often 
lacked the budgets, the staff expertise, and the time to implement MOVE fully. 
Compounding the problems, MOVE's short implementation period placed officials 
at the mercy of vendors who overstated the qualities of their products to assure the 
fast sale. The constricted time did not permit officials to undertake careful and 
comparative assessments in the public interest or to negotiate contracts with appro-
priate protections for the public interest. 
Two election policy trends can be discerned from the three federal enact-
ments-UOCAVA, HAVA, and the MOVE Act-that address voting technology.185 
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First, they significantly increased the federalization of absentee ballot procedures, 
culminating in the MOVE Act's implied pre-emption of conflicting state election 
laws. Second, the laws imposed new federal mandates for deployment of computer 
and network technologies to aid UOCAVA voters (short of voted ballot delivery), 
reflecting high confidence in these systems' capacity to supply reliable, secure 
information transmissions. Unfortunately, because these Internet-connected vot-
ing technologies have not been developed with high assurance techniques designed 
to achieve superior levels of data accuracy and system and data security, their per-
formance will be marred by software bugs and the ubiquitous internet threats; 
these range from hacking to malware to system unavailability because of concerted 
attacks to take down the site.186 The FVAP has proceeded forward anyway, including 
into the funding of mobile phone voting-possibly the single most vulnerable vot-
ing device yet constructed and subject to spyware.187 The agency's technical hubris 
is sadly misplaced, for it did not delay its activities until the public Internet and the 
software on PCs and mobile devices can be re-architected and re-engineered for 
high security.188 
The two federal mandates that concentrate federal policy power over absentee 
ballots apply not only to overseas voters but also to military personnel located in the 
United States. Once adopted, these new technical systems can "bleed over," leading 
to rapid changes in state and local election practices for domestic voters. New tech-
nologies and managerial systems have previously been introduced to serve a particu-
lar subset of voters, but fiscal and administrative pressures almost invariably arise to 
unify voting and administrative support systems. Thus, technological changes ini-
tially adopted for UOCAVA voters may-and often have-become generalized to the 
whole. Where, as here, the new mandates have been interpreted to require deploy-
ment of Internet-connected electronic technologies in "mission-critical"189 areas of 
election administration, the new security threats190 can endanger the integrity and 
legitimacy of the entire election and not only UOCAVA ballots. 
In the MOVE Act's wake but apparently under the radar of busy DoD security 
experts and DoD attorneys, beginning in 2007 FVAP applied even greater pressure 
on the states to move to all-electronic elections while trading on DoD's reputation 
for expertise in cyber security.191 FVAP's leadership and its direct supervisors in the 
Division of Personnel and Readiness lack computer security expertise and election 
law knowledge. Not surprisingly, they have not reined in the agency from its "don't 
worry, be happy" cheerleading approach to sponsoring unproven innovation in elec-
tion technologies that risk substantial disenfranchisement and illegitimate electoral 
results. As a result, many state governments are now deploying FVAP-funded online 
ballot marking systems that send marked ballots over the Internet (from the ven-
dor's software to the voter's computer) that cannot provide ballot privacy or other 
essential protections.192 The FVAP continues to equivocate in its terminology, failing 
to acknowledge the security differences between blank and voted ballot transmis-
sions.193 FVAP's failure to disclose and warn of the differential security properties 
of these two types of ballots has contributed to lawyers and election officials not 
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discerning the congressional line that excluded voted ballots from MOVE's mandate 
of electronic support for election activities.194 
Where a state or the FVAP justifies an Internet voting option only for UOCAVA 
voters, the inequality in convenience will also lead to pressures to expand the ser-
vice option to all voters. The states will also want to accrue maximum return from 
the hardware and software investments made to support UOCAVA voters. Federal 
policymakers, including those at the FVAP/DoD, have not demonstrated awareness 
of these state and local election infrastructural facts,195 or the continuing costs of 
defense-in-depth security for Internet-facing election technologies.196 With FVAP 
positioned inside DoD, security assessments are unlikely to transpire in the state, 
for they are unlikely to understand that DoD has not validated the quality or secu-
rity of these voting systems. The voting systems vendors' capture of the DoD fund-
ing and deployment apparatus agency could lead to an insulation of their products 
from any meaningful scrutiny. With proper legal supervision within DoD and in 
the states, the fundamental right to vote and the correlative right to have votes 
accurately recorded and cast will lead to the close scrutiny of any voting system 
deployed in federal elections. But this task has yet to be shouldered. 
THE FVAP'S CHEERLEADING FOR INTERNET VOTING 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the FVAP identified its set of preferred solutions to 
increase UOCAVA voters' participation rates, producing several documents favoring 
all-electronic voting technologies.197 During the late 1990s adoption of digital infor-
mation systems and networked communications were widely viewed as presenting 
opportunities for greatly increased efficiency with very little downside risk. In 1998, 
the agency conducted its first Internet-based election with actual voted ballots. Thus, 
FVAP formulated its vision of Internet voting as the ideal voting method for highly 
mobile or distant citizens prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, and prior to the 
current legislative understanding that Internet-facing networked information systems 
offer large new attack surfaces that present significant national security risks. FVAP 
also became committed to Internet voting before the available data showing UOCAVA 
voters have extremely low rates of voter registration as compared with domestic voters. 
Despite the dangers posed by Internet voting, and undoubtedly in a good faith 
effort to expand overseas voters' electoral participation, the FVAP has encouraged 
transmission of marked (voted) ballots over the public Internet.198 FVAP has repre-
sented to state governments in legislative hearings and in letters to state governors 
or secretaries of state (the chief election officers) that achieving all-electronic elec-
tions over the Internet is a U.S. Department of Defense policy goal for supporting 
overseas voters.199 
INTERNET VOTING: SEPARATING LEGALLY RELEVANT 
FACTS FROM FANTASY 
Having the option of casting marked ballots online appears to offer advantages that 
include maximum convenience, broad access, 200 and the eventual possibility of lowered 
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costs through elimination of precinct voting and voting machines. Many reality tele-
vision show contests, such as American Idol, 201 use online and telephone voting to gen-
erate broad audience participation. Non-governmental organizations, such as alumni 
boards and labor unions, often conduct online elections. 202 Financial institutions and 
merchants have increasingly nudged their customers to transact their banking busi-
ness and shopping over the Internet.203 Thus, it is a common misunderstanding that 
no sound reasons remain for not moving governmental voting, or at least UOCAVA 
voting, to the Internet. Neither lawyers nor members of the general public are trained 
in threat modeling for cyber security. They may not understand that the relative value 
of attacks on an alumni board-elect versus United States elections are vastly different. 
Our election law is premised upon a constitutional commitment to popular 
sovereignty as expressed through democratic processes for selecting a representative 
government. 204 Realizing these fundamental principles implies-or perhaps neces-
sitates-voters' capacity to cast ballots free from coercion and that the voting system 
and its human administrators correctly determine and report the authentic winners 
of the election as defined by law. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
the fundamental right to vote encompasses the integral steps, the right to have the 
vote correctly counted as cast. 205 
Voters expect-and election statutes generally prescribe-at least four properties 
of voting system performance that Internet systems cannot reliably achieve: high 
performance reliability, 206 protection of voter privacy or "ballot secrecy," security 
of cast ballots and vote tabulations from fraudulent tampering, and the system's 
proven accuracy in its tallies.207 
Ballot secrecy is particularly vulnerable in Internet transmissions of voted 
ballots but is often misunderstood. The scientific and engineering facts of Inter-
net communications establish the inability to assure consistently accurate trans-
missions of sensitive information in a manner that assures privacy. Regardless of 
whether a ballot is cast through a web portal or by e-mail, Internet transmissions 
move from router to router, with forwarding agents passing along the messages 
through an engineering infrastructure that is owned and managed by corpora-
tions, universities, and governmental entities. Third-party re-transmission locations 
(such as ISPs) function similarly to the old telegraph stations. E-mailed voted ballots 
permit many ISP and other forwarding agents' employees access to read message 
contents. As computer scientist David Jefferson notes, "this intrusion [into e-mail 
messages] does not require sophisticated technical abilities or equipment, but only 
an ordinary e-mail program that allows viewing of messages and attachments."208 
E-mail forgery (including phishing attacks), identity theft, and fraudulent business 
transactions are now major categories of criminal fraud. Since most commercial, 
business, and citizen e-mail is not encrypted, ordinary IT personnel anywhere along 
the path from sender to receiver may not only read messages, but also filter or mod-
ify them-including e-mailed ballots addressed to election offices. Interception and 
modification of electronic ballots could be easily automated and would be essen-
tially undetectable by the voter and election officials. Importantly, not only the indi-
vidual UOCAVA voters' rights to a secret and secure ballot are at stake in whether 
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to authorize Internet-return of voted ballots. The systemic integrity of the election 
and its results are dependent upon ensuring that fraudulent ballots are excluded 
from the count and that all valid ballots are reflected in the tabulation as originally 
marked by the voter (voter-cast). 
An election could be remotely controlled by yet another technique: a direct attack 
on the computer server that receives the electronic ballots. As Jefferson observes, 
with Internet voting, virtually any reasonably competent and determined hacker 
(or government or crime syndicate) anywhere in the world can successfully attack 
the election server. Competent server attacks, such as that on the Board of Elections 
and Ethics of Washington DC, perpetrated remotely from the University of Michi-
gan during a public test in October 2010, can take complete control of the server 
and its voted ballots, and quite possibly without detection. 209 
The Michigan researchers were able to exchange all voters' ballots for phony ballots, 
and also inserted code directing the server to modify all subsequent ballots received 
after the attack. 210 Given that the White House, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and virtually all high technology companies with significant security expertise, staff-
ing, and ongoing investment have been successfully attacked remotely over the Inter-
net, 211 it is unrealistic to predicate voting choices upon the specious proposition that 
election offices' servers and their voted ballots can be protected from remote attacks. 
But a motivated attacker need not attack the server directly to control the elec-
tion outcomes. Jefferson states that hundreds of potentially successful additional 
attack methods could be mounted. One particularly devastating version would 
use the voter's ballot document as the vehicle for inserting malware into the elec-
tion servers and network. The malware could engender a crash, preventing further 
receipt of or access to the voted ballots collected, or could insert a virus that modi-
fies ballot choices. Defensive measures for attempting to protect against electoral 
cyber attack are costly and would greatly increase operational complexity and the 
needed IT skill set. But even these investments would be insufficient. As MIT com-
puter scientist Ron Rivest has cautioned, "The risks of 'internet voting' more than 
negate any possible benefits from an increase in franchise .... Large institutions 
[-e.g.,] banks, Google-are successfully attacked all the time. They have much bet-
ter staff and budgets [than election offices.]"212 Especially during fiscally challeng-
ing times, these costs would render the protective steps highly unlikely. 
Malware that secretly resides on millions of voters' personal computers and hand-
held devices presents yet another vector for election subversion. Jefferson observes 
that automated malware by international criminal hackers or partisan political oper-
atives "can infect thousands of voters' computers and modify their votes invisibly as 
they are being transmitted. Again, having a 'secure' connection to the remote elec-
tion server will make no difference at all. There is no effective way to prevent such 
an attack, and no effective recovery."213 The malware could follow the highly suc-
cessful Zeus format, which is blamed for several hundred million dollars in financial 
account losses internationally. 214 After Zeus spies on the customer and records the 
customer's credentials, it fraudulently uses those credentials to transfer funds to an 
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account under criminal control. Voting electronic ballots from personal computers 
and smart phones could similarly mimic the authentic voter's ballot but actually be 
an undetectable automatic malware subterfuge whereby the criminal selects the bal-
lot choices and then casts the ballot. Just as vast millions in automated electronic 
theft were unpreventable and undetected at the time of the Zeus exploits, election 
theft could be similarly achieved. Hostile foreign adversaries as well as unethical U.S. 
hackers could covertly deprive American voters of their constitutional rights to self-
determination through the ballot box if Internet voting were permitted. 215 
Internet return of voted ballots thus opens wide the doors to modification of 
cast ballots in undetectable ways, and to interception and blockage of voted ballots 
so that they cannot reach the election offices for tabulation in a timely manner. 
E-ballots' capacity to be transmitters of viruses and malware also directly impacts 
the accuracy and reliability of the recipient jurisdiction's server-computers. 
The ABA has underscored the lack of e-mail communications' confidentiality 
by issuing an ethics opinion that enunciates a professional obligation to warn the 
client about the risks to confidentiality of sending or receiving electronic commu-
nications. 216 One area of particular ABA concern lies in transmitting communica-
tions across an employer's network to reach the Internet. Many employers maintain 
privacy policies specifying that they do not assure privacy on communications over 
their networks, and they assert a legal obligation to supervise communications suf-
ficiently to assure that laws are not transgressed. Internet-cast ballots over employer 
networks or devices can produce third-party access to the ballot choices, and also 
the capability for modifying unencrypted ballots. Yet voting system vendors have 
not disclosed these risks to ballot privacy and security to their election customers, 
and in turn, election officials have not warned voters. 
Vendors often claim strong security, touting their use of encryption as if it supplies 
complete protection against all security vulnerabilities. Encryption, however, cannot 
suffice as a prophylactic against invasion of privacy or disruption of voting. 217 Similar 
to protective packaging, encryption tools are of widely varying strengths and quality. 
Proper use requires correct performance of a series of complex procedural steps to 
generate, secure, and distribute the encryption keys as well as applying an appropriate 
encryption algorithm.218 Even if encryption is correctly implemented, that encryption 
may still eventually be penetrated. Cryptologists assume that given sufficient time, 
all encryption methods known currently will be broken by methods yet to be discov-
ered, likely as soon as the next decade. 219 Electronic databases containing voted ballots 
could then reveal voters' choices years after the ballots were cast. This long-term indi-
vidualized evidence of ballot selections within a vendor's proprietary software remains 
one of the gravest worries about electronic voting, and especially Internet voting. 
Even assuming the ballot encryption was implemented properly and third-party 
personnel were blocked from reading and modifying a voter's ballot choices, moti-
vated personnel could still intercept and prevent delivery of ballots to the election 
office. Such interception, which could include essentially throwing away the voted 
ballots, would be extremely difficult to detect as long as some ballots were delivered; 
election officials might credibly believe that it was simply a "low turnout" election. 220 
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Some election functions that do not include voted ballot transmission are being 
conducted over the Internet. These include electronic voter registration and blank 
ballot transfer. MOVE mandates these electronic options for UOCAVA voters. 221 
These Internet voting tasks also present significant security threats and technologi-
cal challenges for assuring that valid registrations reach the election offices and 
that valid, unmodified blank ballots reach the overseas voter. However, with dedi-
cated attention and sufficient lead-time, the computer security scientists believe the 
risks to be manageable for the relatively small set of overseas voters. Unfortunately, 
the MOVE Act mandated the electronic options like blank ballot delivery before the 
technical answers had been hypothesized, built, and tested. States are struggling 
with implementation, using uncertified software products. By contrast, MOVE did 
not authorize the return of voted ballots over the public Internet, nor did it require 
states to offer voted ballot transmissions to UOCAVA voters. 
Given current Internet architecture, engineering, and software quality, the pre-
eminent computer security experts stress the current inability to secure this elec-
tronic voted ballot cargo from malware, targeted cyber attacks, and interception and 
surreptitious modification of cast (marked) ballots. Simply put, the election out-
comes can be easily changed, often without detection and without traceability. In 
close elections with Internet-transmitted ballots, the election officials will undoubt-
edly be faced with the question of proving a negative : demonstrating that the elec-
tronic ballots or their computer servers have not been remotely penetrated. This 
proof will often not be available without great expense. If the number of Internet 
ballots is larger than the margin of victory, the impact on voters, on electoral con-
fidence, and on confidence in government could be severely shaken by the serious 
questions of electoral legitimacy. Thus, understanding the Internet's current engi-
neering and profound security deficits, as well as the security issues pertaining to 
the PCs and smartphones voters would use, render FVAP's and the vendors' clamor 
for Internet voting at least a decade premature. 222 
Fortunately, the Military Postal Service Agency expedited its implementation of 
the MOVE Act in 2010, producing statistical evidence that demonstrates that the 
timing problems that Internet transmission of voted ballots was originally intended 
to solve have been virtually eliminated by other strategies sponsored by the MOVE 
Act.223 Congress plainly drew some of the most effective initiatives from the Over-
seas Vote Foundation, 224 including the use of expedited mailing services for absentee 
ballots. Because some states had not fully implemented the MOVE Act and others 
received waivers from the duty of full implementation in 2010, the 2010 data will not 
fully reveal MOVE's impact on UOCAVA rates of valid versus invalid (delayed) ballots. 
FVAP'S LEGALLY PROBLEMATIC PROMOTION OF INTERNET VOTING 
FVAP's powers and duties have been delineated by statute as well as by administra-
tive directive. Since issuance of DoD Directive 1000.04 in 2004 and continuing into 
2011, FVAP has engaged in some significant activities to lay the policy groundwork 
for transmitting voted ballots over the Internet. These initiatives arguably contra-
dict the Directive's explicit instructions, impairing core election values and arguably 
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undermining systemic election security. 225 The particular efforts FVAP has under-
taken are to encourage states to relax ballot secrecy and security requirements for 
UOCAVA voting, thus permitting electronic transmission of voted ballots.226 FVAP 
also has devoted significant time to preliminaries for conducting an Internet vot-
ing demonstration program, construing ambiguous decade-old federal legislation as 
imposing a congressional mandate for it to conduct an Internet voting pilot pro-
gram in a presidential election. 
This section reviews Directive 1000.04 and also considers whether a statutory 
duty to conduct an Internet voting pilot persists after the MOVE Act's passage. It 
finds that MOVE extinguished the last legislative basis, arguably imposing on DoD 
a continuing duty to conduct an Internet voting pilot study. MOVE instead reposes 
in the DoD's discretion as to whether and what types of voting technology studies 
shall be conducted for UOCAVA voters' benefit. Consequently, FVAP lacks a statu-
tory mandate for pursuing the Internet voting pilot Congress originally specified 
in 2002. DoD's capable lawyers could clarify the MOVE Act's withdrawal of the 
prior mandates. But DoD Secretary Panetta could act to safeguard the nation and 
UOCAVA votes by eliminating all technology development and requiring FVAP to 
focus on voter registration. 
Election Technology R&D Delegations and DoD Directive 1000.04. Mesmerized 
by the Internet's apparent promise, in the late 1990s FVAP determined that UOCAVA 
voters would be best supported by moving to all-electronic elections over the public 
Internet. FVAP conducted its first Internet voting pilot program in a real election in 
1998. The 2002 National Defense Authorization Act (NOAA) then directed DoD to 
conduct an Internet voting demonstration pilot for military voters in the next presi-
dential election. 227 The NOAA essentially directed that the pilot project eventually 
named SERVE228 be conducted in the 2004 presidential election using actual ballots 
cast by enlisted personnel; Congress did not mandate any pre-deployment technical 
testing and proof requirements prior to the general election deployment. 
Prior to SERVE's implementation, four computer science and security experts on 
the FVAP-DoD advisory panel publicly released a report that inventoried the breadth 
of ways the votes cast could be modified surreptitiously. 229 They also addressed the 
impact on the federal election's legitimacy by introducing opportunities for thou-
sands of fraudulent votes potentially generated by the nation's foreign adversaries. 
They concluded, 
[b ]ecause the danger of successful, large-scale attacks is so great, we reluctantly rec-
ommend shutting down the development of SERVE immediately and not attempting 
anything like it in the future until both the Internet and the world's home computer 
infrastructure have been fundamentally redesigned, or some other unforeseen secu-
rity breakthroughs appear. 230 
Following the SERVE Report's publication, in mid-2004, DoD Deputy Secretary 
Wolfowitz canceled the SERVE project and issued Directive 1000.04 that continues 
to govern DoD voter assistance activities. The Directive requires FVAP to conduct all 
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of its activities "in a manner that safeguards the integrity of the electoral process and 
secrecy of the ballot," and further, "shall take all necessary steps to prevent fraud and to 
protect voters against any coercion . ... "231 
The legal principles stated in DoD Directive 1000.04, specifically Sections 4.3.3 
and 4.4, enjoy respect and strong support from the voting rights and election security-
integrity communities. The historical record is clear that without ballot secrecy/voter 
privacy, free elections cannot occur; hidden coercion can flourish and fraud can easily 
occur. Election law treats ballot secrecy not simply as a protection for individual vot-
ers' unencumbered capacity to express their political choices, but as a systemic pro-
tection of election legitimacy and constitutional popular sovereignty. Unfortunately, 
FVAP apparently lacked a deep appreciation for the systemic purposes behind ballot 
secrecy, for it has actively lobbied state and federal supervisory offices to eliminate 
privacy protection for UOCAVA voters' ballots.232 Because the principle is listed in 
Directive 1000.04 as a foundation for DoD's voting activities, FVAP's state legislative 
lobbying activities in opposition to ballot secrecy are at least curious if not unlawful. 
Voting system security experts urge that no voting option should be extended 
to American military and overseas civilians unless it offers scientifically tested and 
proven confidence that their ballots will be received and tabulated consistent with 
their voter-determined ballot markings. 233 Anything less would degrade these Ameri-
cans' ballots, which would impact systemic interests as well as individual rights. 
FVAP has repeatedly pressed the Internet voting objective on state governments, 
however, producing contradictory federal positions on core cyber security policies. In 
addition to logical inconsistency with protecting the fundamental right to vote, fed-
eral advocacy of insecure election practices inherently confuses the state and local 
governments, which must shoulder the legal duties and implementation burdens. 
FVAP continued its approach to pursuing its commitment to an all-electronic 
elections mission irrespective of both the DoD Directive 1000.4 and computer secu-
rity science into the first half of 2011. For instance, in March 2011, FVAP submitted 
its strategic plan for implementing the MOVE Act to Congress and the president. 
This report pervasively stresses the FVAP's commitment to all-electronic elections. 
As an example, it states, 
FVAP also proposes the expanded use of email and online transmission for all elec-
tion materials throughout the entire UOCAVA absentee voting process, replacing fax 
and postal mail where possible . . . . [T]he decision to send a voted ballot by unsecured 
electronic means must rest with the individual voter based on the voter's desire to cast his 
or her vote electronically or to ensure the secrecy of the ballot. 234 
Similar statements of this FVAP policy appear in numerous other documents published 
over the last five years, despite their noncompliance with DoD Directive 1000.4.235 
While Section 4.3.3 specifically requires all UOCAVA voters to receive DoD/FVAP 
"voting assistance in a manner that safeguards the integrity of the electoral process and 
secrecy of the ballot," this plan does not explain how FVAP will comply with DoD gov-
erning policy protecting ballot secrecy. The Directive recognizes that ballot secrecy is 
a constituent protection of election legitimacy. The protection is mandated by most 
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states' election laws as well as the DoD Directive. 236 The Directive does not permit 
individuals to waive their rights to a secret ballot, nor for the FVAP to promote tech-
nological voting methods that would necessitate the voter to give up these secret bal-
lot rights. Inexplicably, FVAP neglects the Directive and its critical systemic objectives. 
The Directive's Section 4.4 additionally directs all persons who assist in the voting 
process to "take all necessary steps to prevent fraud." The FVAP's policy stance quoted 
above misconceives the concerns and scope of systemic protections found in federal 
election law. It also ignores the counsel of preeminent security experts who advised 
FVAP officials on the magnitude of Internet-based risks that cannot be effectively mit-
igated owing to Internet architecture, and their ultimate consequences for enabling 
undetectable, fraudulent elections.237 In so doing, the FVAP's lobbying of states for all-
electronic elections undermines our national capacity to achieve election cyber security. 
The second recent reaffirmation of FVAP's promotion of all-electronic elections 
and disregard of Directive 1000.04 occurred in May 2011. FVAP issued a solicitation 
for grant applications that proposed technically "innovative" ways to achieve elec-
tronic absentee voting. 238 FVAP drafted its initial funding solicitations for over $20 
million to fund proto-Internet voting election technologies with little attention to 
security and bereft of requirements that the grantees and the projects comply with 
the foundational election principles enunciated in the DoD Directive. 
This FVAP grant program was designed to induce state election offices to pur-
chase election software from voting system vendors, many of which have a history of 
misrepresenting the security and reliability features of their other e-voting products. 
These vendors have a regrettably deficient record in achieving system security, Inter-
net security, (election) data integrity, (voter ballot) privacy and secrecy, and other 
essential objectives.239 Over $30 million has been allocated in DoD grant funding, 
with the vast proportion going to Internet voting vendors. The FVAP's technology 
program is directed by the former executive director of the voting system vendors' 
trade council, arguably a revolving door that includes conflicts and ethics issues.240 
It also raises questions about "agency capture" by the voting system industry, which 
has been the beneficiary of well over $20 million in new federal funds without FVAP 
requiring it to comply with the EAC's voting systems guidelines, HAVA's Title III 
standards, and the independent testing laboratories certified by the NIST. 
Is Congress Requiring an Internet Voting Pilot? Before the 2000s, when the Internet 
became known as the fastest growing conduit for unprecedented grand larceny, busi-
ness espionage, and grave national security threats, the Internet was widely viewed to 
be an unqualified public good whose capabilities could be tapped for quick, relatively 
cheap communications. Since DoD had funded its creation originally for military 
purposes, Department executives viewed the benefits of military voting opportunities 
over the Internet to far outweigh the risks. But the decade of experience with increas-
ingly virulent malware, the persistent inability of national security agencies and 
the Defense Department to secure their supposed "secured networks" from remote 
attackers, and the computer scientists' incisive report on intractable Internet vot-
ing risks after the first FVAP Internet voting pilot all reduced DoD's enthusiasm for 
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Internet voting. FVAP leadership somehow discounted the relevance of these points, 
because well into 2011 it continued its aggressive pressure for realizing the legally 
superseded prescription for conducting an Internet voting demonstration pilot. 
FVAP bases its zealous pursuit of developing an Internet voting pilot on conflict-
ing provisions found in National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) passed from 
2000 to 2009. 241 Construing multiple contradictory enactments that address the 
same subject can lead to a lengthy (and tedious) examination. Thus, this chapter 
summarizes relevant legislation before briefly identifying two main reasons for con-
struing the last NOAA, which contained the MOVE Act, as the most authoritative. 
While primarily focusing on the needs of U.S. troops in foreign conflicts, Con-
gress included several short provisions addressing the desire for the DoD to con-
duct Internet voting experiments. The 2002 NOAA (enacted in 2001) directed DoD 
to conduct an "electronic voting demonstration project" in the 2002 federal elec-
tion. 242 The provision's language also reflects the prevailing conception of risk and 
technical difficulty presented. Congress authorized the Internet voting demonstra-
tion project for an election only a few months hence; it did not specify that any 
pre-tests be conducted. The statutory language suggests that it expected this to be 
a no-brainer, successful low threshold-testing outcome. Indeed, FVAP had already 
conducted what it believed to be a successful Internet voting test in the 2000 presi-
dential election, with 91 total ballots cast. Only in Section 1604(a)(2) does a cau-
tionary note enter; computer and network security and the software development 
process evidently were not a central part of Congress' time and security calculus. 
The NOAA also conferred on DoD some limited discretion, permitting the demon-
stration project to occur in 2004 if national security would be impaired in 2002.243 
Before the 2004 Internet voting pilot could be conducted, the SERVE Report 
intervened. 244 Co-authored by four prominent computer scientists and the focus of 
a lead New York Times editorial that counseled the project be terminated consistent 
with the Report's recommendations, the Report stands as the most comprehensive 
threat and security assessment yet written of a proposed U.S. Internet voting sys-
tem. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz canceled the pilot project scheduled for 
the 2004 general election and also issued DoD Directive 1000.04. 
The subsequent 2005 NOAA notes the SERVE project's security issues and com-
mences a different path. After restating the direction for an Internet voting pilot, it 
comments, 
the Secretary may delay the implementation of such demonstration project until 
the Election Assistance Commission ... has established electronic absentee voting 
guidelines and certifies that it will assist the Secretary. 245 
The Conference Report accompanying the bill notes disharmony among the two 
Houses of Congress but references a compromise, specifically to delay the pilot proj-
ect. 246 Notably, the Conference Report did not describe the "electronic voting" sys-
tem it contemplated as requiring every aspect of the voting process to be conducted 
digitally. The FVAP Director, however, claims that Congress intended that "every 
aspect" must be electronic and excludes all paper records. 247 
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Both the FVAP Director, Robert Carey, and FVAP staff have commented that 
congressional oversight committee staff have instructed them on Congress's ani-
mating intent and expectation in enacting the 2005 pilot project provision. The 
FVAP Director has underscored these comments as if their content is entitled to 
great weight in interpreting the legislative language. The implications of these state-
ments, though, are not reflected in the statutory text; there is no evidence that they 
represent the views of Congress rather than of individual staffers, and they occurred 
several years after the date of the legislation's passage, when they are no longer part 
of the congressional process of debate and rebuttal. 248 
Director Carey stresses two documents that issued in 2007 as strong support for 
his claim of a congressional "mandate" to develop an Internet voting pilot. He points 
to the 2007 NOAA, which directs, "the Secretary of Defense shall [report] to the Con-
gress ... in detail plans for expanding the use of electronic voting technology for individu-
als covered under the [UOCAVA]."249 Yet again, however, the direction lacks content 
that specifies either an "all-electronic" approach or a "mandate" for FVAP to develop 
voting technology that uses Internet transmissions of voted ballots. The 2007 NOAA 
merely requires development of a plan. Such a plan could delineate, consistent with 
the DoD Directive 1000.04, use of electronic voting in a manner that preserves ballot 
secrecy and election security. The NDAA's direction could be fulfilled by submitting 
a plan that largely mirrors later 2009 MOVE Act technology provisions, which omit 
both a mandates as well as any option to return voted ballots over the Internet. 
Carey also has stressed the importance of a Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report that describes methods of advancing UOCAVA voting through tech-
nology. Carey's emphasis is misplaced, however, because the GAO used a military 
personnel and readiness expert who lacked both computer security and election law 
expertise yet detailed him to provide voting technology recommendations. This per-
sonnel officer's cheerleading recommendation fails miserably in its understanding 
of the Internet's security attributes and possibilities. He concludes: 
[DoD should c]reate an integrated, comprehensive, long-term, results-oriented plan for 
future electronic voting programs that specifies ... the goals to be achieved along with 
tasks including identifying safeguards for the security and privacy of all DOD's vot-
ing systems-both electronic and Internet. 
• The plan should also specify milestones, time frames, and contingencies; 
• Synchronize them with planned development of the Commission's guidelines for 
Internet voting; 
[The GAO shall report to] Congress ... the assessment of ... the progress of [DoD] 
and the [EAC] in developing a secure, deployable system for Internet-based electronic vot-
ing pursuant to [the 2005 NDAA]. 250 
Exhortations to adopt Internet voting from those lacking computer science and 
security gravitas embody the "oxy-topian" approach to voting systems. Preeminent 
MIT computer security expert Ron Rivest has observed: 
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[t]he obvious "solution" for the future would be a remote voting system where 
everyone can vote over the Internet in an auditable manner, and where vote-selling 
and voter coercion are altogether prevented. 
Let me call this the "oxy-topian" voting system. Here "oxytopian" is a combination 
of the two words "oxymoron" -self-contradictory-and "utopian" -ideal, because 
such a set of "ideal" requirements is intrinsically oxymoronic and unrealizable. 251 
The defense personnel expert whom the GAO permitted to file this report obviously 
did not understand technical limitations and contradictions within his recommen-
dation. Unfortunately, because this report issued from the respected GAO, though 
not from its experts in computer security, it may have misled Congress and the 
FVAP on the prospects for developing "secure Internet voting." 
Congress passed the most recent legislation, the MOVE Act, as a component of 
the 2010 NOAA. MOVE requires states to offer electronic Internet-based options for 
voting tasks preceding, but excludes options for Internet-marking of the ballot and its 
return. 252 In Section 589 of the Act, Congress delegated to the Secretary of DoD the dis-
cretion of choosing whether to develop additional technological options for UOCAVA 
voters. This comprehensive congressional delegation of discretion concerning all 
UOCAVA technical voting research, within a larger, comprehensive act that redressed 
UOCAVA deficiencies, entitles the MOVE Act to special weight when attempting to 
construe the earlier NOAA provisions' survival as potentially mandating an Internet 
voting pilot project. 253 Adding additional weight to this construction, Section 589 also 
re-codifies parts of the earlier NDAAs concerning the roles of EAC and NIST in devel-
oping Internet voting white papers and standards, but pointedly did not re-codify the 
direction to DoD to conduct an Internet voting pilot. This omission should be con-
strued as congressional withdrawal of the prior pilot-development directives. 
Instead of the earlier NOAA directions surviving independently of MOVE, the 
MOVE Act taken as a whole and Section 589 read carefully show that Congress 
had developed greater awareness of the cyber security threat. The MOVE legislation 
also requires preservation of Directive 1000.04, which incorporates protections that 
block the ability to conduct Internet voting. 254 Congress chose to codify comple-
tion of the earlier-mandated agency studies and issuance of guidelines, but did not 
repeat or recodify the direction or "mandate" to conduct a live-election Internet 
voting test with real ballots. Recognizing the sensitivity of the voting process and 
the larger cyber security threat, Congress deferred the question of whether and how 
to structure an Internet voting pilot to the Secretary. Thus, Congress implicitly and 
selectively incorporated parts of the 2002 and 2005 NDAAs but implicitly repealed 
the 2002 mandate for conducting an Internet voting pilot. 
As late as February 2012, FVAP Director Carey continued to profess confidence 
that Congress's NDAAs compel the agency to conduct an Internet voting pilot. 255 
Given Director Carey's announced departure from the DoD in June 2012, the DoD's 
interpretation of the MOVE Act's impact on the NDAAs may change with the intro-
duction of new leadership. Appearing to fast-track the technical infrastructure for 
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Internet voting before the cyber security-aware new Secretary of Defense could exer-
cise review, the FVAP has issued at least two multi-million dollar grant solicitations 
to fund new voting technologies. This grant program included solicitations for at 
least $20 million that ultimately awarded untested and uncertified proto-Internet 
voting systems to state governments. These systems arguably violate HAVA's Title III 
standards for auditability and accuracy as well as Directive 1000.04, but Director 
Carey rejected the proposition that FVAP owed any duty to ensure that the voting 
technologies it funded complied with other federal voting system laws.256 
Given that UOCAVA citizens' voter registration rates are relatively low compared 
with domestic voters, some have argued FVAP can best solve the UOCAVA voting prob-
lem by focusing on augmenting military and overseas civilian voter registration rates. If 
not a complete solution, registration still constitutes the threshold requirement in order 
to cast a ballot.257 Instead of a DoD agency funding insecure election technologies, a 
more effective effort at solving the military participation issues would focus on creating 
a culture of voting that begins with enlistment. If FVAP would cease its romantic affair 
with Internet voting technologies and instead focus on the hard work of building a vot-
ing culture that values election participation and security, as well as ballot privacy and 
fiscal prudence, it would earn more respect and quite possibly better results. 
DoD might prudently consider restricting the scope of its voting responsibili-
ties by requesting that it exclusively serve enlisted personnel and their families and 
be explicitly relieved of all voting technology development activity. FVAP lacks the 
staffing, security expertise, and other components needed for conducting election 
~ 
technology research and development. Until the technology duties have ended, gov-
ernment efficiencies from leveraged expertise could be achieved if the DoD would 
contract with NIST and independent academic scientists for any desired election 
technology research and development. EAC's role as an advisor should be preserved, 
as it is bipartisan and is required to conduct itself with greater transparency than 
DoD. 
If DoD were to support congressional transfer for overseas civilians' voting 
participation into the State Department's care, FVAP and DoD would not only 
streamline their electoral mission and likelihood of success, but also augment the 
possibility of better governmental service for remote civilian voters. DoD Secretary 
Panetta has not yet taken a public stand on FVAP and its technology development 
programs. His leadership is needed to right the FVAP ship. He could require DoD to 
work with OHS in developing an initiative to help correct FVAP's misrepresentations 
regarding the capacity for secure Internet voting in the near future, and assist in the 
American public's development of greater sophistication in cyber security. 
Moving Forward 
Professionalism norms counsel lawyers to deal with facts as they find them, rather 
than to indulge in fictions or assumptions that are more preferable. Applying that 
insight to voting technology requires first that we not trust computer technologies 
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to record and tabulate votes accurately unless a robust quality control system is 
instituted that can provide independent checks of their accuracy. 258 Post-election 
auditing or "recounting" using paper ballot records can provide the independent 
check on the voting machines. 259 Recounting using an extrinsic record independent 
of the software should be recognized as essential for preserving voting rights and 
become a routine practice when computer-based voting equipment is deployed. 
The past two decades of federal regulatory involvement in voting technology 
arguably have produced little public benefit, but rather a striking reduction of elec-
tion security and public accountability. Repeatedly, Congress has allocated voting 
technical policy responsibilities to those who lack the educational background to 
understand a digital voting system's "threat assessment" and how the "insider prob-
lem"-standard concerns within computer security-relates to assuring voting rights. 
Both the EAC and the FVAP have persistently been led by persons who seek the pub-
lic benefit but who lack election law and election technical competence. DOJ's vot-
ing section possesses enviable election law expertise but remains bereft of technical 
capability, though statutory law vests the Department with enforcement of voting 
system standards. If the federal government seeks to shoulder responsibilities in the 
voting technology arena, the law should require that the agencies will be structured 
and led by those who will seek to ensure that scientific facts about computers and 
their security issues are not treated as simply unwelcome opinions. With sound 
intercession by the Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, and congressional 
restructuring of federal election powers, this dangerous trajectory can be corrected. 
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Appendix: Contradictory State Laws Governing Election Fraud and Integrity 
State 
Alabama 
Alaska' 
Arizona' 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Permit all voters to 
Permit UOCAVA return voted ballots 
voters to return ballots electronically? 
electronically? (includes (includes fax, 
No 
fax, e-mail, and 
Internet portal) 
Yes, fax only 
Yes, fax and Internet Pilot 
Program 
No 
Yes, fax only 
Yes, e-mail, fax; Internet 
Pilot Program 
e-mail, and Internet 
portal) 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
Yes, fax only 
Yes, fax or Arizona's 
secure ballot upload 
system 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
Only 
Require ballot secrecy for 
in-person voting? 
Yes: ALA. Com § 17-6-34; voters 
are allowed to have assistance, 
17-9-13 
Yes: ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.060; 
exceptions for disabled 
persons who need assistance , 
15.15.240 
Yes: ARIZ. CONST. art. 7, § 1; 
disability exception: ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. 16-578, 16-580 
Yes: ARK. Com ANN. § 7-5-309; 
disability exception: § 7-5-310, 
-311 
Yes: CAL ELEC. Com §§ 14276, 
14287, 14293; child care 
exception: § 14222 
Yes: Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 1-7-
304, -503; disability exception: 
§ 1-7-11 
-----------~'-·-·~·· '-·----·-·-~·--·--·-·- · ------··---
Connecticut 
Delaware' 
District of 
Columbia 
Floridab 
Georgia 
Hawai' ib 
No 
Yes, e-mail and fax 
Yes, fax and e-mail 
Yes, fax only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
Yes, Internet Pilot Program No, mail or in-person 
only 
Yes, fax only No, mail or in-person 
only 
Notes : Research is current to October 2011 . 
Yes: CoNN. CoNsT. art. 6, § 5, 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-236b; 
disability exception: Co NN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 9-264 
Yes: DEL Co NsT. art. 5, § 1; 
disability exception: DEL. CooE 
ANN. tit. 15, § 4943 
Yes: D.C. Com § 1-1001.09(a) ; 
disability exception: 
Yes: FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 101.041 ; 
disability exception: § 101 .051 
Yes: GA. Com ANN. § 21-2-
70(13); disability exception: 
§ 21-2-385 .1 
Yes : HAw. REv. STAT. § 11-137; 
disability exception,§ 11-139 
a = ID required for in-person voting but allows unsecure electronic voting 
b = Photo ID required for in-person voting but allows unsecure electronic voting 
c = ID required, photo required after DOJ precleareance for in-person voting but allows unsecure 
electronic voting 
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Require ballot secrecy for Require polling 
standard, absentee, or Require ballot secrecy for place voter ID? 
mail-in voting? UOCAVA voting? Photo required? State 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes, UOCAVA voting same as Yes, photo not Alabama 
voting: ALA. Com§ 17-11-9 standard absentee, ALA. Com required 
§ 17-11-9 
--~------ ·-
Yes, for mail and in-person Yes for mail-in absentee, no for Yes, photo not Alaska 
absentee voting; no, for electronic transmission, ALASKA required 
electronic transmission: STAT. § 15.20.066 
ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.066 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee, no for Yes, photo not Arizona 
voting: ARIZ. REv. STAT. fax, Internet, and FWAB votes by required 
§ 16-548 electronic trans (secrecy waiver) ' 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes, same as standard absentee Yes, photo not Arkansas 
voting: ARK. Com ANN. voting, ARK. Com ANN.§ 7-5-412 required 
§ 7-5-412 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting, No California 
voting: CAL. ELEC. Com if faxing must include "Oath 
§ 3017 of Voter" waiving right to 
confidential vote' 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee and Yes, photo not Colorado 
voting: Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. electronic transmission of votes, required 
§ 1-8-101 Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 1-5.5-101 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes, same as standard absentee Yes, photo not Connecticut 
voting: CONN. Grn. STAT. ANN. voting required 
§§ 9-137, -139 
-----·---·~···~ ··-----·-·-··-···--·-·-····-·····----·- ·· ··-····---- ····------· ----------~-----~--·--······-··-·~··-··- ···-··---·····-· ········------- -~~-----------·--·-··-····· 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes if returning voted ballots Yes, photo not Delaware 
voting: DEL. Com ANN. tit. by mail, no for electronic required 
15, § 5504 transmission: DEL. Com ANN. tit. 
15, § 5525 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes when returning voted ballots No District of 
voting: D.C. Com by mail Columbia 
§ 1-1001.09(a) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo ID Florida 
voting: FLA. STAT. ANN. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 101.6103(7); no required 
§ 101.6103 for electronic transmission: FLA. 
ADMIN. Com r. 1S-2.030(6)(f) 
-
---
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo ID Georgia 
voting: GA. Com ANN. GA. CoDE ANN. § 21-2-384(e); required 
§ 21-2-384(b) yes for electronic transmission: 
§ 21-2-387(b)(4) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo ID Hawai'i 
voting: HAw. REv. STAT. § 15-6 HAw. REV. STAT. § 15-6; no for required 
electronic transmission:§ 15-5(2) 
-
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State 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indianab 
Iowa 
Kansas' 
Kentucky 
Louisianab 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michiganb 
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Permit all voters to 
Permit UOCAVA return voted ballots 
voters to return ballots electronically? 
electronically? (includes (includes fax, 
fax, e-mail, and 
Internet portal) 
Yes, e-mail and fax for 
emergencies 
No 
Yes, e-mail and fax 
Yes, e-mail and fax : 
military only in combat 
zones 
Yes, e-mail and fax 
No 
Yes, fax only 
Yes, fax only 
No 
Yes, e-mail and fax 
No 
e-mail, and Internet 
portal) 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
Yes, fax only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
Notes: Research is current to October 2011 . 
Require ballot secrecy for 
in-person voting? 
Yes: loAHO CoDE ANN.§ 34-1107; 
disability exception: § 34-1108 
Yes: ILL. CoNST. art. 3, § 4 ; 
disability exception: 10 ILL 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17-14 
Yes: IND. CoDE § 3-11-7.5-8, 
3-11-13-8; disability exception: 
§ 3-11-9-2 
Yes: IowA CoDE ANN. § 49.84; 
disability exception: § 49.90 
Yes : KAN. CONST. art. 4, § 1; 
disability exception: KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-2909 
Yes: KY. CoNsT. § 147; disability 
exception: KY. REV. STAT. 
117.255 
Yes : LA. CONST. art. 11, § 2; 
disability exception: LA. REv. 
STAT. ANN. 18:106 
Yes : ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit . 21-A, 
§ 671 ( 8); disability exception: 
§ 672 
Yes: Mo. CoDE, ELEC. LAw, 
§ 9-203; disability exception: 
10-310 
Yes: MAss . Co NsT. pt. 1, art. 9; 
disability exception: MAss. GEN. 
LAws ANN. ch. 54, § 79 
Yes: MICH. CoNsT. art . 2, § 4; 
disability exception: MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 168.751 
a = ID required for in-person voting but allows unsecure electronic voting 
b = Photo ID required for in-person voting but allows unsecure electronic voting 
c = ID required, photo required after DOJ precleareance for in-person voting but allows unsecure 
electronic voting 
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Require ballot secrecy for Require polling 
standard, absentee, or Require ballot secrecy for place voter ID? 
mail-in voting? UOCAVA voting? Photo required? State 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo ID Idaho 
voting: IDAHO CoDE ANN. IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 34-1004; required 
§ 34-1004 undetermined for faxed votes: 
§ 34-201 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: 10 No Illinois 
voting: 10 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/20-5 
ANN. 5/19-5 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo ID Indiana 
voting: IND. CoDE § 3-11-10-1 IND. CoDE § 3-11-10-1; no for required 
electronic transmission: 3-11-10-
1(b), 3-11-4-6(h) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No Iowa 
voting: IOWA CODE ANN. IowA ADM IN. CoDE r. 721-
§ 53.17 21.320(3); no for electronic 
transmission: r. (')(a) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Photo ID required Kansas 
voting: KAN. STAT. ANN. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 25-1221; no after Jan. 1, 2012 
§ 25-1120 for electronic transmission: 
§ 25-1216 
-·-·-------
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail in absentee votes: KY. Yes, photo not Kentucky 
voting: KY. REv. STAT. REV. STAT.§ 117.086 required 
§ 117.086 
Yes, for mail-in absentee No secrecy for UOCAVA voters, Yes, photo ID Louisiana 
voting: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. even by mail: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. required 
§ 18:1310(A)(1) § 18:1310(A)(2) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No Maine 
voting: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, 
21-A, § 754-A § 782; electronically returned 
ballots to be handled same as 
mailed:§ 783(5) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee No distinction made for military No Maryland 
voting: Mo. CooE, Enc. LAW absentee voters 
§ 9-303, 310 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No Massachusetts 
voting: MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 54, § 87; 
ch. 54, § 92 no for electronic transmission: 
§ 95 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee Yes, photo ID Michigan 
voting: MICH. COM P. LAWS voting: MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. required 
ANN. § 168.764a § 168.764a; no for electronic 
transmission MICH . CoMP. LAws 
ANN. §168.759a(8) 
-
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Permit all voters to 
Permit UOCAVA return voted ballots 
voters to return ballots electronically? 
electronically? (includes (includes fax, 
State 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri' 
Montana' 
No 
fax, e-mail, and 
Internet portal) 
Yes, e-mail and fax 
Yes, e-mail and fax in 
hostile fire areas only 
Yes, e-mail and fax 
Nebraska Yes , e-mail and fax 
Nevada Yes, e-mail and fax 
New Hampshire No 
New Jersey Yes, e-mail and fax 
New Mexico' Yes, e-mail and fax 
New York No 
Notes: Research is current to October 2011. 
e-mail, and Internet 
portal) 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
Require ballot secrecy for 
in-person voting? 
Yes: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204C.18 ; 
disability exception:§ 204C.15 
Yes: Miss. CoDE ANN.§ 23-15-
465; disability exception: 
§ 23-15-549 
Yes: Mo . CONST. art. 8, § 3; 
disability exception: Mo. REv. 
STAT. § 115.445 
Yes : Mo NT. CONST. art. 4, § 1; 
disability exception: Mo NT. CoDE 
ANN.§ 13-13-119 
Yes : Nm. CONST. art. VI, § 6; 
disability exception: Nm. REv. 
STAT. § 32-918 
Yes: NEv. REv. STAT. § 293.2546 ; 
disability exception: § 293 .296 
Yes : N.H. CoNsT. pt. 1, art . 11; 
disability exception: N.H. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 659.20 
Yes : N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 19:15-26; 
disability exception: N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 19:50-3 
Yes: N .M. CoNsT. art. 7, § 1; 
disability exception: N .M. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-12-15 (1978) 
Yes: N.Y. CoNsT. art. 2, § 7; 
disability exception: N .Y. Euc. 
CODE § 8-306 
a= ID required for in-person voting but allows unsecure electronic voting 
b = Photo ID required for in-person voting but allows unsecure electronic voting 
c = ID required, photo required after DOJ precleareance for in-person voting but allows unsecure 
electronic voting 
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Require ballot secrecy for Require polling 
standard, absentee, or Require ballot secrecy for place voter ID? 
mail-in voting? UOCAVA voting? Photo required? State 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No Minnesota 
voting: MINN. STAT. ANN. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 203B.21; 
§ 203B.07 Electronic retun not allowed 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee vot ing: No Mississippi 
voting: Miss. Com ANN. Miss. Com ANN.§ 23-15-699(2); 
§ 23-15-631, 633 electronic t ransmission security 
not guaranteed,§ 23 -1 5-699(5) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo not Missouri 
voting: Mo. REv. STAT. Mo. REv. STAT. § 115.291; no required 
§ 115.291 mention of secrecy for elect ronic 
transmission: 115.291(3), (4) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo not Montana 
voting: MoNT. Com ANN. MoNT. Com ANN.§ 13 -13-241; required 
§ 13-13-201 no guarantee of elect ron ic 
transmission secrecy: § 13-21-207 
-·····-----------··· 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No Nebraska 
voting: NEB. REv. STAT. NEB. REv. STAT.§ 39-939.02(6); no 
§ 32.947 mention of secrecy for elect ronic 
transmission 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No Nevada 
voting: NEv. REv. STAT. NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.3157(2); 
§ 293.325 no for electronic t ransm ission: 
§ 293.3157(3) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No New 
voting: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 657:17; Hampshire 
§ 657:17 no electronic return of voted 
materials allowed 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No New Jersey 
voting: N.J. STAT. ANN. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:59-10; no for 
§ 19:63-16 electronic transmission of voted 
ballot:§ 19:59-14 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee Yes, photo not New Mexico 
voting: N.M. STAT. ANN. voting: N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 1-6- required 
§ 1-6-9(A) (1978) 9(B) (1978); no for electronic 
transmission: § 1-6-9(C) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No New York 
voting: N.Y. ELEC. Com N.Y. ELEc. CooE § 10-112; no 
§ 8-410 electronic t ransmission allowed: 
§ 10-107(2) 
~ 
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1 
Permit all voters to 
Permit UOCAVA return voted ballots 
voters to return ballots electronically? 
electronically? (includes (includes fax , 
fax , e-mail , and e-mail , and Internet Require ballot secrecy for 
State Internet portal) portal) in -person voting? 
North Carolina Yes, e-mail and fax No, mail or in-person Yes: N .C. GEN. STAT. § 163 -166.2, 
only art. 6 ; disability exception: N.C. 
GEN . STAT. AN N. § 163 -166.8 
North Dakota• Yes, e-mail and fax No, mail or in-person Yes: N.D. CoNsT. art. 2, § 1; 
only disabilit y exception: N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 16.1-13-27 
-----···--·--···-··-········-- ·-··-·-- ---
Ohio No No, mail or in-person Yes: OHIO REv. CoDE § 3599.20; 
only disability exception: § 3505.24 
Oklahoma' Yes, fax only No, mail or in-person Yes: O KLA. STAT. ANN. tit . 12, I 
only § 2507; disability except ion : 
O KLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, 
§ 7-123 .3 
Oregon Yes, fax only No, mail or in-person Yes: O R. REV. STAT. § 254.472; 
only disability exception: § 254.445 
·-----
Pennsylvania No No, mail or in-person Yes : PA. CoNsT. art . 7, § 4; 
only disability exception: 25 PA. STAT. 
ANN. § 3058 
Rhode Island Yes, fax only No, mail or in-person Yes : R.I. GEN. LAws § 17-19-24; 
only disability exception: § 17-19-
26.1 
South Carolina' Yes, e-mail and fax No, m ail or in-person Yes: S.C. CoNsT. art. 2 , § 1; 
only disability exception: S.C. CoDE 
§ 7-13-770 
Sout h Dakota No No, m ail or in-person Yes: S.D. CoNsT. art. 7, § 3; 
only disability exception: S. D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 12-18-25 
I 
Tennessee Yes, fax only No, mail or in-person Yes: TENN. CoDE ANN. § 2-7-103; 
only disability exception:§ 2-7-116 
Notes: Research is current to October 2011 . 
a= ID required for in-person voting but allows unsecure electronic vot ing 
b = Photo ID requ ired for in-person voting but allows unsecure electronic voting 
c = ID required, photo required after DOJ precleareance for in-person vot ing but allows unsecure 
electronic voting 
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Require ballot secrecy for Requ ire polling 
standar d , absentee, or Requir e ballot secr ecy for place voter ID? 
mail-in voting? UOCAVA voting? Photo required? State 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No North 
voting: N .C. GEN. STAT. AN N. N .C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163- Carolina 
§ 163-231 250; no mention of secrecy for 
electronic t ransmission : § 163-
257 
-------------.. --·--·-·- ··----
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo not North Dakota 
voting: N .D. CENT. Com N.D. CENT. Com § 16.1-07-11 ; required 
§ 16.1-07-11 no specific secrecy guidelines for 
electronic return of voted ballots: 
§ 16.1-07-05(2) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo not Ohio 
voting: OHIO REv. Com OHIO REv. Com§ 3511.09; no required 
§ 3509.05 electronic transmission permitted 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: After July 1, 2011, Oklahoma 
voting: O KLA. STAT. AN N. tit. O KLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 14-120 ; yes, photo not 
26, § 14-108 no for electronic t ransmission: required 
§ 14-118.1 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No Oregon 
voting: OR. REv. STAT. O R. REV. STAT. § 253 .515; no for 
§ 253.070 electronic transmission :§ 253.690 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: 25 No Pennsylvania 
voting: 25 PA. STAT. ANN. PA. STAT. ANN. § 3146 .6; electronic 
§ 3146.6 t ransmission not perm itted 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No Rhode Island 
voting: R.I. GEN. LAws R.I. GEN. LAws § 17-20-22; no 
§ 17-20-26 mention of security for faxed 
ballots : § 17-20-6.1 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo not Sout h Carolina 
voting: S.C. Com § 7-15-385 S.C. Com § 7-15-385 ; electronic required. Photo 
transmission secrecy not ID law after 
discussed:§ 7-15-460 preclearance from 
DO] 
Yes, for mail- in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: ID requested, South Dakota 
voting: S.D. CornmD LAWS S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 12-19-10; no without ID 
§ 12-19-7 elect ronic t ransmission permitted affidavit required 
to cast regular 
ballot 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo not Tennessee 
voting: TENN. Com ANN. TENN. Com ANN. § 2-6-502(f); required. Photo ID 
§ 2-6-202 no specific details of secrecy for required after Jan . 
electronic transmission of votes: 1, 2012 
§ 2-6 -502(e) 
-
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State 
Texas' 
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Permit UOCAVA 
voters to return ballots 
electronically? (includes 
fax, e-mail, and 
Internet portal) 
Yes, fax for military only 
in combat zones 
Permit all voters to 
return voted ballots 
electronically? 
(includes fax, 
e-mail, and Internet 
portal) 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
Require ballot secrecy for 
in-person voting? 
Yes: TEX. CONST. art. 6, § 4 ; 
disability exception: TEX. ELEC. 
Com ANN. § 64.301 
: 
I' 
I 
----------·-------·---·--------------------------·-·····-----····-··-'"'-··-··-·~·~--··-
Utah' 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington' 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin' 
Wyoming 
Yes, e-mail and fax in No, mail or in-person Yes: UTAH CoNsT. art. 4, § 8 ; 
combat zones only disability exception: UTAH Com 
ANN.§ 20A-3-108 
No 
No 
Yes , fax only followed by 
submission of paper ballot 
Yes , e-mail, fax, and 
Internet Pilot Program 
No 
No 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
No, mail or in-person 
only 
Yes : VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, 
§ 2504; disability exception: 
Yes : VA. CoNsT. art. 2, § 3; 
disability exception: VA. CooE 
ANN. § 24.2-649 
Yes : WASH . CONST. art. 6, § 6; 
disability exception: REV. Com 
WASH. § 29A.40.160 
Yes : W. VA. CoNsT. art. 4, § 2; 
disability exception: W. VA. 
Com § 3-4A-22 
Yes: Wis . CoNsT. art. 3, § 3; 
disability exception: Wis. STAT. 
ANN. § 6.82 
Yes: WYo. CoNsT. art. 6, § 11; 
disability exception: WYO. STAT. 
ANN.§ 22-13-113 
Notes: Research is current to October 2011. 
a = ID required for in-person voting but allows unsecure electronic voting 
b = Photo ID required for in-person voting but allows unsecure electronic voting 
c = ID required, photo required after DOJ precleareance for in-person voting but allows unsecure 
electronic voting 
.......... ..!.. 
1, 
~ 
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Require ballot secrecy for Require polling 
standard, absentee, or Require ballot secrecy for place voter ID? 
m ail-in voting? UOCAVA voting? Photo required? State 
Yes , for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo not Texas 
voting: TEX. ELEc. Com ANN. TEX. fa EC. Com ANN. § 86.005 ; yes required. Photo 
§ 86 .005 for secret transmission of voted ID law after 
ballot electronically: § 105.001 preclearance from 
DOJ 
--
----··----
-...... _____________ 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: Yes, photo n ot Utah 
voting: UTAH CooE ANN. UTAH Com ANN.§ 20A-3-408 ; required 
§ 20A-3-307 no for electronic transmission of 
voted ballots : § 20A-3 -408.5 (5) 
(a) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No Vermont 
voting: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2543 ; 
§ 2543 electronic t ransmission of voted 
ballots not permitted 
····-------·--·-·-·-···-·----···--·-··-·-····-··-·-·--·······-------·--·······-··------ . ·-··--··----····----····-----
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail- in absentee voting: Yes, photo not Virginia 
voting: VA. Com ANN. § 24.2- VA. Com AN N. § 24.2 -707; required 
707 electron ic transmission of voted 
ballots not permitted 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee Yes, photo not Washington 
voting: WASH. REv. Com ANN. vot ing: WASH. REv. Com ANN. required 
§ 29A.40.091 § 29A.40.091; yes for electronic 
t ransmission of voted ballot s: 
§ 29A.40.091(4) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voting: No West Virginia 
voting: W. VA. Com § 3-3-5 W. VA. Com § 3-3-5; no for 
electronic t ransmission of voted 
ballot s: § 3-3-5(e)(2)(A) 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail- in absentee voters: ID requested, Wisconsin 
voting: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.87 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.87; electronic not requi red to 
transmission of voted ballots is present unt il Feb. 
not permitted 2012 primary 
elect ion 
Yes, for mail-in absentee Yes for mail-in absentee voters: No Wyoming 
voting: Wvo. STAT. ANN. Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-113, 115 ; 
§ 22-9-113 , 115 elect ronic transmission of voted 
ballot s is n ot permitted 
-
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Notes 
1. See RoY G. SALTMAN, THE HISTORY AND PoLITics OF VonNG TECHNOLOGY: IN QUEST OF INTEG-
RITY AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 160-69 (2006) [hereinafter SALTMAN]; see also DOUGLAS w. }ONES & 
BARBARA SIMONS, BROKEN BALLOTS: WILL YouR VoTE CouNT? 135-41 (2012) [hereinafter BROKEN 
BALLOTS] (reviewing examples of federal voting technology regulatory inadequacy and the cer-
tification of problematic voting systems). 
2. The Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (2002) [hereinafter 
HAVA], provided financial incentives for state governments to replace mechanical voting 
equipment with electronic, computer-controlled systems. All statutory sections cited in the 
text or notes that omit full citation are HAVA sections. While HAVA did not explicitly man-
date state transition to software-controlled systems, as a whole HAVA mandated particular 
functionality that was largely realized by electronic components. HAVA provided sufficient 
financial incentives and performance mandates so that e-voting was achieved virtually 
nationwide. 
3. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), http://www.eac.gov, generally 
follows the recommendations of the scientists at the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST) in approving qualified laboratories for conducting voting system testing. 
http:I/www.eac.gov/testing_ and_ certification/ laboratory_ accreditation. aspx. Collabora -
tively, the two agencies have substantially strengthened the qualifications for lab certifica-
tion and for lab testing. See id. (linking to manuals that detail the requirements). These vital 
steps forward have unfortunately been undermined by a U.S. Department of Defense agency, 
the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), which had sought to sidestep the certification 
process in developing its voting system. See section titled Litigation and Enforcement Strategies. 
4. Political scientists refer to the "residual vote rate" to describe the top-of-ballot elec-
toral races that do not register a vote; this is often considered an indicator of voter balloting 
error. Stephen Ansolabehere and Charles Stewart III concluded, "If all jurisdictions in the 
United States that used punch cards in 2000 had used optically scanned ballots instead, we 
estimate that approximately 500,000 more votes would have been attributed to presidential 
candidates nationwide." Residual Votes Attributable to Technology, 67 ]. PoL. 365-89 (2009). 
David Kimball analyzed the residual-votes data from the Ohio 2004 general election, disag-
gregating it by racial group and by income. Kimball concluded that 
systems without an error-prevention feature (e.g., punch card ballots and 
central-count optical scan ballots) produce a more dramatic increase in residual 
votes in counties with low median incomes and large percentages of African-
American residents. By comparison, systems with an error-prevention feature 
(DRE voting machines and precinct-count optical scan ballots) do not yield 
such a dramatic increase in residual votes in counties with low median incomes 
or large African-American populations. 
David C. Kimball, Expert's Report (submitted in support of plaintiffs in ACLU of Ohio v. 
Brunner 1, 11-12 (2008), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ 
ACLUOH-Motionforpreliminaryinjunction 1-28-08AppD. pdf). 
--
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5. With few exceptions, HAVA requires voting systems used in federal elections to 
have the capacity to notify the voter of balloting errors, including overvotes (selecting too 
many choices for the race), and to permit the voter to correct the ballot before it is cast and 
counted. 42 U.S.C. § 15302. 
6. The EAC maintains records of the locations using federally certified voting systems. 
At this writing, only a dozen of the over 7,000 local electoral jurisdictions have such voting 
systems deployed for 2012. See http://www.eac.gov/testing_ and_ certification/testing_ and_ 
certification_program.aspx (providing a map identifying locations of federally certified vot-
ing equipment). While HAVA required the creation of federal minimum standards and also a 
certification program, per HAVA § 15231(a)(2), state governments retain the power to ignore 
the federal "voluntary" standards and certification testing. But the states are nevertheless 
bound by the HAVA statutory minimums that are compulsory, not voluntary. See HAVA 
§ 15481(a) (delineating mandatory requirements for all voting systems used in federal elec-
tions), http://www.eac.gov/testing_and_certification/voluntary _ voting_system_guidelines 
.aspx. Unfortunately, little legal attention has been dedicated to enforcing these mandatory 
provisions. See infra Litigation and Enforcement Strategies. 
7. Fortunately, most absentee ballots will at least provide a voter-created record that 
can be recounted or audited. The vast number of absentee ballots not cast at polling loca-
tions or the election offices are marked on paper and returned via postal mail for conven-
tional tabulation by optical scanning equipment. Some states, such as Ohio, define all early 
voting as "absentee," regardless of whether voters cast ballots in person at the local Board 
of Election during early voting periods. See OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 3509.02, 3509.03 (West 
2010). 
8. See http://www.eac.gov/testing_ and_ certification/ certified_ voting_systems.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
9. The most comprehensive and definitive of these scientific studies, the California 
Top to Bottom Review (TTBR) and the Ohio EVEREST assessment, reviewed multiple vot-
ing systems. Each of the reports submitted in these studies includes an Executive Summary 
written for lay readers lacking technical training. See, e.g., the Source Code and Red Team 
Reports for Diebold/Premier, Sequoia, and Hart InterCivic voting systems, found at the Cali-
fornia Secretary of State's website, http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/top-to-
bottom-review.htm. One of the Ohio EVEREST reports, from the academic team, can be 
found at EVEREST: EVALUATION AND VALIDATION OF ELEcnoN-RELATED EQUIPMENT, STANDARDS AND 
TESTING (2007), http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/upload/everest/14-AcademicFinalEVEREST 
Report.pdf. The Ohio Secretary of State's office has removed several of the EVEREST reports, 
but the former Secretary Brunner's Executive Summary of all EVEREST reports (commer-
cial vendors' and the academic experts', which basically confirm one another and the TTBR) 
is still available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/everest/00-SecretarysEVEREST 
ExecutiveReport.pdf (hereinafter Project EVEREST Executive Report). Some fair elections 
organizations have announced plans to post copies of all studies on their websites as a public 
library resource. For example, Verified Voting plans this step in an expanded online library. 
Conversation with the Verified Voting President, Pam Smith (July 2011). A shorter pre-
sentation of the EVEREST study focusing only on deficiencies of ES&S voting systems (the 
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nation's largest company and controlling more votes than any other system) can be found at 
Adam Aviv et al., Security Evaluation of ES&S Voting Machines and Election Management System 
(2008), http://micah.cis.upenn.edu/papers/aviv-evt08.pdf. A relatively comprehensive list-
ing of the scientific studies conducted through 2008 with links to their public reports can 
be found in MATT B1sHor, MARK GRAFF, CANDICE HoKE, DAVID JEFFERSON & SEAN PEISERT, RESOLVING 
THE UNEXPECTED IN ELECTIONS: ELECTION OrncIALs' OPTIONS, Appendix 2: Partial List of Voting 
Systems Studies at 22-27 (2008), available at http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/bishop/notes/2008-
forensic/index.html (providing a guide to indicators of possible electronic malfunctions and 
forensic assessments to determine whether the vote tabulation reports deserve trust). 
The "tiny fraction" the text mentions has not yet been the subject of independent assess-
ments. In the previous edition of America Votes!, the types of voting equipment problems that 
jurisdictions experienced in the 2008 presidential cycle and the scientific studies that had 
predicted the equipment's performance failures were inventoried. These deficiencies related 
to functional reliability, security from tampering, tabulation accuracy, and voter privacy. See 
Candice Hoke & David Jefferson, Voting and Registration Technology Issues: Lessons from 2008, 
in AMERICA VoTEs! 37-64 (Benjamin E. Griffith ed., Supp. 2009) [hereinafter Voting and Reg-
istration Technology Issues]. 
10. See Candice Hoke, judicial Protection of Popular Sovereignty: Redressing Voting Technology, 
CASE W. L. REV. (Symposium; forthcoming summer 2012) (translating the definitive scientific 
and engineering assessments of voting system quality and security into legal concepts relevant 
to election law; noting that the premier scientists in the relevant field "have counseled the 
public and election officials that without other corrections and quality assurance steps, these 
machines are unfit for voting") (emphasis in original). Two definitive studies convened by state 
Secretaries of State explicitly translated the scientific findings. The California TTBR research 
team explained that their studies "demonstrated that the security mechanisms provided for 
all systems analyzed were inadequate to ensure accuracy and integrity of the election results and of 
the systems that provide those results." Id. (emphasis added). The EVEREST academic research-
ers' ultimate conclusion stressed, "All of the studied systems possess critical security failures 
that render [them] insufficient to guarantee a trustworthy election." Id. (quoting Project EVEREST 
Executive Report, supra note 9, at 35). It is not that the vote totals will always be accurate or 
inaccurate. The voting system software does not report when it has erred or been modified sur-
reptitiously and when it is accurate. Unless producing an "implausible" error (see Ellen Theisen, 
Ballot-Scanner Voting System Failures in the News-Partial List, VorERsUNm.ORG (May 22, 2009), 
available at http://www.votersunite.org/Info/OpScansinTheNews.pdf), such as more total bal-
lots cast than registered voters, no indicators may surface. Thus, software bugs, tampering, or 
even election officials' and voters' inadvertent errors with the equipment can produce errone-
ous tallies that can lead to structural disenfranchisement of the voting public or some sub-
set. Currently, other than a few statistically sound post-election auditing programs, election 
officials are not required to check on the accuracy of the machine-generated results. In other 
states (e.g., Virginia), laws prohibit manual recounts, the only effective current check on the 
machine counts. Florida conducts "recounts" by using the same software-produced precinct 
results, which cannot identify a software problem with the count. 
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11. Voting and Registration Technology Issues, supra note 9, at 37-58 (reviewing the record 
of voting system dysfunctions during the 2008 primary and general election cycle) . Few 
jurisdictions have changed voting system equipment since 2008. 
12. The vendors have compensated computer scientists to serve as experts. They have 
claimed that use of the software is "reasonable,'' implying that a low rate of errors occurs. See, 
e.g., defendants' expert reports submitted in Schade v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 930 A.2d 
304, 328 (Md. 2007) (deferring to the state board of elections' judgment in certifying DREs 
that lacked a voter verified paper audit trail), and in Gusciora v. Corzine, No. MER-L-2691-04, 
2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 2319 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2010) (holding that state's certification 
of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units did not violate voters' state constitutional 
rights) . But the supposed scientific experts have not revealed that no comprehensive statistical 
study of the error rates of this voting equipment in actual elections has occurred, nor even of 
the error rates in some elections where errors in the final tabulations have been documented. 
No authoritative power-courts, the EAC, or state Secretaries of State-have convened a study 
independent of the vendors to determine error rates produced by the equipment in the field as 
used in real elections. 
The Schade court additionally credited the supposed "accessibility" of the electronic equip-
ment, but that ruling was not based on qualified testimony but apparently on the marketing 
representations by vendors. By contrast, when a qualified accessibility engineer with over three 
decades of experience in developing and testing assistive technologies tested the "accessible" 
voting devices with volunteer voters of varying physical needs, he documented their failures to 
satisfy the legal requirements for accessibility as well as their abject failure in meeting security 
standards. See infra note 163 (reviewing accessibility engineer Noel Runyan's studies). 
13. 42 u.s.c. §§ 15301-15545. 
14. See supra note 5. 
15. The National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) has repeatedly called for the 
EAC's termination, most recently in 2011, when it voted to establish a task force on real-
locating the EAC's legal duties to other agencies. See NASS Resolution Establishing a Task 
Force on the Future Disposition of EAC Duties (July 13, 2011), http://www.nass.org/index 
.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=87&Itemid=386. The controversy over the 
EAC's contracted voter fraud study provided one flash point. See Rick Hasen, Indiana Secretary 
of State Rokita, the EAC Controversy, and the Incidence of Voter Fraud, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Apr. 11, 
2001), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/008228.html. The EAC Inspector General reports 
have detailed an assortment of legal infractions and nonfeasance. E.g., Report of Investigation: 
Preparation of the Voter Fraud and Voter Intimidation Report, U.S. ELECTION Ass1sTANCE CoMM1ss10N, 
OmcE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (March 2008), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/ 
EAC%20Inspector%20General%20Report%20on%20the%20Preparation%20of%20the%20 
Voter%20Fraud%20and%20Voter%20Intimidation.pdf. See generally Office of Inspector General 
Reports, U.S. ELECTION Ass1sTANCE CoMM1ss10N, http://archives.eac.gov/eac_ig/reports-folder (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2012). This author considers the EAC in need of structural reform and recon-
stitution to be a technically capable entity, with appropriate computer security and usability 
engineering knowledge at every level, on a bipartisan basis. 
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16. The EAC has advised on the scope of its activities while it lacks Commissioners. 
http: //www.eac.gov/blogs/ work_continues_at_the_eac/. In January 2012, the EAC's combi-
nation Acting Executive Director and General Counsel issued a memo directing the EAC's 
37-member Board of Advisors and 110-member Standards Board to cease all official activi-
ties, at http://www.eac.gov/about_the_eac/ eac_advisory_boards.aspx. 
17. As this chapter goes into print, President Obama's proposed budget includes an 
appropriation for the EAC. http: //blog.lib.umn.edu/ cspg/ peea/images/ EAC.FY13.Pres.budget 
.request.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2012). Despite NASS's resolutions calling for termination 
of the EAC, even more recently NASS passed a resolution calling for the continued activi-
ties of the EAC Standards Board and Board of Advisors. NASS referred to these Boards as 
"essential to the continued development of standards for election administration." NASS 
Resolution on the Continued Functioning of the EAC Standards Board and Board of Advisors (Jan. 
28, 2012 ), http://www.nass.org/index.php ?option=com_content&view=article&id =87 &Ite 
mid=386. Professor Rick Hasen blogged about the "hypocrisy" shown by these two resolu-
tions, but they can be reconciled. The July 2011 resolution calling for EAC termination was 
passed on the last day of the NASS conference after more than a majority of the Secretaries 
had departed, and was not listed as an action item on the NASS agenda. The January 2012 
resolution reflects the judgment of a majority of Secretaries, and evidently a commitment to 
EAC's continuation in some form. 
18. Voting and Registration Technology Issues, supra note 9. 
19. A systematic critique of the federal regulatory structure addressing voting technolo-
gies is beyond the scope of this chapter. Voting and Registration Technology Issues, supra note 9, 
passim addresses some of these deficiencies. 
20. While HAVA is silent on private rights of action to enforce these standards, litiga-
tion will undoubtedly ensue to affirm these powers to enforce civil rights within the elec-
torate instead of only partisan-connected leaders. 42 U.S.C. § 15511 (detailing the Attorney 
General's powers to enforce the minimum "uniform and nondiscriminatory election tech-
nology and administration requirements" detailed in specified HAVA sections that include 
§ 15481, Voting Systems Standards). 
21. See P.B. Stark & D.A. Wagner, Evidence-Based Elections, IEEE Security and Privacy, 
http:// statistics.berkeley.edu/ -stark/Preprints/ evidenceVote12. pdf (pre-publication version; 
publication forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Evidence-Based Elections]. Their paper proceeds 
from the premise that under current software development processes and as documented in 
definitive voting system studies, software-based voting systems cannot provide high assurance 
that election results are accurate. But the results may be accurate and can be verified using 
statistically valid, relatively rapid methods. 
Scientists Ron Rivest and John Wack first developed the concept and justification for a 
"software-independent" verification of election results as part of the EAC's development of 
voting systems standards. See R. Rivest, On the Notion of "Software Independence" in Voting 
Systems, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'y A, 3759 (2008) (explaining its use as remedy for 
errors endemic to computer-based elections systems). 
Professors Phillip Stark and David Wagner elaborate Rivest's and Wack's foundational 
concept: 
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A voting system is strongly software-independent if an undetected error or 
change to its software cannot produce an undetectable change in the outcome, 
and we can find the correct outcome without re-running the election. Strong 
software-independence does not mean the voting system has no software; 
rather, it means that even if its software has a flaw that causes it to give the 
wrong outcome, the overall system still produces "breadcrumbs" (an audit trail) 
from which we can find the true outcome, despite any flaw in the software. 
Systems that produce voter-verifiable paper records (for instance, voter marked 
paper ballots) as an audit trail are strongly software-independent, provided the 
integrity of that audit trail is maintained, because the audit trail can be used to 
determine the true outcome. 
Evidence-Based Elections at 2 (emphasis added) . 
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22. A DRE is a direct recording electronic voting unit that digitally records voters' 
choices. The current generation of DREs tends to feature a touchscreen as the mechanism on 
which voters indicate their choices, theoretically translated into electronic signals that enter 
votes into the electronic "buckets" for each candidate consistent with the voters' choices. 
Independent testing has shown that these all-electronic units can be made to "cheat"-either 
deliberately by human tampering or inadvertently because of buggy software or other defects . 
See the California TTBR of voting systems, http ://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/ 
top-to-bottom-review.htm, and the Ohio EVEREST assessments, http://siis.cse.psu.edu/ 
everest.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). The iVotronics DREs' alleged flaws generated the 
hotly contested Florida-13 congressional race that resulted in numerous investigations and 
litigation. Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n of Fla., 958 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007); Government Accountability Office (GAO), Further Testing Could Provide Increased 
but Not Absolute Assurance That Voting Systems Did Not Cause Undervotes in Florida's 13th Con-
gressional District, GA0-08-97T (Oct. 2, 2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/82321 .pdf. 
23. South Carolina uses all-electronic DRE touchscreen voting devices, specifically the 
ES&S iVotronic, that do not produce an independent paper record to provide a check on the 
computer's software-recorded votes and tabulations. See Duncan Buell, E. Hare, F. Heindel, C. 
Moore & B. Zia, Auditing a DRE-Based Election in South Carolina, Electronic Voting Technology/ 
Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE'11) (Aug. 2011) [hereinafter S.C. League]. 
24. The Bradblog reported, "Lancaster County paper absentee ballots went to Rawl 
84% to 16%. The unverifiable touch-screens in the same county, however, said Rawl lost 
the county by 17%. Greene received more votes than were cast in 25 Spartanburg County pre-
cincts. The votes of 50 other precincts were missing from the final count. Statewide, the virtually 
unknown Greene somehow managed to captured 60% of the vote, according to the iVotronic 
DREs." http ://www.bradblog.com/?p=8796 (initial emphasis in original, the remainder 
emphases added). David Axelrod, President Obama's senior advisor, commented, "The whole 
thing is odd .... I don't really know how to explain it, and I don't think anybody else does 
either." Brian Knowlton, More Questions About Mysterious South Carolina Senate Candidate, 
http : I /thecaucu s. blogs .nytimes. com/ 2010I06I13 I more-questions-about-mysterious-sou th-
carolina-senate-candidate /. 
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25. A widely remarked disparity lay in the proportion of paper ballot absentee ballot 
votes for each candidate versus the electronic ballots cast on Election Day at the polls with 
no auditable record. "House Democratic whip James Clyburn of South Carolina has called 
for a federal investigation into the 'shenanigans' and claims up to three state races may have 
been tampered with." Patrik Jonsson, South Carolina Head Scratcher: More Curiosities in Elec-
tion of Alvin Greene (June 12, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/ USA/ Politics/ 2010/ 0612/ 
South-Carolina-head-scratcher-More-curiosities-in-election-of-Alvin-Greene. The Christian 
Science Monitor reported that the strongest Democratic candidate seeking to be GOP Senator 
DeMint's general election opponent, Vic Rawl, had been rated highly competitive because he 
was trailing in opinion polling by only single digits. "Republicans feared DeMint's seat was 
not, in fact, secure and a progressive insurgency could put Rawl ahead of him in Novem-
ber." Id . A mathematician compared the statewide Democratic primary races and found 
the electronic and paper absentee ballot ratios anomalous only in this race. K. Dopp, South 
Carolina 2010 Democratic United States Senate Primary Election, http://kathydopp.com/ 
wordpress/?p=98 (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). Rawl's post-election statistical experts noted 
anomalies; Rawl did "significantly better in absentee paper ballots than on Election Day. 
'In 10 counties we did 20 percent better. In one county we did 43 percent better. We looked 
at the other races on the ballot and that wasn't the case .... In 25 precincts in one county, 
Greene got more votes than were reported to have been cast,"' referring to Spartanburg County. 
"In 50 other precincts in that county, votes were missing." Election Expert, Opposition Cam-
paign Suspect Foul Play in S.C. Primary, NEWSWEEK DAILY BEAST, June 11, 2010 (emphasis added) . 
But see Joseph Bafumi, Michael C. Herron, Seth J. Hill & Jeffrey B. Lewis, Alvin Greene? 
Who? How Did He Win the United States Senate Nomination in South Carolina?, http://www 
.dartmouth.edu/ -herron/ greene.pdf (working paper 2010) (arguing that statistical analysis 
shows the apparent anomalies to be within the range of normal disparities between absentee 
and in-person voting). 
26. Although one deficiency of the all-electronic DRE voting devices defeats effective 
audits of whether the machine accurately recorded each voter's selections, the League of 
Women Voters was able to audit a different task: whether the countywide reported tabula-
tions of results reflected vote records from every voting device used in the election. The tabu-
lations were often incomplete. See S.C. League, supra note 23 . 
27. Peggy J. Brown & Barbara Zia, Can the State Election Commission Do Its fob?, THE STATE 
(Columbia, S.C.), http://www.thestate.com/ 2011/08 / 24/1944276/ brown-zia-can-state-
election-commission.html [hereinafter Brown & Zia]. See also S.C. League, supra note 23. 
28. Brown & Zia, supra note 27. Note that counting some voters' ballots more than 
once ineluctably dilutes the voting weight of other voters' cast ballots and thus generates vote 
dilution proscribed by law. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (citing 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964), and noting, "The right to vote can be affected by 
a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."). 
29. See, e.g., County Blames ES&S Software for Error in Vote Totals, http ://eyeonwilliamson 
.org/?p=648 (providing materials from System Counts Too Many Votes, TAYLOR DAILY PRESS, 
Nov. 16, 2006, regarding Williamson County, Texas, vote totals that were roughly three 
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times greater than the number of voters casting ballots and reporting that ES&S claimed 
human error in the county). 
30. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Antitrust Division, joined by nine states, 
sued vendor Election Systems and Software, Inc., for violations of Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, caused by the corporation's covert purchase of the former Diebold/Pre-
mier election systems division. By this purchase, ES&S sought to merge the nation's larg-
est and second-largest voting system companies, whose combined market share would allow 
their software to control the ballots cast by over 73 percent of all U.S. voters. A comprehen-
sive consent decree issued compelled divestiture. See United States v. Election Sys. & Soft-
ware, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D.D.C. 2010) (Final Judgment); http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/cases/f256200/ 256275.htm (complaint). The DO] claimed success in the action, http:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2010/256267.htm. 
The DO] has not been involved, however, in enforcing HAVA's requirements for voting 
system accuracy and auditability, even if proof of inaccuracy has been generated. See infra 
Litigation and Enforcement Strategies. For instance, ES&S attempted to block a forensic audit of 
the Venango County, Pennsylvania, local election in 2011 that the county Board of Election 
claimed was pervaded with anomalies. The vendor claimed that its proprietary trade-secret 
software would not be sufficiently protected in an audit. Media reported that the company 
had sent threatening legal letters to both the county and the two computer scientists acting 
as auditors. ES&S warned that the county would face a lawsuit unless it agreed to complete 
confidentiality and that results of the analysis would not be publicly released without the 
company's prior review and approval. A preliminary audit report issued, however, establish-
ing that among the electronic records proof existed that someone had used a computer that 
was not a part of the county's election network to remotely access the central election tabu-
lator computer, illegally, "on multiple occasions." http://www.bradblog.com/?p=8874. 
31. HAVA requires auditability of all voting systems used in federal elections. See HAVA 
§ 301. The funding for procuring the vast majority of these ES&S voting machines was HAVA 
monies, yet the company has engaged in only de minimis, perfunctory efforts to render them 
auditable. When forensic audits of the equipment as used in live elections have been sought, the 
company routinely opposes the efforts on trade-secret grounds, which are arguably excluded by 
HAVA's insistence on auditability and by other election law protecting the right to vote. 
32. Unfortunately, even though extrinsic evidence demonstrated substantial errors and 
omissions, the Commission declined to modify the totals. For instance, Colleton County's 
tabulation equipment errors were identified but not corrected in the certified count. "The 
certified returns, accepted by the county and the State Election Commission, contained sev-
eral contests in which the sum of the votes for the candidates exceeded the number of votes cast 
in the county, some by more than 10%. A third tabulation released by the Election Director 
in Colleton County at the end of December, 2010, repaired some problems but in several 
races the number of absentee votes still exceeded the number of absentee ballots." South Carolina 
Voting Information, Final Numbers for Colleton County, http://www.scvotinginfo.com/ 
wp/2011/04/18/final-numbers-for-colleton-county /#more-747 (emphasis added) . 
33 . See supra note 22 (defining DRE voting device). 
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34. Probably the most notorious controversy concerned the Florida congressional district 
13 in 2006. Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n of Fla ., 958 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007). The more recent effort by ES&S, iVotronic's manufacturer, to block a forensic 
audit of the flawed elections conducted in Venango County, Pennsylvania, has received sig-
nificant publicity. See, e.g., http: //www.scvotinginfo.com/ wp/ 2011/ 10/ 04/venango-county-
pennsylvania-decides-to-vote-with-paper-not-ivotronics/ , http:Ilwww.truth-out.org/ election-
s y stems-software-attempts-block-independent-audit-failed-touch-screens / 13 2008116 5; 
Forensic Analysis Finds Venango County E-Voting System "Remotely Accessed" on "Multiple 
Occasions" by Unknown Computer, http: //thevotingnews.com/ blogs/ forensic-analysis-finds-
venango-county-pennsylvania-e-voting-system-remotely-accessed-on-multiple-occasions-
by-unknown-computer-the-brad-blog/. 
35. The popularly used term embracing both optical scan ballots and DRE-paper records 
of cast ballots has become "voter-verified paper record." See, e.g., Statement of Rep. Rush Holt 
to the New Jersey Senate, http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6667; 
Verified Voting's report of Robert Kibrick, Voter-Verified Paper Record Legislation, http: //www 
.verifiedvoting.org/ article.php?list=type&type=43. Verified Voting maintains an inventory 
of voting technologies used in the United States, classified by state, at http://www.verified 
voting.org/ verifier/ ; it identifies states using verifiable paper ballot records. 
36. See Voting and Registration Technology Issues, supra note 9; Voters' Unite and Com-
mon Cause, A Master List of 70+ Voting Machine Failures and Miscounts by State, http ://www 
.commoncause.org/ atf/ cf/%7Bfb3c17e2-cdd1-4df6-92be-bd4429893665%7D/ MASTER 
LISTOFMACHINEFAILURES.pdf [hereinafter Master List]. 
37. South Carolina, which uses only one vendor statewide (ES&S), has experienced a 
multitude of other embarrassing, mission-critical voting system failures. See supra notes 22-36 
and accompanying text; see also Voting and Registration Technology Issues , supra note 9, at 41 . 
38. No reported opinion exists, but Andrew Appel's blog postings provide an overview of 
the issues and the judicial order issued in In re Petition of Zirkle, sub nom. Zirkle v. Henry, No. 
Cum-L-000567-11-A, N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., hearing and bench order Sept. 1, 2011, tran-
script available at http://www.cs.princeton.edu/ -appel/voting/zirkle-transcript-1sep11.pdf. 
See Andrew Appel, New jersey Election Coverup, https: //freedom-to-tinker.com/ blog/ appel/ 
nj-election-cover; Appel's expert report in the case, http ://www.cs .princeton.edu/ -appel/ 
voting/zirkle-appel-certif2.pdf [hereinafter Zirkle Report]. See also Appel blog, Corruption 
Bureau Assigns Fox to Guard Henhouse, discussed infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
39. See Zirkle Report, supra note 38, at 2-8. 
40. New Jersey's all-electronic DRE voting machines have faced constitutional chal-
lenges and prior forensic exams. The importance of Professor Appe!'s expert report filed in 
the ongoing state constitutional challenge to the DRE voting systems, Gusciora v. McGreevey, 
http: I I citpsite. s3-website-us-east-1. amazonaws .com/ oldsite-htdocs/voting/advantage/ 
appel-expert-report-unredacted.pdf, continues. Professor Appel chairs the Princeton Com-
puter Science department and is a widely recognized national expert in computer security, 
unlike the experts that the state impaneled and the Court qualified. Appel has conducted 
forensic studies of New Jersey's most common DRE systems, documenting a range of seri-
ous flaws that undermine their capacity to produce accurate election tallies. Rutgers Law 
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Professor Penny Venetis, who represents the plaintiffs in Zirkle (discussed in the text) and in 
Gusciora v. McGreevey, 2010 WL 444173 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2010), has filed an appeal 
challenging the trial court's judgment that the DRE vulnerabilities could be managed effec-
tively to prevent tampering and to protect accurate elections, and that thus the DREs did not 
require replacement (copy of appeal documents on file with author). 
41. Several of the state of New Jersey's witnesses claimed that tampering was virtually 
impossible. The court recounts these disputations of significant vulnerabilities in Gusciora v. 
McGreevey, 2010 WL 444173. The Court's opinion demonstrates that the judge relied on the 
highly compensated computer experts who held law degrees more than on those who held 
the requisite knowledge in computer security. While she ordered the state to undertake a 
wide range of mitigations designed to reduce their vulnerability to tampering, when the state 
did not perform, the Court continued to offer continuances rather than sanctions or compli-
ance. An appeal is pending. 
42. At the time this book went to press, Zirkle had not been fully resolved. Appel's blog 
entry entitled Corruption Bureau Assigns Fox to Guard Henhouse, recounts the events in the 
ongoing New Jersey dispute. https ://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/appel/corruption-bureau-
assigns-fox-guard-henhouse (Sept. 28, 2011). 
43. The official continued, "[This] may not be a problem in counties where a very large 
volume of ballots are counted, but in our county, where we typically process 2,500 or less, 
the margin of error can greatly affect the outcome of the race." Discussing other irregulari-
ties, the Board noted, "After the second stack of ballots for precincts was run through the 
machine ... , the voting device failed to accept the disk, generating this message : 'Coun-
ters have reached maximum. Counters restored to last batch saved.' Therefore, the backups 
required by the security conditions from the SOS for the M650 were not done." Teresa Benns, 
Canvass Board Answers Complaint (Apr. 3, 2011), http://www.examiner.com/conservative-
in-colorado-springs/canvass-board-answers-complaint. Notably, the M-650 central-count, 
high-speed scanner (manufactured by ES&S) is one of the most broadly deployed central-
count scanners nationwide. 
44. Id . 
45. The central-count, high-speed optical scanner M-650 is manufactured and mar-
keted by ES&S, the nation's largest voting system vendor. 
46. See Final Report of the Cuyahoga Election Review Panel 5-7 (2006), http://urban 
.csuohio.edu/cei/public_monitor/CERP_Final_Report_20060720.pdf. 
47. Id . at 13-67 (reviewing vendor marketing, the executed contracts, and the unful-
filled vendor promises). 
48. Gregory Korte, Federal Agency Finds Defects in Ballot Scanners, USA TooAY, Dec. 22, 
2011, http ://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/ story /2011-12-22/ defective-voting-machines/ 
52172034/l?loc=interstitialskip (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (noting three problems: (1) random 
screen-freezes that prevent ballots from being fed; (2) failure to log errors in a file that would 
let election officials know of problems; and (3) skewing of ballots as fed into the machine, 
making votes unreadable if marked in some ballot areas). Unfortunately, these vendor problems 
imposed additional costs on the taxpayer: "the Cuyahoga County elections director said the 
county had to switch to shorter ballot pages to fix the problems, and later reached a $208,197 
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settlement with the company. Later fixes offered by ES&S also led to system freezes, so the 
county went back to the previous, flawed software as 'the devil we know,' she said." 
49. EAC Issues Formal Investigation Report on DS200 Precinct Count Optical Scanner (Dec. 
22, 2011), http: //www.eac.gov/ biogs/ eac_issues_formal_investigation_report_ on_ds200 _ 
precinct_count_optical_scanner/. 
50. Bill Hess, Computer Glitch Causes Hiccup in Cochise County Tally, WICK NEws SERVICE, 
http: //www.douglasdispatch.com/ articles/ 2008102107 / news/ doc4 7ab6bc4d0b705 50988123 
.txt (last visited Mar. 8, 2012). Cochise County used ES&S voting systems with its Unity 
software for ballot design and tabulation. 
51 . The Director of Butler County elections commented, "Quite frankly, if it's off by 
five votes or 105 votes, I want to know what's causing it. Especially if it's a close election," 
McGary said. "If we cannot produce accurate and reliable numbers, then it throws the entire 
process in question, and that's not something we want to have happen." Jon Craig, But-
ler County Missed 105 Votes, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, archived at http://www.votersunite.org/ 
article.asp?id=7628. The County's letter to the vendor stated, "A situation of this nature 
could impact any election. It may appear that every vote has been counted when cards indi-
cate they are being properly uploaded, when in fact votes cast on a memory card(s) are not 
tabulated in the results." See Bradblog, Failed Again: Widely-Used Diebold Touch-Screens Systems 
Dropped Votes in Recent Ohio Primary, http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5879 (appending copy 
of County letter) . 
52. While the EAC has the statutory duty of conducting an Election Day Survey, and in 
2004 included a few questions regarding voting system performance, inexplicably the ques-
tions were deleted from surveys prepared for 2006 and 2008 federal elections. Susannah 
Goodman testified before the EAC on this point, noting: 
Election Data Services, the contractor who compiled the [2004] survey results, 
recommended the EAC expand collection of data on voting system performance, 
stating, "We recommend that the EAC institute a more extensive program 
designed to investigate reported voting equipment problems . .. with wide rang-
ing rumors and reports of voting equipment problems that came out of the 
2004 election, there is a lack of full information to substantiate or dispel the 
rumors." Unfortunately, questions on voting machine performance have been 
removed from both or were just not put into the 2006 and 2008 surveys. 
Remarks of Susannah Goodman, Director of Common Cause Democracy Program, Tran-
script of the EAC Meeting, at 77 (Dec. 8, 2008), http: //www.eac.gov/ assets/1 / AssetManager/ 
transcript%20public%20meeting%20december%208%2020081 .pdf [hereinafter Goodman 
Testimony] . 
Three voting system inventories of malfunctions or "incidents" have been generated by 
nonprofit research and advocacy organizations. These provide organized listings by state of 
incidents that undermined the voting system's functional performance in elections, includ-
ing its accuracy: (1) a malfunction and miscount list by Common Cause and Voters Unite!, 
Master List, supra note 36; (2) the Voters Unite study of errors attributable to ballot-scanning 
technology, see Ellen Theisen, Ballot-Scanner Voting System Failures in the News-A Partial List, 
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VorrnsUNm.ORc (May 22, 2009), available at http://www.votersunite.org/Info/OpScans 
InTheNews.pdf; (3) the most recent inventory, Lawrence Norden, Voting System Failures: A 
Database Solution, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JuSTicE AT NEw YoRK UNIVERSITY Srnom OF LAw 14 (2010) 
(collecting incidents of miscounts and malfunctions in Appendix 2), available at http:// 
www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/voting_system_failures_a_database_solution/. 
The VotersUnite scanner study was designed to demonstrate that these devices are not pana-
ceas but equally afflicted with buggy software and security failings that can produce a false 
confidence in their accuracy. Scanners do, however, offer a critical difference: they require 
a voter-marked paper ballot that can be retabulated by hand or by a validated scanner, and 
thus serve as a check on flawed software. 
Many of these "incidents" of failure or miscounts, such as those noted in the text, relate 
to software design or coding flaws and thus affect voting systems nationwide even if the 
local election officials have not noticed any significant discrepancy in their own vote totals. 
But unless implausible or systematically audited, the machine totals will normally not pro-
duce any indicators of even grossly erroneous tabulations. Inadvertent or deliberate vote flip-
ping between candidates and other errors will thus not be caught and corrected. There are no 
hard data showing the overall rates and trends of voting system malfunctions and tabulation 
errors, and despite its need, the EAC has not been collecting the data in its Election Day sur-
vey. See Goodman Testimony, supra, and following colloquy with Commissioners. 
53. The EAC held a hearing on whether the agency needed to develop a comprehensive 
voting system incident reporting system. Florida Secretary of State Kurt Browning, New York 
State Board of Elections Co-Chair Douglas Kellner, Michigan Director of Elections Chris 
Thomas, and this author testified before the EAC on the question. See Minutes of the Public 
Meeting, U.S. Election Assistance 97-148 (Dec. 8, 2008), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/ Asset 
Manager/transcript%20public%20meeting%20december%208%2020081.pdf. Three of the 
four witnesses urged the EAC to develop a reporting system on equipment currently deployed, 
regardless of whether the EAC had certified it as compliant with the EAC's own standards. See 
Candice Hoke, Tracking Voting Technology Field Performance: The Federal Role, Public Hearing 
of U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Washington, D.C. (written testimony in advance 
of Dec. 8, 2008 hearing) (outlining some crucial features and justifications), http://www 
. eac .gov I assets! 1 I AssetManager /testimony%2 Ocandice%20 hoke%20 center%20for%2 0 
election%20integrity%20public%20meeting%20december%208%202008.pdf. The Brennan 
Center for Justice published its comprehensive report outlining a feasible solution, see Nor-
den, Voting System Failures, supra note 52 (outlining a feasible incident tracking system that 
provides broad public access and support to election officials and policy makers). 
54. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(5). 
56. See id. § 15481(a)(2). The manual audit capacity requirement arguably requires a 
paper record that must be created contemporaneously with the voter's ballot casting. It can 
then be used as a check on the invisible electronic record via recounts and other auditing 
methods that provide software-independent verification of the computer-generated results. 
57. The per curiam Bush v. Gore opinion, 531 U.S. at 111, noted, "Nationwide statistics 
reveal that an estimated 2% of ballots cast do not register a vote for President for whatever 
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reason . . . . " See also Caltech/ MIT Voting Technology Project, Residual Votes Attributable to 
Technology: An Assessment of the Reliability of Existing Voting Equipment 11 (displaying Table 
3, Residual Vote as a Percent of Total Ballots Cast by Machine Type and Year U.S. Counties, 
1988-2000 Presidential Elections), http:// vote.caltech.edu/ drupal/files/report/residual_ 
votes_attributable_to_tech.pdf (Mar. 30, 2001) . 
58. 531 U.S. at 105-10. The Court observed, "Equal protection applies as well to the 
manner of its exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may 
not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another." 
Id. at 104. The Court held that the judicial order to proceed with the recount despite the 
omission of a consistent standard as to what marks would count as a valid vote violated this 
constitutional principle. Id. at 109-10. 
Commentators have contended that a range of factors other than those the Court directly 
mentioned influenced the Court's decision. Paul Schwartz has offered one of the most per-
suasive assessments of the underlying epistemological approaches of the different voting 
blocs. He suggests that the Justices favoring the continuation of the recount perceived elec-
tion technology as a fallible instrument for converting voters' choices into votes. By con-
trast, the Court's majority placed greater trust in the machines over fallible and conflicted or 
biased humans. The more conservative voting bloc sought hard-edged rules to constrain elec-
tion officials' discretion and thereby avoid these human imperfections. See Paul M. Schwartz, 
Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 625 (2002) . 
59. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98. 
60. Id. These questions included whether Florida had denied its citizens equal protection 
and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when Florida counties used 
varying legal standards for determining a valid punch-card vote. 
61. The incapacity of the punch-card voting equipment to consistently count overvotes 
was one problem, but another lay in the problematic butterfly ballot designs that some coun-
ties used, arguably causing high overvoting rates. See Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn Utrecht, Prob-
lems in America's Polling Places: How They Can Be Stopped, 11 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs . L. REV. 401 , 
429-30 (2002) : 
Perhaps the most prominent allegation of flawed ballot design is the now infa-
mous "butterfly ballot" in Palm Beach County Florida. The design of the ballot 
was such that many people were uncertain which hole to punch for the can-
didate of their choice. In other instances, voters believed that they might have 
punched the wrong hole. 
See also Erwin Chemerinsky, How We Should Think About Bush v. Gore, 34 Lav. U. CHI. 
L.J. 1, 10 (2002) ("The ballot in Palm Beach County was constructed in a misleading man-
ner: the hole next to Gore's name was actually a vote for Patrick Buchanan. This resulted in 
approximately 4000 Palm Beach County voters mistakenly casting their votes for Buchanan, 
though intended for Gore. This, of course, was far more than the margin of Bush's victory 
and more than enough to have made Gore the clear winner in Florida."). 
62 . HAVA, 42 U.S.C. § 15302. 
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63. Optical scanners record and tabulate paper ballots after voters ink their selections. 
Other ballots may be electronic, designed for voters to select their choices and record their 
votes on computer-based equipment that tabulates votes by software applications. See gener-
ally Doug Jones, A Brief Illustrated History of Voting, http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/-jones/voting/ 
pictures/; SALTMAN, supra note 1. 
64. Increased accessibility for voters with disabilities and reduction of uncounted votes 
(owing to "overvoting") are the chief achievements. See R. Michael Alvarez et al. , 2008 Sur-
vey of the Performance of American Elections: Final Report, MIT-Cal Tech Voting Project, www 
.vote.caltech.edu/drupal/files/report/Final%20report20090218.pdf. 
65. The EAC has posted a map of locations with EAC-certified voting systems; in October 
2011, only 10 local jurisdictions were listed. http://www.eac.gov/testing_and_certification/ 
default.asp. 
66. Id.; see BROKEN BALLOTS, supra note 1. 
67. See infra text accompanying notes 94-100. 
68. Technical reliability and security, tabulation accuracy, and voter privacy/ballot 
secrecy are some areas of continuing performance deficiencies. See supra note 9 (regarding 
the TTBR and EVEREST studies); see also Voting and Registration Technology Issues, supra note 
9; BROKEN BALLOTS, supra note 1. 
69. Florida has initiated many changes in its procedures and voting systems since the 
fateful 2000 election. See Kenneth Tinkler, Florida Election Procedural and Legal Changes from 
2000 to 2008: A Primer, in AMERICA Vons! 19-36 (Benjamin Griffith ed., Supp. 2009). 
70. See, e.g., LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VoTER FRAUD (2010), and works referenced 
therein. 
71. The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the Advancement Project, and 
the Brennan Center for Justice maintain research projects and litigation efforts to redress 
voter ID and partisan-animated voter suppression. 
72. Among those who sustain a focus on the election technology issues are election 
officials and their lawyers, fair elections nonprofit advocacy organizations, and voting 
system vendors. Others who lack technical security competence will often advocate new 
ways to use information technologies to advance their agendas without comprehending the 
security risks. See, e.g., Americans Elect Internet Vote for President? Consider How It Worked 
in DC 2010, http://irregulartimes.com/index.php/archives/2011/07 /25/americans-
elect-Internet-vote-for-president-hacked-in-dc-2010/ (criticizing Americans Elect for 
seeking to conduct an Internet-based 2012 presidential nominating election without 
understanding or disclosing the inability to control the security risks that can lead to a 
falsified election). 
73 . An "Archimedean point" refers to a hypothetical standpoint from which totally 
objective and impartial assessments are possible, not subject to the flawed perceptions and 
biases normally characteristic of human judgment. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 
11, 262-68, 322-23 (1958) (cautioning against using this approach when human judgment 
is needed); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 17 (1982); JOH N RAWLS, 
A THEORY OF JusncE 21-22 (1971) (advancing the need for a "standpoint ... to envision our 
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objective from afar"); Pieter Tijmes, The Archimedean Point and Eccentricity: Hannah Arendt's 
Philosophy of Science and Technology, 35 INQUIRY 389 (1992). 
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (2002). Curiously, in enacting HAVA, Congress supplied 
none of the common sources of legislative history. No committee reports accompanied the 
final versions of the bill. 
75. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). 
76. For instance, ballot secrecy is designed to protect voters from coercion and retribu-
tion for their votes, functioning as a systemic protection for free elections. Elections separate 
the identity of the voter from his or her cast ballot, whereas in virtually all other applica-
tions, including financial services and commercial sales, the customer can be tracked and 
individualized audits can occur. 
77. HAVA does transfer the Federal Election Commission powers under the National 
Voter Registration Act to the EAC, which includes a slight amount of regulatory authority. See 
HAVA, 42 U.S.C. § 15532. 
78. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 15381-15387, 15501. The EAC website observes, "One of EAC's 
top priorities is providing assistance to election officials. EAC has issued guidance, advisories 
and best practices to help officials comply with HAVA and make other election administra-
tion improvements and enhancements." Election Management Resources, U.S. ELECTION Ass1s-
TANCE CoMM1ss10N, http ://www.eac.gov/ election_management_resources/default.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2012) . 
79. U.S . CoNsT. art. I, § 4. 
80. These positions are somewhat reflected in HAVA. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 15329: 
The [Election Assistance] Commission shall not have any authority to issue 
any rule, promulgate any regulation, or take any other action which imposes 
any requirement on any State or unit of local government, except to the extent 
permitted under section 9(a) of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ( 42 
U.S.C. 1973gg-7(a)) . 
See also 42 U.S.C. § 15485 : 
The specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of this 
title [Title III, entitled "Uniform and Nondiscriminatory Election Technology 
and Administration Requirements"] shall be left to the discretion of the states. 
Importantly, while state discretion is permitted in determining how to comply, HAVA nev-
ertheless compels states to comply with the specified minimum standard and functions. 
The nationwide empirical record abundantly evinces technological noncompliance of voting 
systems. 
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 15329, which provides: 
The Commission shall not have any authority to issue any rule, promulgate any 
regulation, or take any other action which imposes any requirement on any 
State or unit of local government, except to the extent permitted under section 
9(a) of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ( 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-7(a) ). 
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82 . See Voting and Registration Technology Issues, supra note 9. 
83. See HAVA, 42 U.S.C. § 15361. 
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15482(a)(2), (5). Unfortunately, no judicial or media records evidence 
any Department of Justice effort to enforce these auditability and accuracy provisions, other 
than the lawsuit against New York for failure to replace its lever systems. United States v. 
New York, No. 06-CV-0263, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27664 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2006) (denying 
reconsideration of denial to intervene) (unreported). This case eventually settled. 
85. The National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) created and adminis-
tered with the Election Center's assistance a lab certification program for testing voting systems 
for "qualification"-compliance with the FEC standards. The term "qualified" was used, reserv-
ing the term "certified" for a state's formal decision that a voting system was acceptable accord-
ing to its own standards, which in many cases included the FEC standards. See Stephanie Philips, 
The Risks of Computerized Election Fraud: When Will Congress Rectify a 38-Year-Old Problem?, 
57 ALA. L. REV. 1123 (2006). Once a voting system passed qualification testing, it was assigned 
a "Qualification Number" and no further qualification tests were performed unless modifi-
cations were made to the voting systems by vendors. See Federal Election Commission, Voting 
Systems Performance and Test Standards: An Overview 1 (Agenda Dec. 13, 2001) ("Since NASED's 
testing program was initiated in 1994, more than 30 voting systems or components of voting 
systems have gone through the NASED testing and qualification process. In addition, many 
systems have subsequently been certified at the state level .... ") http: //www.fec.gov/ agenda/ 
agendas2001 / mtgdoc01-62/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) [hereinafter FEC Overview]. 
86. Before HAVA, in the absence of explicit statutory authority, the FEC had attempted 
to redress the regulatory vacuum by developing and issuing voting system standards, but 
few resources and little authority had been authorized. See SALTMAN, supra note 1, at 169-74, 
179-85. The FEC commented, "As the qualification process matured and as qualified sys-
tems were used in the field, the [FEC] Voting Systems Board ... was able to identify certain 
testing issues that needed to be resolved. Moreover, rapid advancements in information and 
personal computer technologies have introduced new voting system development and imple-
mentation scenarios not contemplated by the 1990 Standards." FEC Overview, supra note 85. 
87. FEC, History of the Voting System Standards Program, http:// www.fec.gov/ pages / 
vsshst.htm. 
88. See BROKEN BALLOTS, supra note 1; Doug Jones, Problems with Voting Systems and the 
Applicable Standards, Testimony before the H.R. Comm. on Science, Washington, D.C. (May 
22, 2001), http:// www.divms.uiowa.edu/ -jones/ voting/congress.html. See, e.g., JoHN FuNo, 
STEALING ELECTIONS 1-9 (2004) ; Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming 
U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 942 (2005); 
Philips, supra note 85, at 1123-50. 
89. See BROKEN BALLOTS, supra note 1, at 139-41. 
90. See GAO, Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are 
Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed, GA0-05-956, at 43-45 (Sept. 2005) , 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247851.pdf (noting that "TGDC and NIST have been working 
on behalf of EAC to improve the 2002 Federal Election Commission voluntary voting system 
standards and their impact on the acquisition, testing, operations, and management processes 
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of the voting system life cycle"). The FEC 2002 standards were issued while HAVA was drafted, 
with recognition that HAVA articulated a new collaborative structure for updating the FEC's 
interim effort. The GAO continued, "TGDC's initial priorities have been to correct errors and 
fill gaps in the 2002 standards and to supplement them with provisions that address HAVA 
requirements." Id. at 45. 
91. See, e.g., Avi Rubin, The Dirty Little Secrets of Voting System Testing Labs, http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/avi-rubin/the-dirty-little-secrets-_b_12354.html; see also two TTBR 
assessments that included review of the confidential testing lab reports: CANDICE HoKE & 
DAVE KETTYLE, DOCUMENTATION ASSESSMENT OF THE DIEBOLD VOTING SYSTEMS 2 (TTBR 2007), http:// 
www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/ oversight/ttbr/ diebold-doc-final. pdf (commenting that the 
lab report of 16 pages was too brief and presented insufficient "detail on the methodologies, 
tests, or results that were obtained"; the report thus does "not permit a reader to formulate 
an informed opinion on the degree to which the Diebold voting system met or exceeded the 
minimum federal standards for qualification"; JosErH LORENZO HALL & LAURA QUILTER, Docu-
MENTATION REVIEW OF THE HART ]NTERCIVIC SYSTEM 6.2 .1 VOTING SYSTEM 24-31, 64 (2007), http:// 
www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/ttbr/hart-doc-final.pdf (noting that "the poorly 
documented testing reports and the complete lack of detailed test plans ... put state-level 
certification at an information disadvantage by largely fail[ing] to communicate informa-
tion [needed] to assess the systems" with respect to compliance with FEC 2002 Voting Sys-
tem Standards). 
92 . Whether HAVA supplies a private right of action to enforce some of its provisions 
remains an open question. In Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 555 U.S. 5 (2008), the U.S. 
Supreme Court intimated a negative but did not directly decide this question. See Daniel 
Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 
IND. L. REV. 113 (2010) (arguing for private rights of action under HAVA). 
93. By contrast, the Department of Justice has sought to enforce HAVA's physical 
accessibility and multiple language requirements and certain National Voter Registration 
Act (NVRA) requirements via litigation. The Department's webpage presents information 
on recent election and voting rights statutory enforcement, http://www.justice.gov/crt/ 
about/vot/whatsnew.php, specifically discussing several cases the Department has settled; 
these include United States v. Alameda County, California (language), United States v. Lorain 
County (Puerto Rican bilingual voting rights), and United States v. Louisiana (NVRA). See also 
faECTIONLINE.ORG at 7-8 (2007). 
94. A relatively comprehensive inventory of scientific studies of voting systems through 
2008 with links to their public reports can be found in MATT BISHOP, MARK GRAFF, CANDICE 
HOKE, DAVID JEFFERSON & SEAN PEISERT, RESOLVING THE UNEXPECTED IN ELECTIONS: ELECTION OFFI-
CIALS' O PTIONS, Appendix 2: Voting Systems Studies 22-27 (2008), available at http://nob 
.cs.ucdavis .edu/bishop/notes/2008-forensic/index.html (providing a guide to indicators of 
possible electronic malfunctions and forensic assessments to determine whether the tabula-
tion reports deserve trust). Virtually all reports include an Executive Summary written in 
language accessible for the lay audience. The TTBR covers many of the current voting systems 
deployed nationwide in 2012. The other set of comprehensive scientific assessments, Project 
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EVEREST, has links posted on the Pennsylvania State University website, http:// siis .cse.psu 
.edu/ everest.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) . See supra note 9 (discussing TTBR and EVER-
EST reports). See also Written Testimony of David Wagner, Ph.D.: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Science and Comm. on House Administration, 109th Cong. 2 (July 19, 2006) (statement of 
David Wagner, Ph.D., Computer Science professor, University of California, Berkeley). 
95. The field performance record of currently deployed voting technologies is reviewed 
more extensively in Voting and Registration Technology Issues, supra note 9, and citations 
therein. Consider also the comment of New York State Board of Elections Co-Chair Douglas 
Kellner, who summarized the situation at a Board meeting: "the voting industry sells crap, and 
that is the problem .... " Rady Ananda, NY Loves Its Levers as New Voting Systems Fail , http:// 
www.opednews .com/ articles/ NY-Loves- I ts-Levers-as-New-by-Rady-Ananda-080 701-17 3 
.html. Florida's Secretary of State Kurt Browning testified before the EAC: 
[V]endors will hear about [this] when we meet next month, but I do not under-
stand, I cannot fathom how you can produce automobiles, you can produce air-
planes, you can produce washing machines, you can produce refrigerators, name 
the product, and you know that when you plug it in it's going to work. But with 
voting systems, there's just something systemically wrong that the products that 
are coming off the line are not dependable. 
My goal in Florida, is that when we open the polls in 2010, that we have a 
very high level of confidence that when those Supervisors of Elections in the 
county plug those things in and turn them on it's like turning on your TV. We 
don't have to hold our breath to see if those things are going to come up .... 
Minutes of the Public Meeting, U.S. Election Assistance 106 (Dec. 8, 2008), http://www 
. eac. gov I as sets I 1 I AssetM a nager /tra n scri pt%2 Opu blic %2 Omeeting%2 Odecem ber% 2 0 8 %2 O 
20081 .pdf (discussing the poor reliability of voting systems) . 
96. See, e.g., Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman & Edward W. Felten, Security Analysis of 
the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine (2007), https://www.usenix.org/conference/evt-07 I 
security-analysis-diebold-accuvote-ts-voting-machine. 
97. For example, TTBR scientists explained their findings : 
The ... teams demonstrated that the security mechanisms provided for all 
systems analyzed were inadequate to ensure accuracy and integrity of the election 
results and of the systems that provide those results. 
Matt Bishop, Overview of the Red Team Reports [covering Sequoia, Diebold/Premier, and Hart 
Intercivic voting systems brands] 11, http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/ oversight/ttbr I 
red-overview.pdf (emphasis added). Other TTBR scientists who evaluated the source code for 
one system summarized their conclusion that applies to the other vendors as well : 
[T]he technological controls in the Diebold software do not provide sufficient 
security to guarantee a trustworthy election. The software contains serious design 
flaws that have led directly to specific vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit 
to affect election outcomes. These vulnerabilities include: 
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Vulnerability to malicious software 
The Diebold software contains vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to 
install malicious software on voting machines or on the election management 
system. Malicious software could cause votes to be recorded incorrectly or to be 
miscounted, possibly altering election results . It could also prevent voting machines 
from accepting votes, potentially causing long lines or disenfranchising voters. 
Joseph A. Calandrino et al., Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System at i (July 20, 
2007), available at http: //www.sos.ca.gov/ voting-systems/ oversight/ttbr/ diebold-source-
public-jul29.pdf (emphasis added); see also CWEISANS TOP 25 Most Dangerous Software 
Errors, http: //cwe.mitre.org/ top25 /. 
The United States has made cyber security improvement a major focus and is now extending 
its efforts into reporting on vulnerabilities in election software. The Common Weakness Enu-
meration (CWE) is a federally funded software assurance project designed to help upgrade the 
software industry's persistent neglect of easily exploited yet avoidable vectors for remote hacking 
by identifying the most pervasive and dangerous avoidable coding errors. Neither higher educa-
tional programs in computer science nor the industry has placed high priority on knowledge and 
coding skills that achieve security. The economic, personal, and national security consequences 
are extraordinary. See DAVID R1cE, GEEKONOM1cs: THE REAL Cosr OF INSECURE SOFTWARE passim (2007); 
Tim Green, "Rugged Manifesto" Promotes Secure Coding; Goal Is to Raise Awareness of Pitfalls and 
Adherence to Sound Programming Principles, NETWORK WoRLD (Feb. 8, 2010), http: //www.network 
world.com/ news/ 2010/ 020810-rugged-manifesto-secure-coding.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) 
(reporting on rationale of new software security effort: "The problem ... is that developers write 
code assuming the only task is to make it perform a function. But th.at can lead to programs riddled 
with vulnerabilities that can in turn lead to economic damages, lost data and lost productivity ... 
[quoting Rugged co-founder Corman] 'We have to get to the mass of programmers who simply 
don't realize their code is being attacked and subverted by talented and persistent adversaries."'). 
Part of the U.S. national security effort is dedicated to upgrading security of information systems 
in measurable ways. See generally MAKING SECURITY MEASURABLE, http: //measurablesecurity.mitre 
.org/ about/index.html, and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Bu1LD SECURITY IN 
website, https: / /buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/ bsi/ home.html ("Build Security In is a collaborative 
effort that provides practices, tools, guidelines, rules, principles, and other resources that soft-
ware developers, architects, and security practitioners can use to build security into software in 
every phase of its development."). DHS and its contractor MITRE Corporation have generated 
voting systems security models that reveal the serious vulnerabilities of the deployed systems. See 
CWRAF Domains, Technology Groups, Archetypes, and Vignettes, http://cwe.mitre.org/ cwraf/ 
vignettes.html#evoting-Internet (last visited Apr. 28, 2012). 
98 . Scientists have examined other nations' electronic voting systems' security and 
accuracy, documenting serious flaws . For instance, insufficient security design can compro-
mise vote accuracy and machine availability to voters. See, e.g., Scott Wolchok, Eric Wustrow, 
J. Alex Halderman, Hari K. Prasad, Arun Kankipati, Sai Krishna Sakhamuri, Vasavya Yagati 
& Rop Gonggrijp, Security Analysis of India's Electronic Voting Machines, Proc. 17th ACM Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '10), Chicago (Oct. 2010), and 
http: //indiaevm.org/ (video presentation) . 
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99. Precinct-based optical scanners do provide the combination of a voter-created paper 
record for recounts and checks on the software tabulations, so they are a far better option 
than DREs. 
100. The EAC voting system certification webpage lists some newer voting equipment 
currently undergoing federal certification assessments that has not been subjected to the 
independent testing conducted under the TTBR and EVEREST. See supra note 22. 
101. Douglas W. Jones, Counting Mark-Sense Ballots: Relating Technology, the Law and Com-
mon Sense, DouGLAS W. ]ONES ON VOTING AND ELECTIONS, http://www.divms.uiowa.edu/-jones/ 
voting/optical/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2012) (quoting James Baker, as quoted by CNN on Nov. 
12, 2000) . 
102. Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
103. Jones, supra note 101; see also Jones, supra notes 88 and 63. 
104. See supra note 58 (discussing Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy). 
105. Each of these points is more extensively developed in Voting and Registration Tech-
nology Issues, supra note 9. See also H.R. REP. No. 672 (2011) (seeking to terminate the EAC 
and transfer its functions), explained at http ://cha.house.gov/bill/bill-terminate-election-
assistance-commission. 
106. The NASS resolutions can be found at http://www.nass.org/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id = 87 &Itemid = 3 86. 
107. See, e.g., Opening Statement of Senator Lamar Alexander, U.S. Senate Committee on 
Rules and Administration, http://rules.senate.gov/public/? a= Files.Serve&File_id =411fc971-
c493-4c27-b99e-2aa653cf6120 =2011 (June 29, 2011) (detailing reasons for terminating the 
EAC). See also H. Comm. on Administration, Markup of H.R. 672, http://cha.house.gov/ 
markup/markup-hr-672-hr-1934-committee-resolution-112-8 (amending HAVA to termi-
nate the EAC and transfer its powers). 
108. See NASS Resolution on the Continued Functioning of the EAC Standards Board and 
Board of Advisors, http://www.nass.org/index.php ?option =com_content&view=article&id =87 
&Itemid=386 (passed Jan. 31, 2012). 
109. See generally EAC, STATE REQUIREMENTS AND THE FEDERAL VoTING SYSTEM TESTING AND CER-
TIFICATION PROGRAM, http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/State%20Requirements%20and%20 
the%20Federal%20Voting%20System%20Testing%20and%20Certification%20Program.pdf. 
110. See generally Voting and Registration Technology Issues, supra note 9, at 43-45. 
111. See Letter from EAC to Registered Manufacturer [of Voting Systems] (June 27, 2011), at 
http:IIwww.eac.gov I as sets/ 1 I Do cu men ts I Pro gra m_Drector_Letter_ to _Manufacturers _re_ 
Readiness_for_Testing_6%2027%2011 .pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) ("Over the course of 
the last 12-18 months, the EAC has noticed what appears to be an increasing trend in which 
voting systems submitted to the EAC for conformance testing to the VVSG [voting system 
standards] are clearly not ready to be tested by our VSTLs. Recent examples include ... sub-
mission of software packages containing numerous fundamental coding discrepancies. Sub-
mitting systems for testing before they are functionally ready . . . is a waste of time and 
money for all entities involved in this process. The EAC reminds manufacturers that VSTL 
testing should not be used to replace rigorous internal pre-production and beta testing by 
voting system manufacturers.") . 
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112. Compare Remarks of David Beirne, Executive Director of the [voting system vendors' 
trade group] Election Technology Council, to the Joint Election Official Liaison Committee 
(Jan. 8, 2009) (urging the election officials to "embrace the principle of testable performance 
requirements, not design specifications, for voting system standards") with Earl Barr, Matt 
Bishop & Mark Gondree, Fixing Federal £-Voting Standards, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Mar. 
2007, at 19, 24 ("Neither the government nor electronic voting system vendors have ade-
quately addressed these design and certification flaws, let alone advanced solutions"; also : 
"We need to move beyond the 'patch' approach to electronic voting systems, using high-
assurance techniques to design and implement systems that provide the requisite guaran-
tees."). Note that election officials have no expertise in development methods for designing 
information systems that can achieve high standards of accuracy and reliability, or other 
technical attributes, but do have important experience relevant for usability engineering. 
While it may appear "reasonable" for Beirne and the vendors to request that federal voting 
systems guidelines be limited to performance standards, that position does not evince an 
understanding of the software industry's development process for contexts demanding high 
accuracy and security, or even its normal information systems software development pro-
cess. See GAO, Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under 
Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed, GA0-05-956 (Sept. 2005), http ://www.gao.gov/ 
assets / 250/ 247851.pdf (reviewing the life cycle of voting systems as an information system: 
"The product development phase includes activities such as establishing requirements for the 
system, designing a system architecture, and developing software and integrating compo-
nents .... Design and development activities related to security and reliability of electronic 
voting systems include such things as requirements development and hardware and software 
design"). The trade group's more extensive document, Election Technology Council (ETC), 
BROKEN : THE REGULATORY PROCESS FOR THE VOTING INDUSTRY (2008) , urges changes to the regula-
tory system contrary to best practices for software development. The ETC issued this report 
after its executive director Beirne and this author served on a panel on voting technology 
(at the Pew Charitable Trusts media event in Chicago, December 2007). This author argued 
that the then-current HAVA voting system regulatory structure had not been well designed 
to achieve high-quality software, and that it did not well serve any constituency, including 
the equipment vendors. While this argument advanced marketing and public advantages for 
high-quality, secure voting software, ETC's response in BROKEN suggests a de minimis regula-
tory and testing lab structure. 
113. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(ruling in favor of plaintiffs claiming that the election administrative system systemati-
cally deprived Ohio voters of their equal protection rights); Chavez v. Brewer, 214 P.3d 397 
(Ariz. 2006) (challenging the voting systems under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Vot-
ing Rights Act); Conroy v. Dennis , No. 06-CV-6072 (Colo. Oct. 19, 2006) (unpublished), 
available at http://www.wtotrial.com/conroy-v-dennis-colorado-secretary-of-state-no-06-cv-
6072-colo-oct-19-0 (claiming that DRE systems were illegal under Colorado state law); 
Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006) (challenging voting systems under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act); Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 
2003) (contending that equal protection was violated by some voters' inability to cast ballots 
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on voting systems with paper audit trail); Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 
2002) (alleging that differential undervote rate deprived minority voters of franchise rights 
protected by the Equal Protection Clause) . 
114. For example, the Arizona Legislature amended and enacted several statutes to effec-
tuate HAVA. Among these changes, the legislature amended Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) 
Section 16-442 (A) to require that the Secretary of State determine the voting machines that 
are "certified for use" in elections. 2003 ARIZ. SESS. LAws ch. 260, § 9 (1st Reg. Sess.) . Florida 
amended its recount laws and also began the process of evaluating voting technologies to 
replace the punch-card system. 
115. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (stressing that "free and honest elec-
tions are the very foundation of our republican form of government") . 
116. Other factors could include size of jurisdiction, ease of use by elderly voters, and 
costs of maintenance over time. The states would retain discretion to weigh factors not 
legally barred. 
117. See Heather K. Gerken, Election Law Exceptionalism: A Bird's Eye View of the Sympo-
sium, 737 B.U. L. REV. 743-44 (2002). 
118. Many leading scholars of election law perceive the need to transform the paradigm 
from an individual rights framework to a structural analysis. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, 
Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1663 (2001) (maintaining 
that vote-dilution claims cannot fit comfortably within the conventional individual-rights 
framework that the Court tends to use); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competi-
tion, 85 VA. L. REv. 1605, 1611 (1999) (recommending a structural approach because the 
"constitutional values of American democracy" depend on "appropriately competitive inter-
organizational conditions"); Lani Guinier, [E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 
HARV. L. REv. 109 (1994) (arguing against the adequacy of existing voting rights jurispru-
dence for handling racial groups' claims); Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the 
Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 
HARV. L. REv. 110, 159-60, 170-72 (1999) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court forgoes 
structural analysis when deciding civil-rights and equal-protection claims) ; Daniel R. Ortiz, 
From Rights to Arrangements, 32 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1217, 1218 (1999) (observing the movement 
of election law scholarship "away from a largely rights-based, individual-centered view of 
politics, to a more pragmatic and structural view of politics"); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard 
H. Pildes , Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process , 50 STAN. L. REv. 643 
(1998) (suggesting that courts should approach voting claims in structural terms). 
119. Premier Election Solutions, Inc. filed against the Cuyahoga County Board of Elec-
tions and the state of Ohio in Franklin County courts for a declaratory judgment that it had 
fulfilled its legal obligations. No reported decision is available but the case eventually settled. 
See K.C. Jones, Electronic Voting Machines at Center of Ohio Lawsuits, INFO. W K. (Aug. 8, 2008) , 
http :Ilwww.informationweek.com/ news I global-cio I legal/ 210000402 . 
120. Id. 
121. The Ohio Secretary of State's response is detailed in a press release, Ohio Secretary 
of State Files Counterclaim in Lawsuit with Premier Election Solutions , http://www.votetrustusa 
.org/index.php ?option=com_content&task=view&id=2926&Itemid=51. 
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122. Steve Rosenfeld, San Francisco Seeks Multi-Million Dollar Voting Machine Refund , 
http: Ilwww.alternet.org / story I 673 70 I san_francisco _seeks_multi-million_ dollar_ voting_ 
machine_refund/. 
123. Montgomery Cnty. v. Microvote Corp., 175 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999). 
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (codifying§ 2); 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (codifying§ 5). 
125. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote 
Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 82 S.C. L. REv. 689, 691-92 (2006); 
Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (alleging that differential undervote 
rate deprived minority voters of franchise rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause). 
126. Tokaji, supra note 125. Professor Pamela Karlan explains the Voting Rights Act "two-
step" in Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1998). 
127. Tokaji, supra note 125. Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, No. 11-5256, pending in the 
D.C. Circuit, is one of several lawsuits seeking to invalidate Section 5 as unconstitutionally 
burdensome. 
128. Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 473 F.3d 692 
(6th Cir. 2007) (challenging Ohio's maintenance of different types of voting technolo-
gies that produced different error rates and risk of vote loss; court held that voters had an 
unequal chance of having their votes counted, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause) . 
129. In League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2008), the 
League challenged Ohio's election administration system as constituting structural viola-
tions against the voting public. The case settled with a consent decree. See Lawyers Commit-
tee for Civil Rights Under Law (explanatory note with case document links) at http://www 
.lawyerscommittee.org/ projects/voting_rights/page?id=0048. 
130. Ohio League presented two crucial Fourteenth Amendment issues that in the post-
Bush era have led to a divergence among the circuits: the appropriate standard of review and 
whether the claim requires proof of intent to discriminate. The Sixth Circuit reasoned: 
The Secretary and Governor argued in the district court, and before us, that 
the equal protection claim requires a showing of "intentional and purposeful 
discrimination." The League contends that the proper scienter requirement is, 
alternatively, knowledge, willful blindness, or deliberate indifference. We need 
not decide this issue, however, because the only question before us is whether the 
amended complaint pleads facts, if proven, sufficient to establish that the defendants 
arbitrarily deny Ohioans the right to vote depending on where they live. 
League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d at 476 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added) . See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (per curiam) ("Having once granted 
the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, 
value one person's vote over that of another.") (emphasis added); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 557 (1964) (noting that "arbitrary and capricious action" can violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962)). 
In Hunter v. Hamilton County Board of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 234 (6th Cir. 2011), the 
standard of review and scienter issues resurfaced with largely the same resolution. The court 
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relied on Professor Ned Foley's analytic approach in reaching its decision. See Edward B. 
Foley, Refining the Bush v. Gore Taxonomy, 68 O H10 Sr. L. REv. 1035, 1037 (2007) . On remand, 
Hunter v. Hamilton County Board of Elections, 2012 WL 404786 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2012), 
the court ruled that the Board had not complied with requirements of the Equal Protection 
Clause in determining which provisional ballots it would count. 
131. The plaintiffs summarized the settlement's voting technology and security provisions: 
Improvements to be maintained in the area of voting technology and security 
include procedures for post-election audits of ballots; procedures requiring paper 
ballots in event of DRE machine breakdown; statewide standards for Logic and 
Accuracy testing of tabulating machines, statewide standards for WPAT quality 
and handling; security procedures for components of voting systems; and state-
wide standards on physical security of voting equipment. 
The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, What LWVO v Brunner Settlement 
Means for Ohio Voters, available at http: //www.lawyerscommittee.org/ projects/ voting_rights / 
page ?id=0046 (last visited May 10, 2012). 
132. Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (alleging that differential 
undervote rate deprived minority voters of franchise rights protected by the Equal Protection 
Clause); see also Sw. Voter Registration & Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882 , rev'd en bane, 
344 F. 3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (overturning the panel's enjoining of the special election owing 
to alleged voting technology (punch-card) deficiencies). 
133. League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d at 466, 470 (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
134. Professors Heather Gerken and Spencer Overton are among those election law 
scholars who have developed the structural analysis. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding 
the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1681-91 (2001) (discussing the concept 
of "aggregate rights" for vote-dilution claims); Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. 
Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA. Sr. U. L. REV. 469, 490 (2001) ("Many Americans of 
various backgrounds ... use voting as a means to maintain communities of identity and to 
exert collective self-determination in shaping their world through the political process."). 
135. For further development of this argument, see Candice Hoke, judicial Protection of 
Popular Sovereignty: Redressing Voting Technology, CASE W. L. REv. (Symposium; forthcoming 
summer 2012). The structural aspects of voting technology and the Equal Protection Clause's 
promise of equality in the likelihood that the vote will be counted accurately as cast have led 
some commentators to argue for a unitary, statewide voting system. See, e.g., Stewart v. Black-
well, Punch Card Ballots v. Direct Record Electronic Voting: Why Ohio's Use of Different Methods 
to Count Ballots Violates the Equal Protection Clause, 31 U. DAYTON L. REv. 527 (2006). While 
on its face one statewide voting system appears feasible and compliant with the Fourteenth 
Amendment, computer security teaches us that unless the unitary system has been devel-
oped using high assurance techniques, it poses substantially greater risks to accurate election 
counts and to the overall availability and reliability of the voting system than do multiple 
systems. The impact of coding errors would be magnified, and the value of working on a 
successful exploit would be much higher. Without substantial additional security safeguards 
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in place, such as robust post-election auditing of results, the unitary voting system does not 
supply an acceptable answer to the equal-protection quest. 
136. Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2011) (ruling that state law com-
mitted the choice of voting technology to the Secretary of State, and thus the court would 
not reassess her decisions) . 
137. John Hart Ely has warned of the possibilities of a "political lockup." In Ely's view, our 
government can be said to be "malfunctioning" when "the ins are choking off the channels of 
political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out." JoHN HART ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JurnCIAL REVIEW 103 (1980) . When such behavior occurs, Ely argues, 
"the process is undeserving of trust." He calls for not only judicial action to prevent outright 
"denial of the vote,'' but also "[o]ther practices that go to the core of the right of the people to 
choose their representatives." Id . Ely influenced Paul Schwartz's emphasis of the importance of 
robust judicial policing of the political branches' choices and management of voting technology. 
See Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 625, 678-97 (2002). 
138. Gusciora v. Christie, Appellate Docket No. A-005608-10T3; Gusciora v. McGreevey, 
395 N.J. Super. 422 (App. Div. 2006) . For an assessment of the value of tamper-evident secu-
rity seals for protecting voting systems' integrity, see the article by plaintiffs' expert witness 
Professor Andrew Appel, Security Seals on Voting Machines: A Case Study, ACM Transactions on 
Information and System Security (TISSEC) (2011), http://www.cs.princeton.edu/%7Eappel/ 
voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf. 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42. 
140. Banfield v. Cortes (substituted Aichele), 922 A.2d 36 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) (per-
mitting the case to move into discovery). 
141. See DO], Civil Rights Division, VOTING SECTION, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/ 
vot/whatsnew. php. 
142. Id. These standards are found in§ 301 ofTitle III, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481. 
143. Part of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 42 U.S.C. § 1974, mandates the retention and 
preservation of records concerning federal elections: 
Every officer of election shall retain and preserve, for a period of twenty-two 
months from the date of any ... election of which candidates for ... [federal 
office] are voted for, all records and papers which come into his possession 
relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requi-
site to voting in such election. 
144. Part of HAVA § 301, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(5), addresses voting systems 
tabulations by specifying the permissible error rate and hence the accuracy rate required of 
voting systems used in federal elections: 
The error rate of the voting system in counting ballots (determined by taking into 
account only those errors which are attributable to the voting system and not 
attributable to an act of the voter) shall comply with the error rate standards 
established under section 3.2.1 of the voting systems standards issued by the 
Federal Election Commission which are in effect on October 29, 2002. 
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(Emphasis added.) Although compliance with the original FEC error rate was assessed dur-
ing laboratory compliance testing, that aspect was not codified as part of HAVA. Significant 
empirical evidence exists that the voting systems have amassed field error rates of 8-10 per-
cent of all ballots, not of only "ballot positions" or choices possible, outstripping the FEC 
error rate by a factor of over 10 times. Arguably, a voting system that cannot maintain a low 
error rate in actual elections is of far greater relevance to voting rights than is the rate in a 
lab certification test, and is of constitutional dimension. 
145. Observing the DOJ's nonenforcement of the standards is not to suggest that the 
HAVA standards are well designed or sufficiently specific to protect voting rights. See BROKEN 
BALLOTS, supra note 1, at 139-41. But they are statutory minimums and yet have still been 
neglected by the primary entity that HAVA charged with their enforcement. 
146. In one enforcement action relating to enforcement of the "notice" voting protec-
tions specified in 42 U.S.C. § 15481, the DOJ sued the New York State Board of Elections 
(SBOE) for not undertaking the required rapid transition to notice ore-voting; only periph-
eral motions resulted in judicial records as the case settled. See United States v. N.Y. State 
Bd. of Elections, 312 F. App'x 353; 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8099 (2d Cir. 2008) (denial of 
intervention affirmed); United States v. New York, No. 06-CV-0263, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27664 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2006) (denying reconsideration of denial to intervene). The New 
York SBOE contended that its first responsibility was to ensure that New Yorkers' state con-
stitutional rights to vote were realized. Second, the Board claimed that none of the avail-
able technology had been engineered to attain the levels of accuracy and security required 
by the New York Constitution for voting rights protection. The settlement required New 
York to move forward into purchasing and deploying electronic voting systems despite their 
deficiencies, but New York has established a more robust internal testing apparatus to iden-
tify flaws and require remediation before deployment. 
147. HAVA's auditability section, 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(2), provides: 
(2) Audit Capacity 
(A) In General-The voting system shall produce a record with an audit 
capacity for such system. 
(B) Manual Audit Capacity 
(i) The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record 
with a manual audit capacity for such system. 
(ii) The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity 
to change the ballot or correct any error before the permanent paper 
record is produced. 
(iii) The paper record produced under subparagraph (A) shall be 
available as an official record for any recount conducted with respect to 
any election in which the system is used. 
148. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963), and textual discussion. 
149. Id. 
150. 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) . 
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151. Id. "The right to vote can neither be denied outright, nor destroyed by alteration 
of ballots, nor diluted by ballot-box stuffing." Id. at 555 (citations omitted). The Court also 
quoted United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941): "Obviously included within the right 
to choose, secured by the Constitution, is the right of qualified voters within a state to cast 
their ballots and have them counted .... " 
152. Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 555 U.S. 5 (2008). 
153. 42U.S.C.§15511 (for enforcement of Title III,§§ 301, 302, and 303). 
154. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
155. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S 533 (1964) (holding the Alabama legislative plan for 
redistricting the legislature invalid under the Equal Protection Clause) . The Reynolds Court's 
language has been repeatedly quoted and provides the touchstone for many decisions adjudi-
cating burdens on voting rights: 
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and 
democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free 
and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, 
any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and 
meticulously scrutinized. Almost a century ago, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the 
Court referred to "the political franchise of voting" as "a fundamental political 
right, because preservative of all rights." 
Id. at 561-62 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
156. As Paul Schwartz has observed, "we have seen how the unequal distribution of vot-
ing technology in Florida correlated with disparities of race and wealth .... There has in fact 
been a long tradition in the United States of designing election systems to block access to 
the franchise by racial minorities and the poor." Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and 
Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625, 675-79 (2002) (explaining how political "lockups" of the 
politically powerful can be achieved and perpetuated via voting system designs that are not 
properly policed judicially). The perspicacity of this insight may be seen in current voting sys-
tems with design features that permit covert tampering (and software bugs) to negate voters' 
authentic selections and additionally that allow untraceable destruction of evidence by eras-
ing logging of the activity, or by configuring logs to not record activity, arguably violating 42 
U.S.C. § 1974. See also Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the judicial Oversight of 
Democracy, 96 Gw. L.J. 1411 (2008) (theorizing the political lockup model). 
157. See infra text accompanying notes 162-163. 
158. HAVA delegates enforcement power in 42 U.S.C. § 15511 for enforcement of Title III, 
§§ 301, 302, and 303, providing that the Attorney General 
may bring a civil action against any State or jurisdiction in an appropriate 
United States District Court for such declaratory and injunctive relief (including 
a temporary restraining order, a permanent or temporary injunction, or other 
order) as may be necessary to carry out the uniform and nondiscriminatory 
election technology and administration requirements under [Section 301 of 
HAVA.] 
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But DOJ also has more sweeping enforcement powers under the Voting Rights Act, the Civil 
Rights Acts (including Section 1983), and a broad array of election criminal statutes. Because 
computer-based voting systems are the mechanism by which votes are recorded, tabulated, 
and reported, DOJ must develop technical voting systems background in order to fulfill its 
duties under all its statutory delegations regarding voting rights protection. 
159. U.S. CoNsT. amend. 14, § 1. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the Ohio League complaint 
had properly stated a substantive due process claim related to voting system operation and 
governmental management. See League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463 , 
478 (6th Cir. 2008). 
160. This author, however, would not agree that DOJ is the only proper plaintiff to bring 
HAVA enforcement actions under 42 U.S.C. § 15511. All the HAVA provisions authorizing 
DOJ enforcement are grouped under Title III, with the descriptive name "Uniform and Non-
discriminatory Election Technology and Administration Requirements." See HAVA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 15481 (emphasis added). This language evinces a crucial congressional understanding that 
the choice of particular voting technologies and their technical specifications that relate to 
accuracy and auditability-whose reliable realization will in turn depend in part on secu-
rity design and implementation-are integral components of the right to vote. Additionally, 
enforcement of federal civil-rights statutes is rarely vested exclusively in government actors. 
DOJ's decade of nonenforcement of HAVA's provisions addressing technical accuracy and 
security specifications lends substantial support to the need for private-party enforcement, 
as per Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708 n.42 (1979) (authorizing an implied 
private remedy to enforce Title IX, as helping to overcome impediment of limited federal fis-
cal resources to full enforcement). See also Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of 
Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. REv. 113, 114-15 (2010) (arguing 
that the Court's doctrinal criteria for implying a private right of action do not account for 
the essential supervisory role of the federal courts in protecting franchise right and struc-
tural prerequisites of fair elections especially in pre-election litigation; criteria would defeat 
courts' roles in protecting public rights); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) (commending the private enforcement of public rights). 
161. 42 u.s.c. § 1974. 
162. DOJ's monitoring powers under the Voting Rights Act are described in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973f(d)(2) as extending to the power to "enter and attend at any place for tabulating the 
votes cast at any election held in such subdivision for the purpose of observing whether votes 
cast by persons entitled to vote are being properly tabulated." When software is used for tab-
ulation, the unaided human eye is insufficient to ascertain whether the machine is counting 
accurately. Thus, DOJ must develop an understanding of what methods are available that 
will allow it to monitor whether "votes cast ... are being properly tabulated." 
As only one example of the need, electronic records of the vote tallies are not consistently 
maintained in South Carolina with its questionable elections in 2010 (see the first two sec-
tions of this chapter) . Addressing the accountability lapse in the 2010 federal general elec-
tion, Frank Heindel commented: "We continue to see problems across SC counties regarding 
the inability to properly store and reproduce the electronic files that are required to be kept 
for 22 months . . .. An audit of electronic voting records by South Carolina election officials 
396 • Candice Hoke • 
did not include local files .... " Frank Heindel, Orangeburg County Fails to Keep Electronic Elec-
tion Files, http://www.scvotinginfo.com/wp/2011/08/16/ orangeburg-county-fails-to-keep-
electronic-election-files/ (posted Aug. 16, 2011). Heindel also noted that the "State Election 
Commission has admitted that Lancaster County failed to keep any of their November 2010 
election files for an audit." Frank Heindel, Lancaster County Failed to Record Any Electronic 
Election Files, http ://www.scvotinginfo.com/wp/2011/08/16/lancaster-county-failed-to-
record-any-electronic-election-files/ (posted Aug. 16, 2011). 
Abundant evidence of nationwide failure to maintain appropriate electronic records of 
election activities conducted withe-voting systems has been developed, but DO] has thus far 
not clarified the recordkeeping duties under§ 1974. 
163. DO]'s avoidance of voting systems legal issues may derive from Voting Section legal 
staff's lacking expertise in computer science and engineering, information systems secu-
rity, and scientific knowledge of deployed e-voting systems. Correction of these staffing and 
information gaps will likely be necessary in order for DO] to fulfill its HAVA-specified voting 
systems enforcement duties. While only a few election lawyers have developed technical vot-
ing systems expertise sufficient to support DO]'s legal monitoring and enforcement duties, 
talented scientists are available who are known for skillfully translating the technical and 
security points into concepts and points relevant for legal audiences. 
To swiftly repair the information gap, DO] could develop consultant and adviser relation-
ships with technical experts independent of the vendors. For instance, the widely regarded 
scientists serving (or who previously served) on the EAC's Technical Guidelines Development 
Committee (TGDC) and the scientists who conducted the California TTBR and Ohio EVER-
EST studies of voting systems offer concrete knowledge of each deployed voting system's suc-
cesses and deficiencies. 
Computer scientists who have served on the NIST-EAC-sponsored TGDC include Doug 
Jones, David Wagner, and Ron Rivest; they also publish and speak on voting systems issues. 
Scientist Barbara Simons, a former ACM President and research scientist at IBM, possesses 
expertise in both voting systems and statewide voter registration databases; as an EAC Board 
of Advisers member, she is also knowledgeable about EAC policy positions that have not been 
technically well grounded. David Jefferson's national security insight has informed his voting 
systems work previously as the chair of California's Technical Advisory Board (on election 
technologies) and his work with the Department of Defense on Internet voting issues. All of 
these preeminent voting system experts possess significant expertise in post-election auditing 
methods, the primary check available on whether the voting system has counted accurately. 
Supplying science and engineering expertise in assistive technologies, including for alter-
native (non-English) language needs, scientist and computer engineer Noel Runyan is sin-
gular in having amassed over 30 years in developing and testing assistive technologies of 
all types. Runyan's usability engineering expertise allows him to structure appropriate test 
contexts for determining whether a particular voting system's accessibility is merely asserted 
or fully realized, and for which types of disabilities. See Non H. RUNYAN, IMPROVING AccEss TO 
VoTING: A REPORT ON THE TECH NOLOGY FOR AccESSIBLE VoTING SYSTEMS (Voter Action and DEMOS 
2007); Noel Runyan & Jim Tobias, Accessibility Review Report for California Top-to-Bottom 
Voting Systems Review, http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/ttbr/accessibility-
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review-report-california-ttb-absolute-final-version16.pdf. Among Runyan's principles: "We 
must debunk the myth that we have to choose between accessible voting and verifiable vot-
ing. Democracy requires that we have both" (quoting Director Stanley J. Eichner of the Dis-
ability Law Center, Massachusetts) and those stated in Americans with Disabilities Call for 
Election Systems Featuring Both Accessibility and Security, available at http://www.voteraction 
.org/ resources (Mar. 19, 2007). 
All of these scientists have patiently and effectively educated many policymakers and law-
yers (including this author). 
164. For instance, until recently some states sought to protect against fraud by requiring 
notarization or witnessing of the voter 's signature on the required paperwork. For some over-
seas voters, these requirements posed an insurmountable barrier. State calendars for com-
pleting their administrative tasks generally did not include sufficient time for blank ballots to 
be mailed overseas and returned by mail within the specified period for counting the ballot. 
Recent federal legislation has barred some of these practices for overseas and military voters . 
165. Detailed in Pew Charitable Trusts, No Time to Vote : Challenges Facing America's 
Overseas Military Voters (Jan. 2009), PEw CENTER ON THE STATES, available at http ://www.pew 
centeronthestates.org/ uploadedFiles/ NTTV _Report_ Web.pdf [hereinafter Pew Study]. 
166. Id . 
167. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973ff-1973ff-7, as amended by Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE), 
Pub. L. No. 111-84, subtitle H, §§ 575-589, 123 Stat. 2190, 2318-35 (2009) (MOVE Act). 
168. Exec. Order No. 12,642, Designation of the Secretary of Defense as the Presidential Des-
ignee Under Title I of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (June 8, 1988). 
169. Remarks of FVAP Director Bob Carey, FVAP-NIST-EAC Workshop on UOCAVA Vot-
ing Systems, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 2010), slides posted at http://www.nist.gov/ itl/csd/ct/ 
uocava-2010-workshop-agenda.cfm. 
170. For purposes here, "Internet voting" encompasses the marking and transmission 
of voted ballots over the public Internet. Online ballot-marking devices as well as complete 
systems that include the transmission of voted ballots to the election office for tabulation 
constitute "Internet voting." 
171. See infra note 239. 
172. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1973ff-1973ff-7 (2002). 
173. Id. § 15301 et seq. 
174. The Defense Department agency charged with UOCAVA voter assistance, FVAP, 
has urged states to permit all-electronic, Internet-based elections, despite the convergence 
of opinion by NIST and the security community that it is not technically possible to provide 
secure elections over the public Internet. These points and the discussion of the controversy 
that has ensued are developed more fully in text infra at Federal Promotion of Problematic 
Internet Voting, beginning after note 163. 
175. This provision was revised in the 2004 NDAA and has arguably been superseded by 
the MOVE Act. See infra text accompanying notes 240-255. 
176. The Overseas Vote Foundation and the Pew Charitable Trusts conducted studies that 
influenced the MOVE Act's structure and provisions. See, e.g., Claire D. Smith, It's in the 
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Mail: Surveying UOCAVA Voters and Barriers to Overseas Voting (Overseas Vote Foundation 
Sept. 2009); Pew Study, supra note 165. More recently the Military Voters Protection Project 
has issued studies focused exclusively on military personnel and their families. See Eric Ever-
sole, Military Voting in 2010: A Step Forward, But a Long Way to Go, available at http:// mvp 
project.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/MVPProject_study_download.pdf. 
177. MOVE Act, amending UOCAVA, supra note 167. To redress narrow issues, UOCAVA 
was amended several times before enactment of the omnibus MOVE Act, but these changes 
are not material to the analysis here. 
178. See Pew Study, supra note 165. 
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1, as amended by the MOVE Act (2009) . 
180. Given that voting is a fundamental federal constitutional right, see, e.g., Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964), and that right entails a vote that is counted and tal-
lied as cast, see supra note 151, whether a jurisdiction is deploying a voting technology that 
functions adequately to assure that ballots are recorded, counted, and tallied as cast falls 
within the scope of federal constitutional voting rights concerns. Otherwise, the franchise 
right is theoretical but not actual and enforceable. As yet unresolved legal questions include 
whether Internet voting under present circumstances presents such significant opportunities· 
for fraudulent tampering, blocking, or interception that it cannot suffice constitutionally as 
a voting method, and whether voting systems that provide only circular methods of verifying 
whether machine counts are accurate can reach the constitutionally minimum level of per-
formance. The German Constitutional Court, for instance, declined to approve conducting 
national legislative elections on software-based voting systems that could not provide proof 
of the vote in ways an average person can understand without expert training. See Hoke, supra 
note 10, at note 157 (discussing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Mar. 3, 2009, BVerfGE 123, 39-88, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ 
rs20090303_2bvc000307en.html, an opinion that invalidated the e-voting equipment used 
in Bundestag elections and held that public transparency in vote-counting processes is con-
stitutionally required) . The court's press office released an English summary of the deci-
sion, see Press Release no. 19/2009, Use of Voting Computers in 2005 Bundestag Election 
Unconstitutional (Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/ 
pressemitteilungen/bvg09-019en.html (last visited May 14, 2012). 
181. See the appendix, providing a chart showing state laws on ballot secrecy UOCAVA 
voters versus domestic voters. Verified Voting provides a U.S. map that graphically reflects 
which states permit specific types of voted ballot transmissions over the Internet. http:// 
www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?list=type&type=27. 
182. See id. at text accompanying note 182 and appendix (ballot secrecy laws chang-
ing after FVAP lobbying) . The ABA House of Delegates has recommended several steps to 
improve security and functionality of these new technological systems. See Resolution 114 
(adopted unanimously, Aug. 9-10, 2010) (recommending studies and improved state and 
local defense in depth security practices for statewide voter registration databases), http :// 
www.americanbar.org/ content/ dam/ aba/ directories/policy I 2 01O_am_114. authcheckdam 
.pdf, and Resolution 121 (Aug. 8-9, 2011) (urging administrative steps for improved sound-
ness of voter registration systems) . 
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183. The Cuyahoga Election Review Panel observed that the federal primary is the most 
administratively complex of all the elections it must conduct. RoN ADRINE, ToM HAYES & CAN-
DICE HoKE, CUYAHOGA ELECTION REVIEW PANEL FINAL REPORT 5 (2006), http://urban.csuohio.edu/ 
cei/public_monitor/CERP_Final_Report_20060720.pdf. 
184. HAVA mandated the deployment of new federally funded voting technologies no 
later than the first federal election in 2006, according more than three years for technical 
development, marketing, and procurement, which was still substantially too little time for 
a radical shift in technologies . See supra text accompanying notes 84-86; see also Voting and 
Registration Technology Issues, supra note 9. 
185. I.e., UOCAVA, HAVA, and MOVE Act. 
186. Techniques can include the use of DDOS (distributed denial of service attacks) and 
botnets. 
187. Mobile phones commonly include monitoring software that reports on user con-
duct. This software could be "upgraded" to include reporting back to the vendor or service 
provider information about voting choices. For some examples of monitoring and unper-
mitted spying and data collecting in mobile phones, see Brad Spirrison, iPhone Apps Storing 
Contact Lists just the Latest Privacy Debacle in the Mobile Industry (Feb. 16, 2012), http:// 
www.appolicious.com/tech/ articles I 11090-i phone-a pp s-storing-contact-lists-just-the-latest-
privacy-debacle-in -the-mo bile-industry. 
188. See, e.g., Mark Baard, NSF Preps New, Improved Internet, WIRED (Aug. 28, 2005) 
(reviewing GEN!, the National Science Foundation's "major initiative that could lead to a 
completely new internet architecture, with built-in security measures and support for ubiq-
uitous sensors and wireless communications devices"), http://www.wired.com/science/ 
discoveries/news/2005/08/68667; see also About GENI, http://www.geni.net/?page_id=2. 
189. "Mission critical" describes equipment and procedures that are essential to the suc-
cessful functioning of the core operations of an organization. If a mission-critical piece of 
equipment fails, the business operations will fail. 
190. Computer and network security constitute a subdivision of the information security 
field. Its objectives are defensive as well as facilitative-Le., fostering users' ability to access 
and produce the information as desired. Computer and network security experts are trained 
in methods of protecting information from electronic theft, from unauthorized electronic 
modification, from "corruption" (errors that will affect transmission, retrieval, or process-
ing, or that subject the original data to changes), and from natural disasters . Their focus 
includes the technical equipment or hardware, the software on which the information is cre-
ated and managed, and security policies and practices. Expertise in computer security assists 
in protecting the information from software bugs, from external and remote threats over 
networks that include malware (e.g., viruses, worms, and botnets), and from "insiders" who 
might have become disloyal to the organization. See generally MATT BISHOP, COMPUTER SECURITY: 
ART & SCIENCE (2002). 
191. See, e.g., Colorado legislative hearing, FVAP's representative Paddy McGuire (Feb. 
2011) (recording in author's possession); DoD Awards Grants for State & Local Military! 
Overseas Voting Systems (Mar. 7, 2012) (announcing EASE grant funding awards), http://www 
.fvap.gov/resources/media/nr8-2012.pdf. 
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192. See generally David Jefferson & Candice Hoke, The Dangers of Online and Onscreen 
Ballot Marking (2012) (draft on file with author). 
193. This author flagged the ambiguity and its damaging impact for FVAP's Director and 
its staff, but two years later the equivocation and failure to prominently and consistently 
warn of security dangers for voted ballots continue. 
194. While election officials and policymakers are not conversant with or expert in net-
work and computer security, they have had successful experiences personally and profession-
ally with computer and Internet-based commercial sales and services. They will not necessarily 
recognize and will probably dispute the magnitude and gravity of these Internet-based election 
risks. Even when officials identify some of the new risks, particularly those posed by exposure 
of their election servers to the Internet, they may lack the budgets, technical expertise, and 
security infrastructural support that are essential for ensuring electoral integrity. 
195. In a telephone interview with the author, FVAP's Principal Deputy Director Scott 
Wiedmann stated that it was not FVAP's responsibility to be concerned with the negative 
impact on a state's domestic voters or its election system as a whole. He said the agency's 
position is that UOCAVA and the MOVE Act charge FVAP only with improving voting partici-
pation rates of UOCAVA voters alone (Oct. 7, 2010). 
196. Several factors reduce the likelihood of states' creating and maintaining the security 
infrastructures needed for MOVE Act and FVAP pilots that include returning voted ballots 
over the Internet. These factors include: 
Significant state and local budgetary deficits and reductions in personnel, with few 
exceptions throughout most of the nation; 
A diversity of local electoral administrative structures, personnel, and funding 
sources, some of which are much less well resourced than others; 
Smaller jurisdictions' increased use of outsourced technical support, without the 
capability of internal technical quality control and assurance; 
Lack of cyber security knowledge in the American population as a whole (presum-
ably including election officials as well), as documented in other federal reports; 
The lack of technical and security expertise within much of the local election official 
(LEO) community and sometimes in the Secretary of State staffing; 
The rapid timetables for implementation of the MOVE Act and HAVA, leading to 
incomplete security infrastructure and network testing; and 
Numerous federal agencies' and departments' continued failure to meet information 
security standards, as documented by the GAO. 
Given these factors and the complex security issues that Internet transmission of blank bal-
lots presents, it is crucial that federal and state policymakers not simply assume that the 
essentials are present and then hold election officials accountable for conditions beyond their 
capacity. See Candice Hoke & Matt Bishop, Essential Research Needed to Support UOCAVA-
MOVE Act Implementation at the State and Local Levels, one version published in the NIST-
FVAP-EAC Workshop on UOCAVA Remote Voting Systems, http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ct/ 
uocava_workshop_aug2010.cfm; updated version posted on the Social Science Research Net-
work at http: //papers.ssrn.com/ sol3 / papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697848 (citations omitted). 
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197. See, e.g., FVAP/ DoD, Expanding the Use of Electronic Voting Technology for UOCAVA 
Citizens (2007), http://www.fvap.gov/ resources/ media/ivas2007.pdf; FVAP/ DoD, Voting 
Over the Internet Pilot Project Assessment Report (June 2001), http: //www.fvap.gov/ resources/ 
media/ voi.pdf. 
198. For instance, the 2010 legislative initiatives document states, "FVAP recommends 
the expanded use of email and online transmission for all election materials throughout the entire 
absentee voting process, thereby supplementing fax and postal mail where possible" (empha-
sis added). http: //www.fvap.gov/reference/ laws/ state-initiatives.html (last visited Sept. 12, 
2011). The May 2011 FVAP plan for implementing the MOVE Act repeats this commitment: 
"FVAP also proposes the expanded use of email and online transmission for all election 
materials throughout the entire UOCAVA absentee voting process, replacing fax and postal 
mail where possible." Report on the Status and Implementation of Military and Overseas 
Voter Empowerment Act Programs, transmitted by the Under Secretary of Defense for Person-
nel and Readiness, at 19 (Mar. 2011), http://www.fvap.gov/reference/reports.html. 
199. One example is Democracy Live's (DemLive's) technology, which FVAP is funding 
for deployment in multiple locations. In November 2011, DemLive marketing representatives 
confided to local election officials that their goal is to place "Internet voting in all the states." 
DemLive revealed their strategy: "[We] have to sneak up on it, step-by-incremental-step, to 
bring the public on board .... [We have all these Internet voting-ready] features that can 
be turned on one-by-one. First UOCAVA, then disabled voters, then all absentee voters, then 
eventually everyone else will be clamoring for what the others already have." [Anonymous elec-
tion official], Notes of DemLive marketing presentation, November 2011 (on file with author). 
200. The "digital divide" data suggest that access to the Internet is skewed in favor of the 
more affluent and Caucasian rather than being equally available to all demographic subsets. 
See generally Lee Rainie, Internet, Broadband, and Cell Phone Statistics (Jan. 2010), http: // 
www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Internet-broadband-and-cell-phone-statistics/Report 
.aspx. 
201. See http: //www.americanidolphonenumber.com/#. 
202. See Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Internet Voting in Union Elections , https ://freedom-to-tinker 
.com/ blog/ joehall/internet-voting-union-elections, explaining the ACCURATE research cen-
ter's response to the U.S. Department of Labor's request for public comment on using the 
Internet for union elections: 
ACCURATE submitted a comment, http: //accurate-voting.org/ docs/ comments/ 
accurate-olms-comment-mar2011 .pdf. The essential points we make are pretty 
straightforward: 1) don't allow internet voting from unsupervised, uncontrolled 
computing devices for any election that requires high integrity; and, 2) only 
elections that use voter-verified paper records (WPRs) subject to an audit pro-
cess that uses those records to audit the reported election outcome can avoid the 
various types of threats that DOL is concerned with. The idea is simple: WPRs 
are independent of the software and hardware of the voting system, so it doesn't 
matter how bad those aspects are as long as there is a robust parallel process that 
can check the result. Of course, WPRs are no panacea: they must be carefully 
stored, secured and transported and ACCURATE's HCI researchers have shown 
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that it's very hard to get voters to consistently check them for accuracy. How-
ever, those problems are much more tractable than, say, removing all the mal-
ware and spyware from hundreds of thousands of voter PCs and mobile devices. 
203. Some credit unions also use telephonic voting methods. See CUBALLOT.COM, https:// 
www.cuballot.com/telephonevoting.html. 
204. See, e.g., the Constitution's Preamble and the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, 
§ 4. 
205. The Court's citations include Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1877); United States v. 
Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963); and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964). 
206. HAVA has codified an exceptionally low error rate for voting systems used in federal 
elections that would include Internet systems. 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(5). It incorporates by 
reference the FEC's 2002 standard. In BROKEN BALLOTS, supra note 1, at 135-41, the authors 
critique this standard. Arguably, a voting system's "error rate" reflects malfunctions of all 
kinds, from all causes, including system failure to accurately record the voter's choices, and 
failure to accurately tabulate and report race results, whether caused by hardware fault, soft-
ware bug, or configuration error, and many other sources. 
207. This list of legally mandated voting system properties is not exhaustive but focuses 
on four central, widely required capabilities. The federal Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 
provide content to these four and other recommended properties or attributes. See http:// 
www.eac.gov/testing_and_certification/voluntary_voting_system_guidelines.aspx. 
208. David Jefferson, correspondence with author, May 20, 2012. Jefferson stressed that 
while both web portal and e-mailed voted ballots lack privacy protections, e-mailed ballots 
are considerably worse. While encrypted web portal ballots are vulnerable to spying primar-
ily at the outset and recipient election office locations rather than at every transmission 
point, e-mailed ballots offer a multitude of opportunities for spying, data collection of vot-
ers' choices, and possibly tampering with those choices. "E-mail voting is decrypted and re-
encrypted at each forwarding hop and at the final server at the receiver's ISP. Privacy can be 
violated at several points along the way between the voter and election office .... With web 
portal voting, privacy can only be violated at the end points of the communication." Id.; see 
also David Jefferson, If I Can Shop and Bank Online, Why Can't I Vote Online?, http://verified-
voting.org/downloads/votingtransactions/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2012); Candice Hoke, Inter-
net Voting: Structural Governance Principles for Election Cyber Security in Democratic Nations, 
Internet Voting: Formulating Structural Governance Principles for Elections Cybersecurity, 
proceedings of ISGIG 2009: Second International Symposium on Global Information Gover-
nance, September 15-17, 2009, Prague, Czech Republic; published in ACM Library, http:// 
dl.acm.org/ citation.cfm ?id =1920329. 
209. David Jefferson, correspondence with author, May 20, 2012. 
210. Professor Alex Halderman led his graduate students in attacking the District of 
Columbia's Internet voting system, planned for launch with real votes in the November 2010 
general election barely three weeks hence. To their credit the D.C. Board of Elections and 
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Ethics planned a public test. The team's remote attack resulted in their substitution of science 
fiction write-in candidates on 100% of the ballots. Media coverage includes: slashdot, In The-
ory and Practice, Why Internet-Based Voting Is a Bad Idea (Mar. 2, 2012) (hereinafter Bad Idea), 
http: I / politics. slashdot.org/ story I 12103 / 02119402 3 61 in-theory-and-practice-why-internet-
based-voting-is-a-bad-idea; Jaikumar Vijayan, Internet Voting Systems Too Insecure, Researcher 
Warns (Mar. 1, 2012), http:/ / www.computerworld.com/ s/ article/ 9224799/Internet_ 
voting_systems_too_insecure_researcher_warns?taxonomyid=l 7 &pageNumber=2; Alex Altman, 
Will Online Voting Turn Into an Election Day Debacle?, TIME, Oct. 15, 2010, http: //www.time 
.com/ time/ printout/0,8816,2025696,00.html; see also Editorial: Flaws in D.C. 's Online Vot-
ing System Should Serve As a Warning to All States (Oct. 18, 2010) , available at http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/ content/ article/ 2010/ 10/ 18/ AR2010101804529.html (last vis-
ited April 30, 2012). The team's academic article discussing their attack can be found at Scott 
Wolchak, et al., Attacking the Washington, D.C. Internet Voting System, Proc. 16th Conference 
on Financial Cryptography & Data Security (Feb. 2012), https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ 
dcvoting-fc12.pdf. Halderman says the exercise was meant to educate election officials about 
the dangers of online voting. "The question is not whether these systems can be broken into," 
he says. "It's whether anyone wants to." See Altman, supra. For a discussion of issues directed 
to the legal audience, see Jeremy Epstein, Internet Voting, Security, Privacy, 19 WM. & MARY BILL 
Rrs J. 885 (2011) (explaining the technical problems and their dangerous impact for voting 
rights and election integrity). 
211. These attacks have sought to achieve intellectual property theft, industrial espionage, 
vandalism, and governmental embarrassment, among other objectives. 
212. Ronald L. Rivest, Thoughts on UOCAVA Voting, Presentation at Workshop on 
UOCAVA Remote Voting Systems (Aug. 6, 2010), slides available at http://csrc.nist.gov/ 
groups/ ST/ UOCAVA/2010/ Presentations / RIVEST_2010-08-05 -uocava.pdf. As David Jeffer-
son has noted, "Even if a jurisdiction has appropriate security expertise and vigilant network 
supervision, it is still at risk for all [the dangerous] consequences. [Computer science does] 
not know how to eliminate these risks .. .. [A] jurisdiction that exposes its voting infrastruc-
ture to the Internet has essentially no chance of successfully defending against a competent 
determined attack." Jefferson, message to author, Oct. 17, 2010 (on file with the author). 
213 . David Jefferson, If I Can Shop and Bank Online, Why Can't I Vote Online?, http:// 
electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/jefferson-onlinevoting.pdf (last visited May 12, 
2012). 
214. "The Zeus malware has been a significant issue for banks. It is capable of intercepting 
login credentials in real-time on an infected computer and carrying out immediate transac-
tions. Zeus is also frequently undetected by antivirus software." Jeremy Kirk, Researchers See 
Updated Zeus Malware, http: / / www.computerworld.com/ s/ article/ 9 219489 / Researchers_ 
see_updated_Zeus_malware ?source=CTWNLE_nlt_security _2011-08-2 5 &utm_source= 
feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+computerworld%2Fs%2Ffeed%2F 
topic%2F85+%28Computerworld+Malware+and+Vulnerabilities+News%29. "After sneaking 
onto a PC via an exploit, the Zeus bot watches for, then silently captures log-in credentials for 
a large number of online banks, as well as usernames and passwords for Schwab accounts . The 
attack code also injects a bogus form that asks victims to provide additional information the 
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thieves can later use to confirm that they are the legitimate owner of the Schwab investment 
account. On that form are fields asking for the user's mother's maiden name, driver license 
number and employer. " Gregg Keizer, Zeus Botnet Gang Targets Charles Schwab Accounts; Attacks 
Vulnerable PCs to Steal Full Access to Investments, Cash (Oct. 16, 2010), http: / /www.computer 
world.com/ s/ article/ 91914 79 I Zeus_botnet_gang_targets_ Charles_Schwab_accounts. 
215 . As has been set forth by several preeminent academic cyber security experts (MIT's 
Ron Rivest and UC Berkeley's David Wagner), NIST scientists, and the SERVE Report scien-
tists (2004) , returning voted ballots over the insecure public Internet severely jeopardizes the 
security of our nation. They all have identified the transmission of voted ballots over the public 
Internet as presenting an unusually attractive and achievable target for numerous adversar-
ies, foreign and domestic. The slides from these scientists' talks delivered at the NIST-EAC-
FVAP workshop on UOCAVA Solutions present their risk assessments and recommendations 
to avoid Internet voting. See http: //www.nist.gov/ itl/csd/ ct/uocava-2010-workshop-agenda. 
cfm (Aug. 2010). See also NISTIR, A Threat Analysis of UOCAVA Voting Systems; NISTIR 7682, 
Information System Security Best Practices for UOCAVA-Supporting Systems (Apr. 2010); NISTIR 
7770, Security Considerations for Remote Electronic UOCAVA Voting. 
216. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'! Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011): "A lawyer 
sending or receiving substantive communications with a client via e-mail or other electronic 
means ordinarily must warn the client about the risk of sending or receiving electronic com-
munications using a computer or other device, or e-mail account, where there is a significant 
risk that a third party may gain access." 
217. As computer security expert Bruce Schneier has commented: 
Different [encryption] algorithms offer different degrees of security; it depends 
on how hard they are to break. If the cost required to break algorithms is greater 
than the value of the encrypted data, then you're probably safe. If the time 
required to break an algorithm is longer than the time the encrypted data must 
remain secret, then you're probably safe. If the amount of data encrypted with a 
single key is less than the amount of data necessary to break the algorithm, then 
you're probably safe. 
I say "probably", because there is always a chance of new breakthroughs in 
cryptanalysis. 
BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLI ED CRYPTOGRAPHY 8 (2d ed. 1996). 
218. Computer scientists and voting system specialists Barbara Simons and Doug Jones 
have written: 
Some systems, such as Helios and Remotegrity provide cryptographic tools to 
allow the voter to verify that an accurate version of her ballot has been received 
and counted. Encryption does not protect against Denial of Service attacks, 
spoofing, coercion, design flaws , and many kinds of ordinary software bugs. 
If a serious problem is uncovered in an election, there is no way to conduct a 
recount. While these systems have been used for some small elections, the gen-
eral consensus is that they are not ready for use in a major election. 
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They quote cryptographer Ben Adida, the creator of Helios, who underscored the security 
limitations of electronic voting: 
We now have documented evidence . .. that viruses like Stuxnet that corrupt 
nuclear power plants by spreading from one Windows machine to the other 
have been built. And so if you run a very large scale election for a president of a 
GS country, why wouldn't we see a similar scenario? Certainly, it's worth just as 
much money; it's worth just as much strategically . . .. All the verifiability doesn't 
change the fact that a client side corruption in my browser can flip my vote even 
before it's encrypted, and if we . .. must have a lot of voters verify their process, I 
think we're going to lose, because most voters don't quite do that yet. 
BROKEN BALLOTS, supra note 1, at 278-79 (citations omitted) . Nonetheless, Internet voting 
vendors continue to claim their products achieve security and privacy. See, e.g., Scytl Press 
Release, Scytl Unveils Secure Online Voting on Google Android and Apple iOS Devices, avail-
able at http: //www.marketwatch.com/story/ scytl-unveils-secure-online-voting-on-google-
android-and-apple-ios-devices-2012-0 5-14. 
219. Encryption, or cryptosystems, over time are subject to mathematical discoveries 
that can permit their penetration. For instance, the U.S. Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
was officially adopted in 1976. A message encrypted using DES was first broken in public in 
1997. See https: //en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Data_Encryption_Standard. DES was finally with-
drawn as an encryption standard for government use in 2005. See Notices, 70 Fed. Reg. 
28,907 (May 19, 2005), available at http ://csrc.nist.gov/ publications/fips/05-9945-DES-
Withdrawl.pdf. 
220. For instance, a May 2009 Hawai'i Internet election for a neighborhood race pro-
duced sharply lower turnout rates than the prior election, but no independent investiga-
tion was undertaken to determine whether voted ballots had not been delivered. The vendor 
simply pronounced it a "historic success," and the jurisdiction saved money over conven-
tional elections. A town official commented that voters did not "bother" to vote, without 
understanding that voters may have cast ballots that were not received and counted. Vot-
ing Drops 83 Percent in All-Digital Election; People Could Vote Online, on Phone for Neighbor-
hood Board, http://www.kitv.com/politics/19573770/detail.html#ixzz1YLb4NcnQ. The 
vendor whom the town paid to conduct the election produced an effusive press announce-
ment claiming that the election was a "historic success." See Historic Success to Be Repeated 
with All-Digital Election by Everyone Counts; Honolulu Again Chooses Everyone Counts to Pro-
vide Universal Access Elections, http: //www.everyonecounts .com/ news/ press-releases/ 72-
historic-success-to-be-repeated-with-all-digital-election-by-everyone-counts ("The City and 
County of Honolulu have selected Everyone Counts, Inc.-a world leader in transparent, 
secure, and accessible elections for all voters-to deliver Internet and telephone voting for the 
2011 Neighborhood Board Elections. This year's election will build upon 2009's success and 
historical landmark, as it became the nation's first all-digital election.") . 
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff-1(a)(6)-(7). 
222. Professor Ron Rivest has stated: 
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At some point in the far distant future-perhaps by mid-century-the see-saw 
battle between attack and defense for computer and internet security will have 
settled down with a total victory for the defenders. But I'm not particularly opti-
mistic about this. If that should happen, then perhaps we'll have some sort of 
voting method where you can vote in an auditable and uncoercable manner ... 
with communications secured by unbreakable cryptography, in a manner where 
your vote is necessarily private and visible only to you. [But such a vision] would 
require decades of progress on many fronts to realize. 
Remarks on the Future of Election Integrity, MIT: Election Integrity: Past, Present, and Future 
workshop (Oct. 1, 2011). 
223. The MOVE Act specified remedial activities by the Military Postal Service Agency 
(MPSA), including a requirement to postmark the absentee ballot on the day it is collected 
and to provide expedited mail delivery. The MPSA Report to Congress on the 2010 service 
to UOCAVA voters revealed that the MPSA is able to deliver voted ballots from the troops 
back to county election headquarters averaging only 5.2 days, with "92% of absentee ballots 
reach[ing] election offices within 7 days." FVAP has posted the report at http: //www.fvap 
.gov/resources/ media/2010_MPSA_after_action_report.pdf. 
224. See http: //www.overseasvote.org. 
225. Former FVAP Deputy Director Scott Wiedmann reported that DoD is updating and 
revising the Directives governing FVAP activities as this chapter goes to press. Others have 
argued the FVAP has historically neglected its voter registration duties under the National 
Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-1 et seq. See Military Voter Protection Project, Mili-
tary Voting in 2010. The Project's Executive Director, Eric Eversole, also recommends that 
FVAP focus on augmenting military service members' absentee ballot requests, noting that 
only 15.8 percent of military voters requested an absentee ballot in 2010. 
226. See appendix (chart of ballot-secrecy laws). 
227. National Defense Authorization Act of 2002 , Pub. L. No. 107-107, 115 Stat. 1277 
(2001). 
228 . Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE). See http: //www 
.servesecurityreport.org. 
229. See http://servesecurityreport.org/. 
230. Id. Executive Summary conclusion h. 
231. Directive 1000.04 provides in pertinent part: 
4.3. Every eligible voter shall: 
4.3.1 . Be given, unless military necessity precludes it, an opportunity to 
register and vote in any election for which he or she is eligible. 
4.3.2. Be able to vote in person or by absentee process when local condi-
tions allow the voter to participate in the electoral process. 
4.3.3. Receive voting assistance in a manner that safeguards the integrity of the 
electoral process and secrecy of the ballot. 
4.4. All persons assisting in the voting process shall take all necessary steps to prevent 
fraud and to protect voters against any coercion .. .. 
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(Emphasis added.) Available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/ directives/ corres/pdf/100004p.pdf 
(last visited April 30, 2012). 
232 . FVAP employees have confidentially acknowledged to this author that the FVAP is 
seeking changes in DoD Directive 1000.04 that would eliminate the requirement for DoD 
staff to protect ballot secrecy. Given that FVAP has been lobbying state governments for 
many years for no ballot secrecy requirement, despite its violation of Directive 1000.04, and 
has achieved this outcome for UOCAVA voters in over three-fifths of the states, the FVAP's 
formal request for the Directive's elimination is not surprising. FVAP's record manifests little 
understanding and respect for fundamental election law principles, such as ballot secrecy's 
role in protecting systemic electoral integrity. 
233. Computer Technologists' Statement on Internet Voting (Sept. 11, 2008), http:// 
www.voteraction.org/files/Computer%20Scientist%20Internet%20Voting%20Statement 
.pdf. 
234. FVAP, Report on the Status and Implementation of Military and Overseas Voter 
Empowerment Act Programs, transmitted by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 
and Readiness, at 19 (Mar. 2011), http ://www.fvap.gov/ reference/ reports.html (emphasis 
added). 
235. E.g., in FVAP's legislative initiatives on which it seeks state action, the 2010 version 
comments: 
Given that the MOVE Act requires States send ballots to voters at least 45 days 
before the election and to send them electronically as well as by postal mail, 
FVAP recommends the expanded use of email and online transmission for all election 
materials throughout the entire absentee voting process, thereby supplementing fax 
and postal mail where possible. 
http: //www.fvap.gov/reference/ laws/state-initiatives.html (last visited Sept 12, 2011) 
(emphasis added). This policy statement recommends the permissibility of conducting all 
election tasks over the Internet as a "supplement" rather than as a "replacement" for postal 
and fax transmissions. This revision continues to violate Directive 1000.04. See also FVAP, 
Voting Over the Internet Pilot Project Assessment Report (June 2001), which often has a cheer-
leading tone but occasionally includes remarks about security and election integrity. For 
instance, at 10: 
[t]he biggest question regarding the use of the Internet for registration and voting is 
whether the integrity of the electoral process can be preserved. There are a number of 
elements to be considered relative to whether this technology can provide sufficient 
security, secrecy, and transparency of the process to be relied upon for the exercise 
of this most fundamental of Constitutional rights. Another major concern is the 
potential for election fraud when using the Internet [emphasis added]. 
236. See the appendix for an inventory of state ballot-secrecy laws. 
237. See, e.g., presentations by Professors Ron Rivest, David Wagner, and David Jeffer-
son at the FVAP-NIST-EAC Workshop on UOCAVA Voting Systems, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 
2010), slides posted at http: //www.nist.gov/ itl/csd/ ct/uocava-2010-workshop-agenda.cfm. 
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238. FVAP Grants webpage with link to solicitation, http://www.fvap.gov/leo/grants 
.html. 
239. When compared to other parts of the DoD budget, $20 million may not seem mam-
moth. But these FVAP monies are virtually the only governmental source of research and 
development funds currently and prospectively available for developing new election tech-
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